← Rhea Lendreviewed 2026-11-02 · 10 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Rhea Lend against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
1 claimThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits
“The vulnerability was identified by Halborn and covered by The Block in a post-mortem analysis.”
reviewerThe vulnerability was identified by HalbornHalborn published an explainer. Neither source says Halborn identified the flaw, and The Block covered Rhea's post-mortem, not Halborn's. The proposed wording is the smallest change the sources support.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The vulnerability was analyzed by Halborn and covered by The Block in a post-mortem analysis.
unverifiable
4 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits
“**BlockSec** (April 2, 2025): Audited the Burrow Margin Trading module specifically.”
reviewerBlockSec audited the Burrow Margin Trading module on April 2, 2025The fetched audits page does not list this audit. The page's later claim that the exploited code passed it is therefore unsupported. - #8[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Risk Assessment
“with the vulnerable code having passed a BlockSec audit of the Margin Trading module in April 2025”
reviewerThe exploited code passed a BlockSec audit in April 2025The page itself hedges elsewhere that the audited version may predate the exploited code, which contradicts this definite statement. No source says the vulnerable code was audited. - #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Ref Finance and Burrow Finance announce merger to form Rhea Finance on NEAR Protocol”
reviewerRef Finance and Burrow Finance announced the merger in February 2025Timeline[0] dates it 2025-02 while the background section and timeline[2] say the merger was announced in March 2025. The two entries are internally inconsistent, and I did not find a source for February. Not verified against a primary announcement. - #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Background
“As of Q2 2026, Rhea Finance's total value locked (TVL) stands at approximately $120.96 million”
reviewerRhea Finance TVL is about $120.96M and RHEA market cap about $2.02MDefiLlama is a dynamic page and I did not fetch it. The figure is a point-in-time snapshot and is stale at 2026-11. The page also says TVL dropped post-exploit, which sits oddly with a 120.96M figure.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits
“$3.291 million USDT frozen by Tether (Paolo Ardoino confirmed this publicly)”
reviewerTether froze $3.291M USDT, Ardoino confirmed publiclySources differ on the frozen total (3.29M vs about 4.34M, the latter likely including the Near Intents freeze). The page's split into 3.291M plus 1.053M is consistent with that. - #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits
“Total recovered or frozen: approximately $9–13 million. Unaccounted shortfall: approximately $5.4–9.4 million depending on the recovery figure used.”
reviewerTotal recovered or frozen about $9-13M; shortfall $5.4-9.4MThe Block's $11.2M and $5.6M fall inside the page's ranges. The ranges are wide and rest partly on unverified community figures (Zcash, AAVE). A RootData summary mentions only about $400K left to compensate, which I could not confirm from a primary source.
confirmed
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security & Audits
“Initial estimates placed losses at $7.6 million; the figure was revised to $18.4 million in the official post-mortem.”
reviewerOn April 16, 2026 an attacker drained about $18.4 million; initial estimate $7.6M revised to $18.4M in the post-mortemConfirmed by The Block. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security & Audits
“The attacker spent at least two days (April 13–15) preparing infrastructure: creating a primary wallet, 423 intermediary wallets, fake ERC-20-style token contracts, and eight trading pools on Ref Finance with manipulated price ratios.”
reviewerAttacker prepared April 13-15 with 423 intermediary wallets and eight poolsSupported by Coin Edition, which relays the post-mortem. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Risk Assessment
“The Halborn post-mortem noted the protocol's oracle relied on recent data without historical context”
reviewerHalborn post-mortem noted the oracle relied on recent data without historical contextSupported, though Halborn's piece is an explainer rather than a post-mortem.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.