← Ravencoin (RVN)reviewed 2026-10-16 · 20 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Ravencoin (RVN) against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
4 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #4[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Three-Day Reorganization Risk and Chain Split
“Ravencoin's official notice stated that 'transactions confirmed after block 4,487,775 should be treated as potentially reversible' and urged users to 'avoid relying on recent confirmations until the network stabilizes.'”
reviewerRavencoin's official notice stated that transactions confirmed after block 4,487,775 should be treated as potentially reversible, and urged users to avoid relying on recent confirmations until the network stabilizes.The page presents this as a direct quote from the official X notice, but no secondary source reproduces this exact wording, and the primary source (X) could not be accessed to confirm. The underlying sentiment is corroborated elsewhere, but the specific quoted phrasing is unverified. - #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Emergency Patch and Governance Failure
“Ravencoin maintainer Hans Schmidt is reported to have recommended using the 2Miners code as an interim fix for the mining validation problem, while noting that a separate asset transfer quantity overflow bug had not yet been addressed in the same release.”
reviewerRavencoin maintainer Hans Schmidt recommended using the 2Miners code as an interim fix, while noting a separate asset transfer quantity overflow bug remained unaddressed.Neither cited source names 'Hans Schmidt,' and a direct web search for this name in connection with Ravencoin returned no corroborating results at all. The existence of an asset transfer overflow bug is independently confirmed elsewhere (GitHub release notes for v4.7.0/v4.8.0), but the specific attribution of a recommendation to a named individual, 'Hans Schmidt,' could not be verified or refuted by any source. - #15[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Ravencoin enforces inflation exploit patch at block 1,304,352, closing the 2020 supply inflation vulnerability.”
reviewerA patch for the 2020 inflation exploit was enforced specifically at block 1,304,352 on July 4, 2020.The specific block height (1,304,352) and date (July 4, 2020) could not be found in the cited source or in any independent source consulted. This is a precise, checkable figure that appears unsupported by the citation given. - #19[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: The KAWPOW Consensus Vulnerability
“Multiple parties are alleged to have produced invalid blocks following the initial demonstration of the flaw.”
reviewerMultiple parties are alleged to have produced invalid blocks following the initial demonstration of the flaw.Appropriately hedged with 'alleged,' but no source consulted specifically corroborates more than one actor; could not confirm or refute further.
link rot
1 claimA cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.
- #20[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://medium.com/@cryproscope/the-anatomy-of-ravencoin-exploit-finding-8fa4fe7547a9”
reviewerCitation to a Medium article by CryptoScope ('The anatomy of Ravencoin exploit finding') as a source for 2020 exploit discovery details.Both an independent fetch and the page's own recorded archive metadata indicate this source cannot currently be verified or retrieved. The underlying claim it supports (CryptoScope credited with discovery) is otherwise corroborated via CryptoPotato, so removing this dead citation does not undermine the claim.
partially supported
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Exchange Suspensions and Market Impact
“Upbit and Bithumb placed RVN on watchlists, raising the risk of delisting from crucial Korean liquidity markets.”
reviewerUpbit and Bithumb placed RVN on watchlists, raising delisting risk.The claim itself checks out against an independent outlet, but none of the three sources actually cited for this section mention Bithumb or watchlisting at all — the citation does not support the specific sentence it's attached to. - #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: History of Consensus and Supply Failures
“The August 2026 incident is reported to be the third known consensus or supply integrity failure in Ravencoin's history.”
reviewerThe August 2026 incident is the third known consensus or supply integrity failure in Ravencoin's history (prior: 2019 Raptoreum-found bugs, 2020 inflation exploit).The page's own cited source for this section discusses a 2018 double-spend incident that the page omits entirely, while still citing a 'third failure' framing whose count is ambiguous without it. The page should either name all prior incidents it is counting or clarify which three it means. - #12[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“The incident — the network's third known consensus or supply failure — triggered an approximately 19-20% price crash, exchange-wide suspension of RVN transfers, and raised acute governance concerns about the project's effectively inactive development team.”
reviewerThe August 2026 incident is Ravencoin's third known consensus/supply failure (summary statement).Same underlying gap as the History section finding; grouped under the same defect_group.
confirmed
12 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The KAWPOW Consensus Vulnerability
“The first confirmed invalid block appeared at height 4,487,776 at 15:44:01 UTC on August 7, 2026.”
reviewerKAWPOW mainnet exploit began at block height 4,487,776 at 15:44:01 UTC on August 7, 2026, via an unchecked nHeight field that let attackers skip the memory-intensive PoW check.Mechanism and timestamp independently corroborated across multiple outlets. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The KAWPOW Consensus Vulnerability
“Analysis of a 2,089-block sample range (heights 4,489,527 to 4,491,615) identified 96 malicious blocks, indicating systematic and sustained exploitation rather than isolated incidents.”
reviewerA 2,089-block sample (heights 4,489,527–4,491,615) contained 96 malicious blocks.Figures match multiple secondary reports of 2Miners' own sampling analysis. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Three-Day Reorganization Risk and Chain Split
“Two major mining pools, 2Miners and RavenMiner, which together control a majority of Ravencoin's hashrate, announced they would begin mining an alternative chain excluding all blocks from height 4,487,776 onward, treating block 4,487,775 as the last valid checkpoint.”
reviewer2Miners and RavenMiner, a hashrate majority, began mining an alternative chain from block 4,487,775 and declined the core team's request for a shallower recovery point.Corroborated by two independent outlets. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Exchange Suspensions and Market Impact
“Confirmed suspensions include Upbit (South Korea), which froze RVN deposit and withdrawal services and flagged RVN pairs across KRW, BTC, and USDT trading pairs; Bitget, which halted transfers as a precautionary measure; and Bitvavo (Netherlands), which implemented a similar freeze.”
reviewerUpbit froze RVN deposits/withdrawals and flagged RVN pairs across KRW/BTC/USDT; Bitget halted transfers as a precaution; Bitvavo implemented a similar freeze.No single cited source names all three exchanges together, but each is independently corroborated across the citation set. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Exchange Suspensions and Market Impact
“RVN's market price fell approximately 18-20% within 24 hours of the public disclosure on August 10-11, 2026, declining from approximately $0.0055 to around $0.00287-$0.00292.”
reviewerRVN fell ~18-20% in 24 hours (Aug 10-11, 2026) from ~$0.0055 to ~$0.00287-$0.00292; market cap dropped to ~$46-47M; volume surged ~1,118%.Price, market cap and volume figures closely match two independently fetched sources. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Emergency Patch and Governance Failure
“The emergency software fix — version 4.6.1.1-hf1 — was not produced by the Ravencoin core development team. It was written and released by mining pool 2Miners.”
reviewerEmergency patch v4.6.1.1-hf1 was written and released by mining pool 2Miners, not the Ravencoin core team, which was effectively inactive.Well corroborated. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Network Centralization and Hash Rate Concentration Risk
“A separate asset transfer quantity overflow bug identified in the codebase had not yet been addressed in any released patch.”
reviewerA separate asset transfer quantity overflow bug existed in the Ravencoin codebase, unaddressed in the emergency release.Confirmed via the project's own GitHub release notes, found independently of the page's cited sources. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: History of Consensus and Supply Failures
“In July 2020, an inflation exploit was used to mint approximately 301.8 to 315 million counterfeit RVN tokens — roughly 1.5% of the total 21 billion supply cap — worth approximately $5.7 million at the time.”
reviewerIn July 2020, an inflation exploit minted approximately 301.8-315 million counterfeit RVN (~1.5% of 21B supply cap), worth ~$5.7M, discovered by CryptoScope.Figures and discovery credit confirmed directly from fetched source text. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“2020-07-02”
reviewerDisclosure of the 2020 inflation exploit occurred on 2020-07-02.Date matches independently fetched source, even though some aggregators (CoinMarketCap) cite an earlier June 3, 2020 minting date, which is consistent with disclosure following mint by about a month. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: History of Consensus and Supply Failures
“An earlier 2019 incident involving asset issuance bugs was identified by Raptoreum.”
reviewerAn earlier 2019 incident involving asset issuance bugs was identified by Raptoreum.Matches cited source. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Double-Spend Risk and Transaction Reversibility
“No confirmed double-spend incidents resulting in documented financial losses have been reported as of August 11, 2026.”
reviewerNo confirmed double-spend incidents resulting in documented financial losses have been reported as of August 11, 2026.Properly hedged, date-scoped claim; consistent with all sources reviewed. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Three-Day Reorganization Risk and Chain Split
“As of reporting on August 11, 2026, the reorg had not yet been confirmed as completed or resolved.”
reviewerAs of reporting on August 11, 2026, the reorg had not yet been confirmed as completed or resolved.Accurately scoped to its reporting date; the page does not claim the situation remained unresolved indefinitely. Noted as a coverage gap for not addressing the later outcome, which is a reasonable limitation of an investigation filed close to the event.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.