Fact-check findings

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #2[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT Investigation and Findings

   “ZachXBT's analysis indicated the actor had dumped a portion of the stolen tokens before returning the majority of funds, contradicting the purely altruistic characterization offered by the Peapods team.”

   reviewerZachXBT's analysis showed the exploiter dumped a portion of the stolen tokens before returning the majority.The tweet could not be read. The timing evidence the page describes (1,000 USDC sent to FixedFloat 17 minutes before the exploit) is pre-exploit activity and does not by itself show stolen tokens were dumped. The page's own description is therefore weaker than its conclusion. The summary repeats the claim without hedging. The tweet ID decodes to 2023-12-13 19:56 UTC.
   citedx.com/zachxbt/status/1735025990819049968coinpaper.com/2875/over-8-4-million-stol…in-a-single-week
2. #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Incident 3 — Oracle Price Manipulation Attack (July 2025)

   “The incident resulted in a reported 70% decline in TVL from the protocol's March 2024 peak.”

   reviewerTVL had declined to about $1.9 million by mid-2025, and fell 70% from the March 2024 peak.I did not find the 70% decline or the March 2024 peak date in the sources I read. The page also gives two different peak dates for TVL ('early 2024' versus 'March 2024'), which are consistent but loose.
   citeddefillama.com/protocol/peapods-finance

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Peapods Finance announces ~90% of stolen funds returned; characterizes incident as 'white hat hack.' ZachXBT publishes on-chain evidence that the exploiter had dumped a portion of stolen funds through FixedFloat before returning the majority.”

   reviewerZachXBT published the on-chain evidence on 2023-12-14.The ZachXBT tweet appears to date from Dec 13, not Dec 14. The same entry also repeats the unverified 'dumped' characterization. Timeline entries have empty source fields.
2. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Incident 3 — Oracle Price Manipulation Attack (July 2025)

   “Stolen funds were routed through ChangeNow and FixedFloat mixers.”

   reviewerThe July 2025 exploit drained about 78 ETH (~$207,000), was flagged by SlowMist, CertiK, PeckShield and TenArmor, and funds went through ChangeNow and FixedFloat.The headline loss and incident are confirmed. The ChangeNow and FixedFloat routing, Yoink and the 78 ETH figure were not found in the sources I could read. ChangeNow and FixedFloat are instant swap services, not mixers, so 'mixers' is an unsupported characterization. The proposed edit only drops that label.
   citedquadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/peapods…lationattack.phpgetfailsafe.com/peapods-finance-hack-200…ow-to-stay-safe/
3. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Incident 3 — Oracle Price Manipulation Attack (July 2025)

   “As of the time of reporting, Peapods Finance had not issued a formal public statement or post-mortem.”

   reviewerAs of reporting Peapods had issued no formal statement, while also saying the team attributed the breach to a bad oracle configuration.True only for the first hours after the incident. Later reporting records a team comment, so the page is time-bound. A post-mortem status as of late 2026 was not checked.
   citedgetfailsafe.com/peapods-finance-hack-200…ow-to-stay-safe/
4. #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Peapods Finance announces conclusion of Sherlock audit contest for Leveraged Volatility Farming upgrade; 84 independent auditors participated. Contest prize pool was 120,000 USDC.”

   reviewerSherlock audit contest for the LVF upgrade drew 84 independent auditors; the prize pool was 120,000 USDC; announced concluded on 2025-02-15.The prize pool is confirmed. The 84-auditor count could not be read. The date of 2025-02-15 may be off by about three days, based on the tweet ID, and I did not fetch the tweet. No correction proposed because I could not read it.
   citedx.com/PeapodsFinance/status/1891971076936347935audits.sherlock.xyz/contests/749

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Incident 1 — Reentrancy Exploit (December 2023)

   “The attack resulted in the theft of PEAS tokens valued at approximately $231,192 (104.47 ETH) at the time.”

   reviewerThe December 2023 reentrancy exploit stole about $231,192 (104.47 ETH) in PEAS, with the stated attacker addresses, malicious contract and primary transaction.Figures, addresses and tx hash match the cited write-up. It is a secondary community repository.
   citedgithub.com/liqtags/crypto-rekts/blob/mai…nance-Exploit.md
2. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Incident 2 — Slippage Manipulation Attack (February 2025)

   “Financial impact was limited to approximately $3,500.”

   reviewerSecond incident on 2025-02-08: slippage frontrun in depositFromPairedLpToken, about $3,500, with _slippageOverride set to 999.Matches the SolidityScan analysis. The summary's description of this as one of three 'distinct security incidents' is consistent.
   citedblog.solidityscan.com/peapods-finance-ha…sis-bdc5432107a5
3. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview

   “The protocol's native token, PEAS, has a fixed total supply of 10 million.”

   reviewerPEAS supply of 10 million, distributed 44% / 44% to Uniswap V3 positions and 12% to the team across six recipients, fully vested at TGE.Distribution confirmed. The docs call the supply 'initial supply', so 'fixed' is slightly stronger than the source, and the burn mechanism described elsewhere on the page would reduce supply.
   citeddocs.peapods.finance/peas-tokenomics