← Onyx V2reviewed 2026-11-02 · 12 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Onyx V2 against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
2 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #1[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“2023-11-02”
reviewerFirst exploit occurred on 2 November 2023Page uses the rekt publication date as the exploit date; the exploit preceded it (Tuesday 31 Oct 2023 per rekt; Halborn says October 2023).Proposed correction (not yet applied)2023-10-31 - #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: First Exploit — November 2023 ($2.1M)
“On November 2, 2023, Onyx Protocol suffered its first major exploit”
reviewerOnyx suffered its first major exploit on November 2, 2023Same date error as the timeline entry. The section heading and summary say only 'November 2023', which is also likely off by days (October 2023 per Halborn).Proposed correction (not yet applied)On October 31, 2023, Onyx Protocol suffered its first major exploit
unverifiable
4 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: XCN Token Performance and Market Impact
“The rekt.news analysis noted that the protocol 'lacked the community support and vigilance needed to prevent the vulnerability from being exploited.'”
reviewerRekt News quote about community support and vigilanceQuote not located in the cited article (second rekt article not checked for it). May be a paraphrase presented as a direct quote. - #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: First Exploit — November 2023 ($2.1M)
“The protocol's TVL dropped approximately 87% — from $2.9 million to $392,000 — following the exploit.”
reviewerTVL fell about 87%, from $2.9M to $392KNot found in the two cited sources I read; other cited sources (CertiK, Hacken, Merkle) not checked. - #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“V2 targeting compliance with the U.S. CLARITY Act launched in Q3 2025 on a new XCN Ledger infrastructure.”
reviewerOnyx V2 launched in Q3 2025 (summary) versus October 2025 (timeline) versus late 2025 (section)Internal inconsistency: Q3 2025 in summary, 2025-10 in timeline[11], 'late 2025' in sections[4]. No source was fetched to resolve the date. The summary and timeline also describe 'Onyx V2' as launching in 2024 and again in 2025, which is confusing. - #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Background
“The project was audited by CertiK in January 2022, but subsequent protocol updates were not subjected to fresh audits.”
reviewerCertiK audited Onyx in January 2022 and subsequent updates were not auditedA January 2022 audit is plausible per a secondary snippet. I did not fetch the CertiK post. The 'no fresh audits' claim is an absence claim. The page states elsewhere that the CertiK audit 'identified the vulnerability class' and then says the vulnerability was 'not flagged', which is in tension with the altFINS snippet.
stale
1 claimThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #12[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: XCN Token Performance and Market Impact
“As of May 2026, XCN trades at approximately $0.004673 USD with a 24-hour trading volume near $6.3 million.”
reviewerXCN price of about $0.004673 as of May 2026 with 24h volume near $6.3MA point-in-time price from about six months before today (2026-11-02). It is dated and cannot be verified now. Flagged as stale without a correction because I did not fetch a current price.
partially supported
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Repeated Failure to Remediate Known Vulnerabilities
“Halborn Security described the second exploit as 'the same vulnerability that caused it to lose $2.1 million one year back,'”
reviewerHalborn quote that the second exploit used 'the same vulnerability that caused it to lose $2.1 million one year back'Substance supported; the exact quoted wording was not found. - #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Post-Hack Response and Relaunch as Onyx Core
“The proposal passed with 100% approval in under two days, with execution scheduled for October 1, 2024.”
reviewerOIP-46 proposed September 27, 2024 and passed within two days, execution scheduled for October 1, 2024Proposal date and passage are supported. The 100% figure and the 1 Oct execution date are not visible on the forum page, though a 30 Sep '15 hours to execution' comment is consistent with 1 Oct. The timeline also says OIP-46 passed on 2024-09-29. - #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Post-Hack Response and Relaunch as Onyx Core
“Onyx's Goliath proof-of-stake Layer 1 mainnet went live on March 27, 2026.”
reviewerGoliath Layer 1 mainnet went live on March 27, 2026Search results indicate the launch happened around 27-28 March 2026. No primary source was fetched. The sentence has no direct citation on the page.
confirmed
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: V2 Launch and Second Exploit — September 2024 ($3.8M)
“On September 26, 2024, Onyx Protocol was exploited a second time for approximately $3.8 million.”
reviewerSecond exploit: $3.8M, attacker address, tx hash, 2,000 ETH Balancer flash loan, 56 micro-transactions, assets stolenAmount, address, hash, flash loan and stolen assets all match rekt. The article date is 26 Sep 2024. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: First Exploit — November 2023 ($2.1M)
“Of the stolen funds, 1,140 ETH was deposited into Tornado Cash and approximately 24 ETH was distributed to on-chain addresses.”
reviewerFirst exploit: 1,164 ETH / $2.1M, attacker address, 1,140 ETH to Tornado Cash, ~24 ETH distributed, Proposal 22 with 11 votes and ~97% from one addressCore figures confirmed. The 87% TVL drop was not found in rekt or Halborn; it may come from another cited source.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.