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← Onyx Protocolreviewed 2026-11-02 · 7 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Onyx Protocol against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 1unverifiable 3confirmed 31 correction pending · 0 applied

disputed

1 claim

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Second Exploit — September 2024 ($3.8 Million)
    “Blockchain security firm PeckShield first reported the exploit publicly; Cyvers also flagged the anomaly.”
    reviewerPeckShield first reported the exploit publiclyRekt names Cyvers as the first to flag. The dailyhodl article may credit PeckShield as the first public report, so the evidence conflicts. I did not fetch dailyhodl.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Blockchain security firm Cyvers first flagged the suspicious transaction; PeckShield also reported the exploit publicly.

unverifiable

3 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: First Exploit — October/November 2023 ($2.1 Million)
    “Primary attacker address: 0x085bdff2c522e8637d4154039db8746bb8642bff.”
    reviewerAttacker drained about 1,164 ETH and the primary attacker address is 0x085bdff...; Proposal 22 got 11 votesThe CertiK post-mortem does not carry these details. I did not check the other cited sources (Hacken, Halborn, Merkle Science).
  2. #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the summary
    “Following the second hack the Ethereum-based lending market was shut down and the protocol relaunched as Onyx Core.”
    reviewerEthereum lending market shut down and relaunched as Onyx Core (OIP-46)I did not fetch the cited relaunch sources. The timeline itself says the relaunch was only 'scheduled', so 'relaunched' in the summary may be stronger than the page body supports.
  3. #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “Token rebranded from CHN to XCN at a 1:1,000 ratio; 5 billion XCN burned and 15 billion XCN donated to a new foundation.”
    reviewerRebrand of CHN to XCN in March 2022 and Chain founded 2014 by Adam LudwinBackground claims rest on low-tier exchange marketing pages. I did not check them in this pass.

confirmed

3 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “CertiK publishes audit report identifying the empty-pool/precision vulnerability in the Compound v2 fork code and explicitly recommending remediation. The Onyx team acknowledges the finding and decides not to act.”
    reviewerCertiK published an audit report on Feb 27, 2023 identifying the empty-pool vulnerability; Onyx acknowledged and took no actionCertiK post-mortem directly supports the date and the no-action decision.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “PEPE market contract deployed on Onyx with zero initial liquidity, creating the conditions for an empty-pool exploit.”
    reviewerFirst exploit on Nov 1, 2023 of about $2.1M; PEPE market deployed Oct 26, 2023 with zero liquidityDate and amount match. CertiK gives no ETH figure.
  3. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “Second exploit: attacker (0x680910cf5Fc9969A25Fd57e7896A14fF1E55F36B) drains $3.8 million from Onyx Protocol using the same Compound v2 precision vulnerability plus an NFTLiquidation contract input-validation flaw. Assets stolen: 4.1M VUSD, 7.35M XCN, 0.23 WBTC, 5K DAI, 50K USDT.”
    reviewerSecond exploit on Sep 26, 2024 of $3.8M with the stated assets, addresses, 2,000 ETH Balancer flash loan and NFTLiquidation flawRekt confirms the details.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.