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← npm debug / chalk Supply Chain Attack (September 2025)reviewed 2026-11-04 · 5 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read npm debug / chalk Supply Chain Attack (September 2025) against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

unverifiable

1 claim

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “13:16 UTC: First malicious package version published to npm, approximately 16 minutes after the AiTM phishing attack captured the maintainer's credentials and live 2FA token.”
    reviewerSygnia-sourced UTC timeline (13:00 phishing, 13:16 first publish, 14:16, 15:15, 17:17, 19:59)Sygnia returned 403, so the detailed timeline, IOCs (IP, domains, wallet) and containment times were not verified.

stale

1 claim

The claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.

  1. #1[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Attribution and Threat Actor
    “No specific threat actor or group has been publicly attributed to this attack as of the available reporting.”
    reviewerNo specific threat actor has been publicly attributed to this attackSuperseded by later reporting. The page's hedge 'as of the available reporting' is now outdated.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    In July 2026, Amazon Threat Intelligence attributed this attack, with medium confidence, to the North Korean group Sapphire Sleet (also known as BlueNoroff); Amazon appears to be the sole source for this attribution.

partially supported

1 claim

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Affected Packages
    “Additional packages affected in the second wave included prebid, prebid-universal-creative, @coveops/abi, and proto-tinker-wc.”
    reviewerSecond wave packages including prebid, @coveops/abi and the DuckDB packagesThree of four confirmed; proto-tinker-wc not verified in fetched source. THN also does not date the duckdb compromise to Sept 9 explicitly.

confirmed

2 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    “malicious versions of 18 foundational JavaScript packages”
    reviewer18 packages compromised in first waveConsistent with the title of the Checkmarx source and other reporting.
  2. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Impact and Actual Theft
    “approximately $600 USD in total assets across all chains: roughly $429 in Ethereum, approximately $46 in Solana”
    reviewerTheft approximately $600 total, ~$429 ETH, ~$46 SOLMatches The Hacker News citing Socket.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.