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← NEAR Intentsreviewed 2026-10-27 · 15 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read NEAR Intents against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

Read this first

These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed

4 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: October 2026 Exploit: $3.8 Million Drained from BSC Hot Wallet
    “occurring between 7:54 p.m. ET on Wednesday, October 1 and 2:08 a.m. ET on Thursday, October 2”
    reviewerAttacker transfers occurred from 7:54 p.m. ET on Wednesday (Sept 30) to 2:08 a.m. ET Thursday (Oct 1); page assigns them to Oct 1 and Oct 2Weekday and date disagree on the page (Oct 1, 2026 is a Thursday). The weekdays and the CoinDesk timestamp place the transfers Sep 30 to Oct 1. Calendar dates are inferred from the weekdays; the sources give none.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    occurring between 7:54 p.m. ET on Wednesday, September 30 and 2:08 a.m. ET on Thursday, October 1
  2. #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: October 2026 Exploit: $3.8 Million Drained from BSC Hot Wallet
    “The team announced the breach publicly at approximately 8:53 a.m. ET on Thursday, October 2.”
    reviewerBreach announced at about 8:53 a.m. ET Thursday, October 2Thursday was October 1, and the CoinDesk piece dated Oct 1 already reports the announcement. The time of day is correct.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    The team announced the breach publicly at approximately 8:53 a.m. ET on Thursday, October 1.
  3. #4[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “2026-10-01”
    reviewerTimeline date for start of exploit is 2026-10-01; transfers began Wednesday afternoon (Sept 30)Wednesday precedes Thursday Oct 1, so the first transfers are Sept 30.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2026-09-30
  4. #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “2026-10-02”
    reviewerTimeline date for public announcement is 2026-10-02The page's own cited source URL is dated 2026/10/01. Note that the CoinDesk text itself mentions Oct 2 for the announcement, so the source is internally inconsistent; the Unchained weekday and the publication timestamp point to Oct 1.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2026-10-01

unverifiable

2 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #12[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Platform Overview
    “that audit identified five findings, of which two were resolved, two accepted, and one mitigated, with test coverage reported at 22% region coverage.”
    reviewerHacken audit: five findings (2 resolved, 2 accepted, 1 mitigated), 22% region coverage, completed Jan 27, 2025Blocked, not scored. Internal inconsistency: timeline[1] says the audit was completed 2024-12-01 while sections[5] says it was completed January 27, 2025.
  2. #14[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Market Impact
    “The price drop was directly correlated with the timing of NEAR Intents' public disclosure.”
    reviewerPrice drop was directly correlated with disclosure timingA causal claim stated as fact; I did not fetch the market sources, so the 7.5% and $4.76 figures were not verified. Causation is an inference, not something reporting can establish.

stale

3 claims

The claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.

  1. #6[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Fund Movement and On-Chain Tracing
    “No on-chain recovery or return of funds had been publicly confirmed as of the date of this filing.”
    reviewerNo recovery or return of funds had been publicly confirmedSuperseded by two independent outlets. The page's framing of an unrecovered theft is now wrong.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    According to General Manager Alex Shevchenko, as reported by Decrypt on October 4, 2026, the attacker returned the roughly $3.8 million in full.
  2. #7[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Market Impact
    “A post-mortem report was promised by the team but had not been published as of the date of this filing.”
    reviewerPost-mortem promised but not published (Security Posture section)Secondary source only; the primary postmortem was not located, so the correction is attributed.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    A post-mortem report was promised by the team and has since been reported as published (Phemex, October 16, 2026).
  3. #8[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Posture and Audit History
    “A post-mortem report was committed to but had not been published as of the investigation date. No independent confirmation of the reimbursement status or scope of affected users had appeared in public reporting at the time of this filing.”
    reviewerPost-mortem not published; reimbursement status unconfirmed (Response section)Because the attacker returned the funds, the treasury reimbursement may have been moot; reporting differs on which happened.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    A post-mortem report was committed to and has since been reported as published, and the team stated that all affected users were fully reimbursed (Phemex, October 16, 2026).

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Context: $50 Million Bitget Interception (September 2026)
    “The crypto industry cannot demand recognition of digital property rights while simultaneously building infrastructure optimized to help launder stolen funds.”
    reviewerShevchenko quote on launderingQuote not found in the fetched cited sources; it may come from a source I did not check (e.g. his X post). Not rewritten.
  2. #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Fund Movement and On-Chain Tracing
    “Approximately 1.5 million USDT was routed through CoW Protocol's settlement contract; the remainder was sent to additional unidentified addresses before the KuCoin transfer.”
    reviewerFunds went to a BNB address, 1.5M USDT through CoW Protocol, then KuCoin and bridged to Bitcoin per ZachXBTPage states the KuCoin and Bitcoin movement as fact; the source says it is unconfirmed. The page also implies the CoW routing came before the KuCoin transfer, which the source does not establish.

confirmed

3 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    “On October 1, 2026, the protocol suffered a confirmed $3.8 million exploit traced to a vulnerability in the interaction between its Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure and its smart contract, resulting in unauthorized outflows from its BNB Chain hot wallet.”
    reviewerApproximately $3.8M was exploited from NEAR Intents via a bug in the Omni deposit/withdrawal and smart contract interaction, hitting a BNB Chain hot walletCore incident facts are well supported. Later reporting (Phemex, Oct 16) describes the root cause as a refund-balance bug, which is compatible but more specific.
  2. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Context: $50 Million Bitget Interception (September 2026)
    “$503,000 was frozen mid-swap, and approximately $166,000 was completed before the block was implemented.”
    reviewerSHIELD blocked more than $50M; $503K frozen; ~$166K completed; Bitget 5% freezing and 5% recovery bounties waived; $387.5M Bitget hackFigures match. The article gives the Bitget hack day only as 'Thursday'; Sept 24 is consistent.
  3. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Platform Overview
    “Alex Shevchenko, co-founder of Aurora, serves as General Manager of NEAR Intents.”
    reviewerAlex Shevchenko is General Manager of NEAR IntentsTitle confirmed; Aurora co-founder role not independently checked.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.