← More Marketsreviewed 2026-10-16 · 26 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read More Markets against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed 2unverifiable 4stale 6link rot 3partially supported 2confirmed 911 corrections pending · 0 applied
disputed
2 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #7[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Attack Mechanism: E-Mode and LST Collateral Pricing
“Ankr stated its Flow liquid staking contracts had undergone external audits by Halborn and that Ankr itself was not identified as compromised.”
reviewerAnkr stated its Flow liquid staking contracts had undergone external audits by Halborn and that Ankr itself was not identified as compromised.None of the page's cited sources for this section actually mention a Halborn audit or an Ankr non-compromise statement; separately, Flow Foundation's later official statement contradicts the 'not compromised' characterization by locating the flaw inside an Ankr contract.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Ankr stated its Flow liquid staking contracts had undergone external audits by Halborn; Flow Foundation's official September 1, 2026 statement subsequently identified the vulnerability as residing in an Ankr Solidity smart contract, placing the root cause within Ankr's system. - #12[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Response and Solvency Position
“One outlet citing DefiLlama data placed pre-exploit deposits at approximately $27.9 million against $19.6 million in loans.”
reviewerOne outlet citing DefiLlama data placed pre-exploit deposits at approximately $27.9 million against $19.6 million in loans.Direct contradiction between the page's characterization and the cited source's own framing of when the snapshot was taken.Proposed correction (not yet applied)One outlet citing DefiLlama data placed post-exploit deposits at approximately $27.9 million against $19.6 million in loans.
unverifiable
4 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: August 31, 2026 Exploit Overview
“Blockaid identified two attacker-associated addresses (primary exploiter: 0xa1E...6A7Cc; helper wallet: 0xA0C...b3702) and a cluster of post-exploit fund-transfer transactions.”
reviewerBlockaid identified two attacker-associated addresses: a primary exploiter (0xa1E...6A7Cc) and a helper wallet (0xA0C...b3702).General claim that Blockaid published attacker/helper addresses and follow-up transfers is consistent with secondary reporting (e.g. 11 follow-up transfers), but the specific truncated address strings could not be independently confirmed. - #8[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Response and Solvency Position
“Following Blockaid's disclosure, More Markets posted an initial statement on X (formerly Twitter) at approximately 06:18 UTC on August 31, 2026, acknowledging: 'Our team is currently investigating a claim that MORE Markets was exploited. We will share our findings shortlhy [sic].'”
reviewerMore Markets' initial X statement at ~06:18 UTC on Aug 31, 2026 read: 'Our team is currently investigating a claim that MORE Markets was exploited. We will share our findings shortlhy [sic].'Plausible and consistent with the broader narrative, but could not be independently confirmed from an accessible source. - #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Response and Solvency Position
“Coverage published simultaneously by multiple outlets reported that after the drain, More Markets' total value locked fell to approximately $3.64 million against active loans of approximately $3.67 million, a near-parity state representing virtually no buffer between held assets and outstanding liabilities.”
reviewerAfter the drain, More Markets' total value locked fell to approximately $3.64 million against active loans of approximately $3.67 million.Could not locate these exact figures in any accessible outlet. Current live DefiLlama snapshots show a broadly similar range ($3.44M-$3.88M TVL, ~$3.53M active loans), making the claim plausible but not independently confirmable given the dead primary citation. - #15[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Architecture and Risk Parameters
“The protocol launched on Flow's Crescendo mainnet and supports nine asset markets.”
reviewerThe protocol launched on Flow's Crescendo mainnet and supports nine asset markets.Could not independently confirm the specific 'nine asset markets' figure or the Crescendo mainnet detail; no contradicting source found either.
stale
6 claimsThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #2[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: August 31, 2026 Exploit Overview
“More Markets' own subsequent statement disputed the total, claiming that attackers were able to bridge out less than 5% of the value announced by Blockaid from Flow — a claim that had not been independently verified at the time of this report.”
reviewerMore Markets disputed the $9.3M total, claiming attackers bridged out less than 5% of the announced value; the page states this had not been independently verified at the time of the report.The page's hedge was accurate when written but is now stale: an official, credible third-party statement (Flow Foundation) corroborates More Markets' lower figure rather than leaving it unverified. The page did not cite or discover this statement.Proposed correction (not yet applied)More Markets' own subsequent statement disputed the total, claiming that attackers were able to bridge out less than 5% of the value announced by Blockaid from Flow — a claim later corroborated by Flow Foundation's official September 1, 2026 statement, which put the drained amount at roughly $410,000 and the attacker's realized gain at approximately $246,000 after slippage. - #6[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Attack Mechanism: E-Mode and LST Collateral Pricing
“Blockaid stated that the precise technical sequence remained undisclosed and that it was unclear whether the root vulnerability originated in More Markets' implementation, Ankr's asset handling, pricing assumptions, or their interaction.”
reviewerBlockaid stated the precise technical sequence remained undisclosed and it was unclear whether the vulnerability sat in More Markets, Ankr, pricing assumptions, or their interaction.Accurate as a historical statement of what Blockaid said, but presented without the later, more authoritative resolution naming Ankr's contract as the root cause.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Blockaid initially stated that the precise technical sequence remained undisclosed and that it was unclear whether the root vulnerability originated in More Markets' implementation, Ankr's asset handling, pricing assumptions, or their interaction; Flow Foundation's September 1, 2026 statement subsequently identified the vulnerability as residing in an Ankr Solidity smart contract. - #10[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Response and Solvency Position
“These claims — particularly regarding user losses and the scale of bridged funds — had not been independently verified at the time of this report.”
reviewerThese claims (user losses and scale of bridged funds) had not been independently verified at the time of this report.A credible, official independent source resolving this uncertainty existed (and predates some of the page's own cited archive timestamps) but was not incorporated.Proposed correction (not yet applied)These claims — particularly regarding user losses and the scale of bridged funds — were subsequently corroborated by Flow Foundation's official September 1, 2026 statement, which said no MORE Markets or ankrFLOW depositor lost funds and that the attacker realized approximately $246,000 after slippage. - #18[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Broader Exploit Pattern: Third DeFi Lending Attack in Five Days
“On approximately August 30, 2026, Tectonic on the Cronos chain lost an estimated $66 to $75 million after the TONIC governance token's price was inflated roughly 100 times in approximately 20 minutes, forcing Cronos validators to halt the entire chain.”
reviewerOn approximately August 30, 2026, Tectonic on the Cronos chain lost an estimated $66 to $75 million after TONIC's price was inflated ~100x in ~20 minutes, forcing Cronos validators to halt the entire chain.The $66-75M range was accurate for initial Aug 30-31 reporting but is superseded by Cronos's own later, more authoritative post-mortem figure.Proposed correction (not yet applied)On approximately August 30, 2026, Tectonic on the Cronos chain lost an estimated $66 to $75 million in early reporting, a figure later revised by Cronos's own post-mortem to approximately $111.2 million in impacted value (with about $9.19 million unrecovered), after the TONIC governance token's price was inflated roughly 100 times in approximately 20 minutes, forcing Cronos validators to halt the entire chain. - #22[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Transparency and Communication Assessment
“At the time of the exploit and as of the date of this report, More Markets had not published a formal post-mortem.”
reviewerAt the time of the exploit and as of the date of this report, More Markets had not published a formal post-mortem.Technically true that More Markets itself had not published a post-mortem, but the broader framing that the central facts remained unresolved is outdated given Flow Foundation's statement.Proposed correction (not yet applied)At the time of the exploit, More Markets itself had not published a formal post-mortem, though Flow Foundation issued an official statement on September 1, 2026 addressing the incident's root cause and loss figures. - #24[stale][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“though a post-mortem had not been published as of the date of this report”
reviewerThe protocol subsequently paused operations and disputed the scale of losses reported by Blockaid, attributing the root vulnerability to a third party, though a post-mortem had not been published as of the date of this report.Same underlying gap as the section-level findings grouped under this defect: an available, credible official statement that resolves the central dispute was not incorporated into the page.Proposed correction (not yet applied)though More Markets itself had not published a formal post-mortem by the date of this report; Flow Foundation issued an official statement on September 1, 2026 attributing the vulnerability to an Ankr smart contract and estimating the attacker's realized gain at approximately $246,000
link rot
3 claimsA cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.
- #13[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://coindesk.cc/defi-lending-exploit-drains-9-3m-from-more-markets-leaves-reserves-razor-thin-107854.html”
reviewerSource citation: coindesk.cc article on reserves 'razor-thin'.Dead link cited under a 'CoinDesk' byline on a domain that is not CoinDesk's real domain; recommend removal and sourcing the TVL figures to a verifiable outlet. - #25[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: August 31, 2026 Exploit Overview
“https://cryptobriefing.com/more-markets-9m-lending-reserve-exploit-blockaid/”
reviewerSource citation: cryptobriefing.com article as support for the ~$9.3M framing.The cited source no longer supports the claim it was cited for. - #26[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: August 31, 2026 Exploit Overview
“https://crypto.news/more-markets-suffers-9-3m-wflow-exploit-on-flow-evm/”
reviewerSource citation: crypto.news article as support for the ~$9.3M framing.The cited source has been edited post-publication and now reports a figure roughly 20x lower than what the page cites it for.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #19[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Broader Exploit Pattern: Third DeFi Lending Attack in Five Days
“August 2026 crypto hack losses across all platforms reached approximately $139.7 million, making it the third-largest month for stolen funds in 2026, below July's approximately $254 million.”
reviewerAugust 2026 crypto hack losses across all platforms reached approximately $139.7 million, making it the third-largest month for stolen funds in 2026, below July's approximately $254 million.The $139.7M and $254M numbers themselves are supported by the cited source, but the page mischaracterizes a DeFi-specific DefiLlama figure as covering 'all platforms.' - #23[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Transparency and Communication Assessment
“The team's initial public statement contained a typographical error ('shortlhy') and was followed by a series of posts that disputed Blockaid's loss estimate without providing verifiable on-chain data to support the lower figure.”
reviewerThe team's posts disputed Blockaid's loss estimate without providing verifiable on-chain data to support the lower figure.Accurate as to More Markets' own posts in isolation, but the broader 'unsupported claim' framing is undercut by later corroboration from a credible third party.
confirmed
9 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 31, 2026 Exploit Overview
“The attacker drained approximately 15.5 million Wrapped Flow (WFLOW) tokens from the reserve. Blockaid initially characterized the loss at approximately $9.3 million USD, though it later described that figure as a preliminary detector estimate.”
reviewerBlockaid detected an exploit draining ~15.5 million WFLOW from More Markets' mFlowWFLOW reserve, initially characterized by Blockaid at ~$9.3 million, later described by Blockaid itself as a preliminary detector estimate.Figure is accurately attributed as Blockaid's initial/preliminary detector estimate, which is itself an accurate characterization of what Blockaid said at the time. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Attack Mechanism: E-Mode and LST Collateral Pricing
“More Markets had assigned WFLOW an 81.5% LTV with an 83% liquidation threshold, and ankrFLOW a 78.5% LTV.”
reviewerMore Markets had assigned WFLOW an 81.5% LTV with an 83% liquidation threshold, and ankrFLOW a 78.5% LTV in the E-Mode configuration.Figures match the cited source precisely. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Attack Mechanism: E-Mode and LST Collateral Pricing
“Second, the attacker reportedly created approximately 8.6 million unbacked ankrFLOW tokens and deposited them as collateral against this E-Mode pairing.”
reviewerThe attacker created approximately 8.6 million unbacked ankrFLOW tokens and deposited them as collateral.Figure is independently corroborated by an official source. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Response and Solvency Position
“In subsequent posts the team stated: 'Our initial investigation reveals that MORE was not exploited. MORE's contracts are secure. MORE is solvent. The protocol is paused.'”
reviewerMore Markets' later posts stated: 'Our initial investigation reveals that MORE was not exploited. MORE's contracts are secure. MORE is solvent. The protocol is paused,' and that 'the exploit appears to be due to a vulnerability associated with a third party on which MORE relies' and 'an attacker was able to bridge out less than 5% of the value announced by Blockaid from Flow.'Direct quotes confirmed verbatim against independent secondary reporting of the same thread. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Architecture and Risk Parameters
“More Markets is developed by More Labs and operates as a fork of Aave V3 on the Flow EVM blockchain.”
reviewerMore Markets is developed by More Labs and operates as a fork of Aave V3 on the Flow EVM blockchain.Corroborated independently. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Architecture and Risk Parameters
“The protocol's documentation describes a security model built around a 'small, battle-tested' governance-controlled core, modular facets to isolate strategy risk, and timelocks on privileged actions. The documentation states that 'the DAO funds yearly audits of the core' but does not name specific auditing firms, and that a standing bug bounty program 'will soon' be offered — indicating that, at the time of the exploit, a live bug bounty program was not in place. The documentation further states that static analysis reports are published for each approved facet or oracle.”
reviewerMore Markets' documentation describes a 'small, battle-tested' governance-controlled core, modular facets, timelocks, DAO-funded yearly audits without naming firms, a forthcoming bug bounty, and published static analysis reports.Accurately summarizes the documentation. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Broader Exploit Pattern: Third DeFi Lending Attack in Five Days
“On August 27, 2026, Moonwell on Coinbase's Base network lost approximately $8.7 million after an attacker manipulated the price of MAMO, a thinly traded token, to borrow real assets against it.”
reviewerOn August 27, 2026, Moonwell on Coinbase's Base network lost approximately $8.7 million after an attacker manipulated the price of MAMO to borrow real assets against it.Loss estimates vary by tracker ($5.7M-$9M range reported elsewhere), but $8.7M is a legitimately and commonly cited figure, not an outlier. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Flow Blockchain Prior Security History
“On December 27, 2025, an attacker exploited a type confusion vulnerability in Flow's Cadence execution layer, enabling fungible token duplication and the extraction of approximately $3.9 million in value via cross-chain bridges including Celer, deBridge, Stargate, and Relay. Flow validators halted the network within hours.”
reviewerOn December 27, 2025, an attacker exploited a type confusion vulnerability in Flow's Cadence execution layer, draining approximately $3.9 million via bridges including Celer, deBridge, Stargate, and Relay; validators halted the network within hours.Minor nuance on exact start time (Dec 26 evening PST vs Dec 27 halt) does not materially change the claim; the bridge list is corroborated by secondary reporting, though flagged there as 'less certain' than Flow's own account. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Flow Blockchain Prior Security History
“Flow Foundation initially proposed a full chain rollback but subsequently abandoned that approach in favour of an isolated recovery process designed to identify and destroy counterfeit assets while preserving legitimate transaction history.”
reviewerFlow Foundation initially proposed a full chain rollback but subsequently abandoned that approach in favour of an isolated recovery process to destroy counterfeit assets while preserving legitimate history.Matches independent reporting.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.