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← Liquid Globalreviewed 2026-10-12 · 40 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Liquid Global against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 6unverifiable 3link rot 4partially supported 3confirmed 2410 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

6 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #14[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “Approximately 9,000 ETH was subsequently routed through the Tornado Cash mixer, and a portion was converted to Bitcoin via DeFi bridging protocols and mixed again.”
    reviewerApproximately 9,000 ETH was subsequently routed through the Tornado Cash mixer, and a portion was converted to Bitcoin via DeFi bridging and mixed again.At typical August 2021 ETH prices (~$3,000), 9,000 ETH would be worth roughly $27 million, inconsistent with the ~$20 million figure reported by both Elliptic and CipherTrace. The contemporaneous CipherTrace figure of 6,005 ETH better matches the dollar amount actually reported.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Approximately 6,000 ETH was subsequently routed through the Tornado Cash mixer, and a portion was converted to Bitcoin via DeFi bridging protocols and mixed again.
    citedwww.elliptic.co/blog/liquid-exchange-hac…4-million-stolen
  2. #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “Stolen tokens also reached centralized exchanges Huobi and Bilaxy.”
    reviewerStolen tokens also reached centralized exchanges Huobi and Bilaxy.Huobi's receipt of stolen TRON funds is well documented. No source found supports stolen Liquid funds reaching Bilaxy; Bilaxy was itself the victim of an unrelated hack in the same week, which appears to be the likely source of this conflation.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Stolen tokens also reached the centralized exchange Huobi.
    citedmedium.com/sentinel-protocol/tracking-th…ing-acd94e01c762
  3. #21[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Lazarus Group / DPRK Attribution
    “The tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research repository on GitHub — a widely referenced open-source compilation of DPRK-attributed hacks — lists the Liquid Global breach as a Lazarus/Bluenoroff operation, cataloguing fifteen Ethereum addresses and eight Bitcoin addresses associated with the attacker, along with Ripple and TRON addresses.”
    reviewerThe tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research GitHub repository catalogues fifteen Ethereum addresses and eight Bitcoin addresses associated with the attacker.The page's own cited source does not match the counts given; the repository lists more addresses of both types than stated.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    The tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research repository on GitHub — a widely referenced open-source compilation of DPRK-attributed hacks — lists the Liquid Global breach as a Lazarus/Bluenoroff operation, cataloguing sixteen Ethereum addresses and thirteen Bitcoin addresses associated with the attacker, along with Ripple and TRON addresses.
    citedgithub.com/tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-re…liquid_global.md
  4. #30[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: FTX Collapse and Liquid Withdrawal Freeze (November 2022)
    “On November 15, 2022, Liquid Global — operating as Quoine Pte. Ltd. — announced the suspension of all fiat and cryptocurrency withdrawals, citing the Chapter 11 filing by FTX Trading International as the ultimate beneficial owner of Quoine Pte. Ltd.”
    reviewerLiquid Global cited the Chapter 11 filing by 'FTX Trading International' as the ultimate beneficial owner of Quoine Pte. Ltd.The withdrawal-suspension date and the fact pattern are correct, but the named parent entity does not match how any source describes FTX's corporate structure; 'FTX Trading Ltd.' is the entity that filed Chapter 11 and is consistently named as the acquirer/owner.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    On November 15, 2022, Liquid Global — operating as Quoine Pte. Ltd. — announced the suspension of all fiat and cryptocurrency withdrawals, citing the Chapter 11 filing by FTX Trading Ltd. as the ultimate beneficial owner of Quoine Pte. Ltd.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2022/11/15/liq…alts-withdrawals
  5. #32[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “Liquid Global halts all trading, days after suspending withdrawals.”
    reviewerLiquid Global halted all trading days after the withdrawal freeze (timeline: November 18, 2022).The cited Bitcompare source no longer supports the claim (see separate link_rot finding), and the only working corroboration found places the trading halt around November 20, not November 18.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2022-11-20
    citedbitcompare.net/post/liquid-global-halts-…ding-withdrawals
  6. #40[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Infrastructure Failures
    “The tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research repository classifies the incident as a potential inside job, noting that an ex-employee later disputed claims of scapegoating.”
    reviewerThe tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research repository classifies the incident as a potential inside job, noting that an ex-employee later disputed claims of scapegoating.The page's phrasing ('disputed claims of scapegoating') reverses the actual posture of the referenced lawsuit: the ex-employee's claim is that the company wrongfully blamed/scapegoated her, which she is contesting as unjust — she is not denying that scapegoating happened.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    The tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-research repository classifies the incident as a potential inside job and links to reporting that a former employee sued the company, alleging she had been wrongfully scapegoated for the hack.
    citedgithub.com/tayvano/lazarus-bluenoroff-re…liquid_global.md

unverifiable

3 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Background and Operations
    “By 2021 the exchange reported over 800,000 customers and a peak daily trade volume of $1.1 billion.”
    reviewerBy 2021 the exchange reported over 800,000 customers and a peak daily trade volume of $1.1 billion.No section source is cited for this sentence, and the only corroboration found is low-tier aggregator content repeating the same unsourced figures. Not contradicted, but not independently verifiable from a primary source.
  2. #17[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “This was the third-largest exchange hack in Japan at the time, and also the second significant security incident for Liquid — the exchange had previously suffered a DNS hijack attack in 2020.”
    reviewerThis was the third-largest exchange hack in Japan at the time.Plausible given known comparative hack sizes, but no source directly makes the 'third-largest in Japan' claim, so it cannot be confirmed as written. The DNS hijack / second-incident portion of the sentence is separately confirmed (see next finding).
  3. #23[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Lazarus Group / DPRK Attribution
    “No law enforcement agency has publicly issued formal indictments specifically naming individuals responsible for the Liquid hack as of the knowledge cutoff; the attribution rests on Chainalysis blockchain analysis and the on-chain behavioral fingerprint characteristic of DPRK operations.”
    reviewerNo law enforcement agency has publicly issued formal indictments naming individuals responsible for the Liquid hack.An absence-of-indictment claim is difficult to verify exhaustively; no contrary evidence of an indictment was found, but this is not the same as confirming the negative.

partially supported

3 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #26[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: FTX Emergency Loan and Acquisition
    “Liquid's prior unicorn-level valuation (exceeding $1 billion in April 2019) was noted as context, though the acquisition price was never disclosed.”
    reviewerLiquid's prior unicorn-level valuation exceeded $1 billion in April 2019.The >$1 billion 2019 valuation is corroborated; the specific month (April) could not be independently confirmed.
  2. #38[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Infrastructure Failures
    “Post-incident analysis by Fireblocks (an MPC wallet provider) concluded that the attack likely resulted from a compromise of the MPC key management process rather than a flaw in MPC cryptography itself, highlighting that implementation security and key ceremony procedures are as critical as the underlying cryptographic system.”
    reviewerFireblocks concluded the attack likely resulted from a compromise of the MPC key management process rather than a flaw in MPC cryptography itself.The 'not a cryptographic flaw' half of the claim is directly supported; the specific characterization as a 'key management process'/'key ceremony' failure is the page's own gloss and is somewhat more specific than what Fireblocks actually states.
    citedwww.fireblocks.com/blog/revisiting-the-l…working-with-mpc
  3. #39[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Infrastructure Failures
    “The attacker's speed and systematic asset conversion — converting USDT-on-TRON to TRON within minutes, rapidly swapping 67 ERC-20 token types to ETH — is consistent with prior rehearsal and insider knowledge of the wallet architecture.”
    reviewerThe attacker's speed and systematic asset conversion is consistent with prior rehearsal and insider knowledge of the wallet architecture.Rehearsal/pre-planning is supported by the cited TRM analysis; the additional inference of 'insider knowledge of the wallet architecture' goes beyond what that source states and is not independently supported elsewhere in the hack-analysis sources.
    citedtrmlabs.com/post/liquid-hack-the-second-time-around

confirmed

24 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    “Liquid Global (operating under its parent entity Quoine Pte. Ltd.) was a Japanese-headquartered cryptocurrency exchange founded in 2014 and rebranded from QUOINE to Liquid in 2018.”
    reviewerLiquid Global (Quoine Pte. Ltd.) was founded in 2014 and rebranded from QUOINE to Liquid in 2018.Founding year and rebrand year are corroborated by multiple independent sources.
    citedcointelegraph.com/top-people-in-crypto-a…20/mike-kayamori
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    “In August 2021, the exchange suffered one of the largest exchange hacks of that year — approximately $97 million in Bitcoin, Ethereum, XRP, TRON, and other tokens stolen — with the attack subsequently attributed by Chainalysis to actors working on behalf of the DPRK, consistent with Lazarus Group tradecraft.”
    reviewerAugust 2021 hack: ~$97 million stolen across BTC, ETH, XRP, TRON and other tokens, attributed by Chainalysis to DPRK/Lazarus-consistent actors.Amount and DPRK attribution both independently corroborated.
    citedwww.elliptic.co/blog/liquid-exchange-hac…4-million-stolenwww.chainalysis.com/blog/north-korean-ha…h-all-time-high/
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
    “FTX provided a $120 million emergency loan days after the breach, then acquired Liquid outright in April 2022; when FTX itself filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2022, Liquid halted all withdrawals and customer funds were caught in the subsequent restructuring proceedings.”
    reviewerFTX gave a $120M loan days after the breach, acquired Liquid outright in April 2022; Liquid halted withdrawals when FTX filed Chapter 11 in November 2022.Sequence of loan, acquisition, and later withdrawal freeze all confirmed by independent reporting.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2021/08/25/rec…0m-loan-from-ftxwww.coindesk.com/business/2022/05/02/ftx…-a-few-days-late
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Operations
    “Kayamori, a Harvard MBA and former SoftBank SVP, served as CEO through April 2022.”
    reviewerKayamori held a Harvard MBA, was a former SoftBank SVP, and served as CEO through April 2022.Biographical details corroborated across multiple independent bios.
    citedcointelegraph.com/top-people-in-crypto-a…20/mike-kayamori
  5. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Operations
    “Quoine was the first global crypto fintech company to receive a license from Japan's Financial Services Agency (JFSA), a milestone announced in August 2017.”
    reviewerQuoine was the first global crypto fintech company to receive a JFSA license, announced August 2017.Directly confirmed by the cited primary announcement.
    citedwww.prnewswire.com/news-releases/quoine-…y-300528136.html
  6. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Operations
    “In October 2021, Quoine Corporation obtained an additional Type I Financial Instruments Business license under Japan's Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, allowing it to offer cryptocurrency derivatives to Japanese users — a process that took more than a year of regulatory review.”
    reviewerOctober 2021: Quoine Corporation obtained a Type I Financial Instruments Business license after a review of more than a year.The article does not state the review length explicitly but the filing-to-grant gap it reports (roughly 16-17 months) supports the claim.
    citedcointelegraph.com/news/crypto-exchange-l…ivatives-licence
  7. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “The stolen assets comprised 107 Bitcoin (approximately $4.3 million at the time), 11 million XRP (approximately $13.1 million), 9 million TRON tokens, and roughly $60 million in ERC-20 tokens spread across 67 different token contracts — with ETH and various DeFi-related tokens making up the bulk of ERC-20 value.”
    reviewerBreakdown of stolen assets: 107 BTC (~$4.3M), 11M XRP (~$13.1M), 9M TRON, ~$60M in ERC-20 tokens across 67 contracts.Every individual figure in this sentence is independently corroborated by at least one cited source.
    citedwww.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-an…-security-breachtrmlabs.com/post/liquid-hack-the-second-time-around
  8. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “Blockchain analytics firm Elliptic counted just over $97 million received by addresses identified by Liquid as belonging to the attacker.”
    reviewerElliptic counted just over $97 million received by attacker-linked addresses.Direct, exact match to the cited source.
    citedwww.elliptic.co/blog/liquid-exchange-hac…4-million-stolen
  9. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “stolen USDT-on-TRON was converted to native TRON within minutes — a technique likely learned from the Poly Network incident where Tether froze stolen USDT”
    reviewerStolen USDT-on-TRON was converted to native TRON within minutes, a technique likely learned from the Poly Network incident where Tether froze stolen USDT.Confirmed near-verbatim by the cited TRM Labs analysis.
    citedtrmlabs.com/post/liquid-hack-the-second-time-around
  10. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “Roughly 15,000 ETH (approximately $45 million) was consolidated into a single Ethereum address (0x5578840AAe68682a9779623Fa9e8714802B59946).”
    reviewer~15,000 ETH (~$45 million) was consolidated into Ethereum address 0x5578840AAe68682a9779623Fa9e8714802B59946.Exact match including the specific address.
    citedtrmlabs.com/post/liquid-hack-the-second-time-around
  11. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “Community coordination and exchange cooperation enabled the freezing of approximately $16 million in Ethereum-based assets.”
    reviewerCommunity coordination and exchange cooperation enabled freezing of approximately $16 million in Ethereum-based assets.Figure is consistent with the Merkle Science analysis cited on the page; a separate Medium/Sentinel Protocol report cites a slightly higher $17.4M, within a reasonable range of estimate variance.
    citedwww.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-an…-security-breach
  12. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2021 Hack — $97 Million Stolen
    “the exchange had previously suffered a DNS hijack attack in 2020”
    reviewerLiquid had previously suffered a DNS hijack attack in 2020.Confirmed.
    citedtrmlabs.com/post/liquid-hack-the-second-time-around
  13. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Lazarus Group / DPRK Attribution
    “Chainalysis, in its January 2022 Crypto Crime Report, attributed the August 2021 Liquid hack to actors working on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), consistent with Lazarus Group operational patterns.”
    reviewerChainalysis, in its January 2022 Crypto Crime Report, attributed the hack to DPRK-linked actors consistent with Lazarus Group operational patterns.Confirmed by both the primary Chainalysis post and independent news coverage of the same report.
    citedwww.chainalysis.com/blog/north-korean-ha…h-all-time-high/
  14. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Lazarus Group / DPRK Attribution
    “Chainalysis estimated that hackers laundered over $91 million from the Liquid breach.”
    reviewerChainalysis estimated hackers laundered over $91 million from the Liquid breach.Figure traces to the cited secondary report of the Chainalysis findings.
    citedihodl.com/topnews/2022-01-14/north-korea…-liquidcom-hack/
  15. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Lazarus Group / DPRK Attribution
    “Chainalysis noted that DPRK-linked actors launched at least seven attacks in 2021, stealing close to $400 million in total, with the Liquid hack representing one of the largest single incidents in that period.”
    reviewerChainalysis noted DPRK-linked actors launched at least seven attacks in 2021, stealing close to $400 million in total.Confirmed.
    citedcointelegraph.com/news/north-korean-hack…-eth-chainalysis
  16. #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Emergency Loan and Acquisition
    “Six days after the hack, on August 25, 2021, Liquid Global announced it had secured a $120 million debt financing facility from FTX, the Bahamas-based exchange operated by Sam Bankman-Fried.”
    reviewerSix days after the hack, on August 25, 2021, Liquid Global announced a $120 million debt facility from FTX; the deal closed August 26, 2021.Confirmed by multiple independent contemporaneous reports.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2021/08/25/rec…0m-loan-from-ftx
  17. #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Emergency Loan and Acquisition
    “On February 2, 2022, FTX announced it would acquire Liquid Group outright for an undisclosed sum; the acquisition included Quoine Corporation and its FSA license, giving FTX a regulated foothold in the Japanese market — one of the few major jurisdictions where FTX did not yet hold a direct license.”
    reviewerOn February 2, 2022, FTX announced it would acquire Liquid Group outright for an undisclosed sum, including Quoine Corporation and its FSA license.Confirmed.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2022/02/02/ftx…pansion-in-japan
  18. #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Emergency Loan and Acquisition
    “The deal closed on approximately April 4, 2022, a few days after the originally scheduled closing.”
    reviewerThe deal closed on approximately April 4, 2022, a few days after the originally scheduled closing.Confirmed exactly by the cited source.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2022/05/02/ftx…-a-few-days-late
  19. #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Emergency Loan and Acquisition
    “Existing Japanese FTX users were migrated to the Liquid platform effective March 30, 2022.”
    reviewerExisting Japanese FTX users were migrated to the Liquid platform effective March 30, 2022.Confirmed.
  20. #29[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Collapse and Liquid Withdrawal Freeze (November 2022)
    “On November 11, 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. and 134 affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, following a collapse triggered by a CoinDesk report on Alameda Research's FTT holdings and the subsequent mass withdrawal event.”
    reviewerOn November 11, 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. and 134 affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11 in Delaware.Core facts confirmed; the exact affiliate count varies slightly (130-134) across sources depending on counting method, but 134 is within the reported range.
    citedrestructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX/
  21. #31[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Collapse and Liquid Withdrawal Freeze (November 2022)
    “The exchange's native token, QASH, fell more than 25% on the withdrawal suspension announcement.”
    reviewerQASH fell more than 25% on the withdrawal suspension announcement.Confirmed by independent reporting.
    citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2022/11/15/liq…alts-withdrawals
  22. #35[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Collapse and Liquid Withdrawal Freeze (November 2022)
    “Singapore's Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) indicated it would factor the FTX developments into its ongoing review of Quoine's registration application.”
    reviewerMAS indicated it would factor FTX developments into its ongoing review of Quoine's registration application.Confirmed by contemporaneous MAS statements.
  23. #36[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Collapse and Liquid Withdrawal Freeze (November 2022)
    “The claims submission deadline for FTX, Quoine, and affiliated entities was set at September 29, 2023.”
    reviewerThe claims submission deadline for FTX, Quoine, and affiliated entities was set at September 29, 2023.Confirmed.
    citedhelp.liquid.com/en/articles/8165529-maki…tx-claims-portal
  24. #37[confirmed][no action needed]in section: FTX Collapse and Liquid Withdrawal Freeze (November 2022)
    “The Liquid exchange's situation contrasted with FTX Japan (a separate entity), which had segregated customer funds under Japanese law and was able to resume withdrawals — a process that concluded in early 2023.”
    reviewerFTX Japan had segregated customer funds under Japanese law and resumed withdrawals in a process that concluded in early 2023.Confirmed.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.