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← LiFi Protocolreviewed 2026-10-27 · 9 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read LiFi Protocol against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed

1 claim

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #6[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Alleged DPRK Money Laundering via LI.FI (ZachXBT)
    “LI.FI's founder and team reportedly stated they had been attempting to reduce hacker-linked volumes, though the protocol's permissionless architecture provides limited screening by design.”
    reviewerLI.FI's founder and team reportedly stated they had been attempting to reduce hacker-linked volumesThe cited crypto.news article contains no statement about reducing hacker-linked volume. The 'permissionless ... by design' clause is the page's own inference and is not in that article.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    LI.FI's founder shared the May 2025 volume figures but, per ZachXBT, did not address the likely reason for the surge, and the protocol's permissionless architecture provides limited screening by design.

unverifiable

2 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “GasZipFacet deployed to the LI.FI diamond proxy (July 11, 2024), missing the whitelist validation present in other facets, about five days before the second exploit.”
    reviewerGasZipFacet was deployed about five days before the attackThe cited source does not give the facet name or date. Other cited analyses (QuillAudits, Three Sigma, Decurity) were not fetched for this.
  2. #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: March 2022 Exploit: $600,000 Approval Drain
    “Of the 29 affected wallets, 25 were reimbursed from treasury for losses totalling approximately $80,000 (about 13% of total losses); the remaining four wallets, which together lost approximately $517,000, were offered compensation in the form of angel-investment / early-investor token allocations in LI.FI rather than direct cash repayment.”
    reviewerMarch 2022 exploit details: 29 wallets, about $600,000, 25 reimbursed (about $80,000), four wallets about $517,000 offered token allocationsPrimary blog blocked. Only the $600K headline loss is corroborated; the reimbursement split was not checked against another source.

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: User Compensation and Incident Response
    “one describes a commitment to fully compensate all 153 wallets”
    reviewerLI.FI described as committing to compensate / voluntary compensation plan for all 153 walletsThe page does hedge that accounts differ, and the 'evaluating options' quote is accurate. The primary source does not itself show a commitment.
  2. #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
    “As of late 2025, LI.FI reported over $60 billion in lifetime transaction volume and approximately 1,000 B2B integration partners”
    reviewerAs of late 2025 LI.FI had approximately 1,000 B2B integration partnersSlight overstatement. Figures are company self-reported.

confirmed

4 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2024 Exploit: $11.6 Million Approval Drain
    “On July 16, 2024, LI.FI suffered a second, substantially larger exploit in which approximately $11.6 million was drained from 153 wallets on Ethereum and Arbitrum.”
    reviewerJuly 2024 exploit drained about $11.6M from 153 wallets on Ethereum and Arbitrum; stolen assets were USDC, USDT, DAIMatches LI.FI's own incident report.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2024 Exploit: $11.6 Million Approval Drain
    “LI.FI attributed the omission to 'individual human error in overseeing the deployment process.'”
    reviewerLI.FI attributed the failure to individual human error in overseeing deploymentQuote is accurate.
  3. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Alleged DPRK Money Laundering via LI.FI (ZachXBT)
    “ZachXBT stated that DPRK actors represented 'at minimum 15–25% of LiFi activity' during May 2025, the same month LI.FI reported record performance of $3 billion in volume and 4.37 million transactions.”
    reviewerZachXBT alleged on June 3, 2025 that DPRK actors accounted for at minimum 15-25% of LiFi activity in May 2025; chain-hop quote; May volume $3B and 4.37M transactionsAccurately attributed as an allegation. The summary says 'May 2025 volume' while the quote says 'activity', a minor looseness.
  4. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Funding and Corporate Background
    “Total capital raised is approximately $51.7 million.”
    reviewer$29M Series A extension led by Multicoin and CoinFund, total raised about $51.7M, 595% growth Oct 2024 to Oct 2025Core funding figures hold.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.