v1 → v2
Scores
trust_score53 → 58
severity_base— → —
score_modifier-5 → -5
Sections
Company Background
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2020 E-Commerce Data Breach (272,000 Physical Addresses, 1M+ Emails) → 2020 E-Commerce Data Breach (First-Party) — Approximately 1 Million Emails and 270,000 Physical Addresses
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Class Action Lawsuit (Ledger and Shopify, 2021) → Class Action Litigation Over the 2020 Breach (Ledger and Shopify)
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Post-Breach Phishing Campaigns and Physical Threats (2021–2022) → Post-Breach Phishing and Alleged Physical-Threat Campaigns (2021–2022)
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Ledger Connect Kit Supply Chain Attack (December 2023) → Ledger Recover Controversy (May 2023)
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Ledger Recover Controversy (May 2023) → Ledger Connect Kit Supply Chain Attack (December 2023)
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Fake Ledger Live Apps — Apple App Store Theft of $9.5M (April 2026) → Post-Exploit Response: Reimbursement Pledge and Removal of Blind Signing
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January 2026 Third-Party Data Breach (Global-e) → NPM Supply Chain Risk: Lessons from the Connect Kit Compromise
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Known Attacker Addresses (Connect Kit Exploit) → Fake Ledger Live App on Apple App Store — Alleged $9.5 Million Theft (April 2026)
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Regulatory and Legal Standing → January 2026 Third-Party Data Breach via Global-e
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User Safety Guidance → Known Attacker Infrastructure (Connect Kit Exploit)
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Company Overview → Regulatory and Legal Standing
- Ledger SAS was founded in 2014 in Paris, France by Thomas France, Nicolas Bacca, Eric Larcheveque, Joel Pobeda, and Vanessa Fara Rabesandratana. The company manufactures hardware cryptocurrency wallets — primarily the Nano S Plus and Nano X — that provide offline private key storage for over 5,500 cryptocurrencies and tokens. As of 2024 Ledger reported approximately $70.9 million in annual recurring revenue. The company raised $380 million in a 2021 Series C round and an additional $108 million in March 2023, achieving a valuation of approximately $1.3–1.5 billion. As of early 2026 Ledger was reportedly evaluating a US IPO targeting a valuation above $4 billion. Ledger's products are broadly regarded as legitimate and technically sound hardware security modules for self-custody of digital assets.+
December 2023 Connect Kit Supply Chain Attack → User Safety Guidance
- On December 14, 2023, Ledger's open-source JavaScript library @ledgerhq/connect-kit — used by DeFi protocol front-ends to connect Ledger hardware wallets to decentralized applications — was compromised in a supply chain attack. A former Ledger employee fell victim to a phishing attack that yielded the attacker access to the employee's NPMJS account session token, bypassing existing two-factor authentication controls. The attacker used this access to publish three malicious versions of the package: 1.1.5, 1.1.6, and 1.1.7. Versions 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 downloaded a secondary malicious npm package (internally identified as 2e6d5f64604be31) acting as a crypto drainer, while version 1.1.7 directly embedded a wallet-draining payload.- - The injected payload was the Angel Drainer malware-as-a-service, a tool designed to craft malicious transaction approvals that redirect user funds to attacker-controlled wallets when signed. The main drainer smart contract was deployed at Ethereum address 0x000067464bdcbec51051ddcce8551e702f130000. This contract featured a multicall function accessible only to the operator wallet at 0x00003ffA7857408ab714c28B1451914330240000. The collector wallet — used for profit collection and harvesting approvals directly from users — was 0x658729879fca881d9526480b82ae00efc54b5c2d. A fee-collector wallet at 0x412f10AAd96fD78da6736387e2C84931Ac20313f, which holds the ENS name angel-drainer.eth, received 15% of drained funds as the Angel Drainer service fee; the remaining 85% went to the collector wallet.- - Affected DeFi protocols and front-ends included SushiSwap, Zapper, Revoke.cash, MetalSwap, Harvest Finance, and hey.xyz (Lens protocol), among others. Security researchers estimated upwards of 100 front-ends were exposed. Estimates of total funds drained varied between $484,000 and $850,000, with Ledger's official communications citing approximately $600,000. The approximately $44,000 in USDT held in the attacker's wallet at 0x658729879fca881d9526480b82ae00efc54b5c2d was frozen by Tether at 2:55 PM CET on December 14, 2023, following coordination with Ledger. - Ledger's technology and security teams were alerted at approximately 1:45 PM CET by ecosystem partners including Blockaid. A patched version (1.1.8) was deployed within 40 minutes. The total window from NPMJS compromise to full resolution was approximately five hours; the active asset-draining window was under two hours.
Ledger's Post-Exploit Response and Reimbursement Commitment → (section 14)
- Following the December 2023 Connect Kit attack, Ledger Chairman and CEO Pascal Gauthier issued a public letter committing to reimburse all affected users — both Ledger and non-Ledger customers — by the end of February 2024. Gauthier stated: 'My personal commitment: Ledger will dedicate as much internal and external resources as possible to help the affected individuals recover their assets.' Ledger also announced it would phase out blind signing for EVM DApps by June 2024, replacing it with a clear-signing standard that displays human-readable transaction data on the device screen, consistent with Ledger's existing 'what you see is what you sign' policy advocacy. WalletConnect was coordinated with to disable the rogue WalletConnect instance used in the attack. Ledger additionally committed to reinforced npm access controls, third-party audits on code distribution pipelines, and enhanced employee phishing-resistance training. The Ledger support portal subsequently published a claims process for affected users.+
2020 Customer Database Breach → (section 15)
- In June 2020, a researcher participating in Ledger's bug bounty program identified a vulnerability in Ledger's e-commerce website. The breach was patched on July 14, 2020. Forensic investigation conducted by Orange Cyberdefense determined that an attacker had exported customer records from Ledger's marketing and e-commerce database. The breach exposed 1,075,382 email addresses belonging to newsletter subscribers and 272,853 records containing full names, mailing addresses, phone numbers, and product order details belonging to hardware wallet purchasers.- - A separate, related breach originating from Ledger's e-commerce platform provider Shopify came to light in December 2020. Shopify became aware of this breach in September 2020 — involving rogue employees of a third-party support contractor — but did not notify Ledger until December 21, 2020. The Shopify-related breach exposed approximately 292,000 records, of which roughly 20,000 were new and not previously known from the July 2020 incident.- - The stolen data was privately sold in August 2020 before being publicly posted on the Raidforum hacker forum in December 2020, in two files titled 'All Emails (Subscription).txt' and 'Ledger Orders (Buyers) only.txt.' The public release immediately fueled phishing, SIM-swapping, and physical extortion campaigns targeting Ledger customers at their home addresses. Ledger filed a complaint with the French public prosecutor on August 5, 2020, and notified France's data protection authority (CNIL) on July 17, 2020. - A class action lawsuit was filed in the Northern District of California in April 2021 against Ledger SAS, Ledger Technologies Inc., Shopify (USA) Inc., and Shopify Inc., alleging negligence and cover-up. The case was initially dismissed in November 2021 on jurisdictional grounds, but was revived by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in December 2022. A second class action was filed in the US District Court of Delaware in April 2022.
January 2026 Global-e Third-Party Payment Processor Breach → (section 16)
- On January 5, 2026, Ledger disclosed a new data exposure incident affecting customers who had purchased products on Ledger.com using Global-e as the merchant of record — typically for international orders. The breach was caused by unauthorized access to a Global-e cloud-based information system, facilitated by a misconfigured API key on the Ledger website. Exposed data included customer names, email addresses, postal addresses, and phone numbers. No payment card information, account credentials, or cryptocurrency recovery phrases were accessed. Global-e retained independent forensic experts to investigate the incident. The exact number of impacted individuals was not disclosed by either Ledger or Global-e at the time of disclosure.+
Angel Drainer Attribution and npm Supply Chain Risk → (section 17)
- The December 2023 Connect Kit attack has been attributed to the Angel Drainer group, operators of a malware-as-a-service drainer infrastructure. The Angel Drainer fee-collector wallet at 0x412f10AAd96fD78da6736387e2C84931Ac20313f holds the ENS name angel-drainer.eth and received 15% of all drained funds as a service fee. Angel Drainer had been linked to prior DeFi phishing campaigns before this incident. Blockchain security firm Blockaid subsequently tracked a new version of the Angel Drainer malware in September 2024, indicating the group remained active despite an alleged shutdown. The attack demonstrated systemic risk in the npm software supply chain for DeFi: a single compromised developer account with publish rights to a widely-depended-upon package could expose hundreds of DApp front-ends and their users simultaneously. Checkmarx and Cycode identified that the lack of two-factor authentication enforcement on npm publish rights was a contributing factor.+
Timeline events
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Accepted submissions
No changes to accepted submissions.
Each version is bound to the decision event that created it. Verify the chain anchor for either via the audit log.
v1 hash: 7451b0c71cab8ee2a379b2cb845cf0713f21c55d4a63d0e6c3ecee6c4e6ed6cd
v2 hash: 135d33bc9d352bb7781a0865ec0e03ebafe079dd00a919ddb5e0f5b9e8a08946