Fact-check findings

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #1[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the summary

   “ZachXBT has flagged the protocol in the context of broader DeFi security concerns, and the project has been surrounded by scam forks, impersonator accounts, and fraudulent staking services operated by unaffiliated parties.”

   reviewerZachXBT has flagged the protocol in the context of broader DeFi security concernsNo section or source on the page mentions ZachXBT, and a search found nothing linking him to Keep3r/KP3R. The scam-forks half of the sentence is supported by the body.
2. #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Keep3r Oracle Implicated in Inverse Finance $15.6M Hack (April 2022)

   “On April 2, 2022, the DeFi lending protocol Inverse Finance was exploited for approximately $15.6 million in ETH, WBTC, DOLA, and YFI.”

   reviewerInverse Finance exploit April 2, 2022, $15.6M, Keep3r oracleNot fetched in this review. The date and amount are consistent with the CoinDesk URL slug and the Inverse incident title. The 'Keep3r oracle' attribution was not independently checked.
   citedwww.coindesk.com/tech/2022/04/02/defi-le…-for-156-million

The claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.

1. #8[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: SEC Regulatory Scrutiny and Andre Cronje's 2022 Departure

   “As of 2025, the token trades significantly below its all-time high — in the range of $2–$5 — representing a decline of over 99% from peak. The circulating supply is approximately 476,000 KP3R with a market capitalization under $2 million.”

   reviewerToken market data: ATH about $1,995 in Oct 2020; 2025 price $2-$5; circulating supply about 476,000Price and supply figures appear outdated, and the snippets did not give a stable ATH date. No exact replacement text was verified, so no correction is proposed; the judge should treat this as a refresh.
   citedcoinmarketcap.com/currencies/keep3rv1/

A cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.

1. #3[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: June 2023 Exploit — Vanity Address Governance Takeover ($211k)

   “https://daotimes.com/keep3r-network-exploited-for-over-200k/”

   reviewerCited DAO Times URL is liveThe primary source for the exploit is dead at the live URL. The replacement was seen in search results but not fetched, so the judge may prefer the archive_url instead.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   https://defi-wonderland.notion.site/Post-Mortem-KP3R-v1-Exploit-12-06-2023-eff860276f9b4babb0c9b2b4f2bb5c70
   citeddaotimes.com/keep3r-network-exploited-for-over-200k/
2. #4[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “https://daotimes.com/keep3r-network-exploited-for-over-200k/”

   reviewerTimeline entry for the June 12 exploit cites the dead DAO Times URLSame dead URL as above.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   https://defi-wonderland.notion.site/Post-Mortem-KP3R-v1-Exploit-12-06-2023-eff860276f9b4babb0c9b2b4f2bb5c70
   citeddaotimes.com/keep3r-network-exploited-for-over-200k/

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Two-Year Latent Vulnerability in GaugeProxyV2 (September 2022)

   “Beyond Keep3r, Statemind identified the same class of vulnerability across five additional blockchain projects: Pickle Finance, Spirit Swap, Venera Swap, Snowball Finance, and Milky Swap.”

   reviewerStatemind disclosed the GaugeProxyV2 flaw in September 2022 with five other affected projects including Spirit SwapThe core claims are confirmed. Spirit Swap was not found in the fetched release, and the release's own count is inconsistent (the title says 6 others). The timeline's 'Five other DeFi protocols' is consistent with the section.
   citedwww.prnewswire.com/news-releases/statemi…s-301635676.html
2. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Fraudulent Forks, Impersonator Accounts, and stKeep3r Scam

   “subsequently investigated whether Yearn's yield-bearing vaults constituted investment vehicles under U.S. securities law — applying the Howey Test standard.”

   reviewerCronje disclosed SEC correspondence in January 2025; SEC began in 2021; Sonic Labs; Howey testMost claims are confirmed. The Howey attribution is not in the cited article; other cited sources were not checked.
   citedcryptoslate.com/how-sec-scrutiny-pushed-…to-quit-in-2022/
3. #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “SEC begins sending investigative letters to Andre Cronje requesting information about Yearn Finance and, subsequently, Keep3r Network's operational mechanics.”

   reviewerTimeline says SEC letters asked about Keep3r Network's operational mechanics; section says the focus was YearnThe timeline overstates Keep3r's role relative to the source and relative to the page's own section, which says the focus was Yearn.
   citedcryptoslate.com/how-sec-scrutiny-pushed-…to-quit-in-2022/

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2023 Exploit — Vanity Address Governance Takeover ($211k)

   “On June 12, 2023, Keep3r Network suffered a confirmed exploit resulting in the loss of 4,084 KP3R tokens valued at approximately $211,000 at the time.”

   reviewerJune 2023 exploit: 4,084 KP3R (~$211k), vanity address, June 2 and June 12 datesThe facts are confirmed by the post-mortem. The cited DAO Times URL returns 404 (see link_rot finding).
   citeddaotimes.com/keep3r-network-exploited-for-over-200k/