Fact-check findings

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Technical Vulnerability Analysis

   “The absence of pre-deployment auditing is a significant contributing factor to the exploit.”

   reviewerAbsence of pre-deployment audit is a significant contributing factorEditorial inference; the sources fetched do not state this. The previous sentence correctly hedges that no audit evidence has surfaced.
2. #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Compensation Program

   “By November 2025, the team had distributed over $1,031,115 USDC across multiple compensation rounds to affected users, including a round in November 2025 distributing an additional 36,977.61 USDC.”

   reviewerOver $1,031,115 USDC distributed by November 2025, including 36,977.61 USDC in NovemberThe only cited source likely to carry these figures (mexc) is gone, and the other cited sources predate the distributions. The figures were not found anywhere else.
   citedwww.mexc.com/news/95334phemex.com/news/article/kame-aggregator-…mpensation-18436
3. #12[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Cumulative compensation distributions exceed $1,031,115 USDC across all stages; team states commitment to 100% reimbursement.”

   reviewerTimeline: cumulative compensation exceeds $1,031,115 USDC in 2025-11Same as the section claim. The timeline entry has no source, and the figure was not found in any reachable source.
4. #14[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Background and Legitimacy

   “The protocol was founded by Juan Delgado and Carlos Delgado, along with at least one additional co-founder.”

   reviewerFounders are Juan Delgado and Carlos DelgadoTracxn is a gated aggregator and I did not fetch it. Founder names for a named-person claim need a stronger source than a database listing.
   citedtracxn.com/d/companies/kame/__8YJXssv554…ard-of-directors
5. #15[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Background and Legitimacy

   “Kame Aggregator launched on the Sei blockchain in late May 2025 as the network's first native DEX aggregator.”

   reviewerLaunch in late May 2025 as Sei's first native DEX aggregatorI did not independently check the launch date or the 'first native' claim. The cited sources are low-tier promotional or directory pages.
   citedstouy.com/kame-dex-aggregator-on-sei-guide/

A cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.

1. #13[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: Incident Response and Fund Recovery

   “https://www.mexc.com/news/95334”

   reviewerLink rot on mexc.com sourceThe URL is permanently gone and cannot be archived. The same URL is also cited in sections[3].sources[0] and sources_used[7].
   citedwww.mexc.com/news/95334

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #1[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Exploit — September 2025

   “On September 13, 2025, Kame Aggregator's AggregationRouter smart contract was exploited via an arbitrary external call vulnerability in its swap() function.”

   reviewerExploit occurred on September 13, 2025Primary sources say Sept 12; press implies Sept 13 (possible timezone difference). Not changed because sources conflict; the date should be reconciled by a human.
   citedkameagg.substack.com/p/post-mortem-kame-…gregator-exploitrevoke.cash/exploits/kame
2. #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Exploit — September 2025

   “Attackers designated a malicious Multicall contract (address 0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11) as the executor”

   reviewerContract addresses and Multicall executorAddresses match the case study; describing the canonical Multicall3 as 'malicious' is a mischaracterisation, though it was used as the executor.
   citedquadrigainitiative.com/casestudy/kameagg…cutorcallbug.php
3. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security Exploit — September 2025

   “Secondary exploiters who acted opportunistically during the incident retained approximately $356,438 that was not recovered.”

   reviewerSecondary exploiters retained ~$356,438The figure equals total minus recoveries (1,324,535 - 946,195 - 21,900), a derived number, not reported by any source. Whether the entire remainder is held by copycats is an inference.
   citedkameagg.substack.com/p/post-mortem-kame-…gregator-exploit
4. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Technical Vulnerability Analysis

   “The Kame team's post-mortem identified five remediation requirements: eliminating arbitrary external calls, implementing strict executor whitelisting, deploying real-time monitoring systems, conducting enhanced third-party audits, and adding suspend/upgrade functionality to the aggregator contract.”

   reviewerTeam posted five remediation requirements including suspend/upgrade functionalitySubstance matches; the 'five' count and pause/upgrade as a remediation item are not clearly stated.
   citedkameagg.substack.com/p/post-mortem-kame-…gregator-exploit
5. #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “2025-09-14”

   reviewerTimeline: primary exploiter transfer on 2025-09-14Press reports of the return are dated Sept 13, so a Sept 14 return looks late. Exact transaction date was not independently confirmed, so no correction is proposed.
   citedwww.cryptopolitan.com/kame-aggregator-recovers-185-eth/
6. #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Compensation Program

   “committing to full reimbursement of losses”

   reviewerKame committed to full reimbursement of lossesRevoke.cash describes a phased plan (about 75% upfront), not a flat full immediate reimbursement. The page's own text also says the team aimed at 100%, which may come from a later update.
   citedrevoke.cash/exploits/kame

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Exploit — September 2025

   “Approximately 830 unique user accounts were affected. Total assets drained were approximately $1,324,535 USD.”

   reviewerAbout $1.325M drained from 830 walletsMatches the post-mortem.
   citedkameagg.substack.com/p/post-mortem-kame-…gregator-exploit
2. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Exploit — September 2025

   “agreeing to a 20% bounty arrangement and returning approximately $946,195 in funds. White hat hackers assisted in recovering an additional $21,900.”

   reviewerPrimary exploiter returned about $946,195 under a 20% bounty; whitehats recovered $21,900Confirmed.
   citedkameagg.substack.com/p/post-mortem-kame-…gregator-exploit
3. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Incident Response and Fund Recovery

   “The primary exploiter accepted and transferred 185 ETH to a designated recovery wallet via an on-chain Ethereum transaction.”

   reviewerPrimary exploiter returned 185 ETHConfirmed.
   citedwww.cryptopolitan.com/kame-aggregator-recovers-185-eth/