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← JELLYreviewed 2026-10-28 · 21 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read JELLY against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 2partially supported 2confirmed 172 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

2 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Token Background
    “At launch, the token surged approximately 2,800x within two and a half hours, reaching a market capitalization of roughly $250 million.”
    reviewerThe token surged approximately 2,800x within two and a half hours, reaching a market capitalization of roughly $250 millionBoth cited sources were fetched directly and neither supports '2,800x in two and a half hours.' The $250M market cap figure is correct, but the multiplier/timeframe is roughly two orders of magnitude off from what the cited reporting actually says (1,278% / ~13.8x in four hours per Decrypt).
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    At launch, the token surged approximately 1,278% within four hours, reaching a market capitalization of roughly $250 million.
  2. #9[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: ZachXBT's Analysis and Criticism
    “He accused Hyperliquid of 'mimicking the centralized playbook of FTX.'”
    reviewerZachXBT accused Hyperliquid of 'mimicking the centralized playbook of FTX'Extensive search found the 'mimicking the centralized playbook of FTX' framing only ever attributed to Bitget CEO Gracy Chen ('FTX 2.0') or BitMEX's Arthur Hayes, never to ZachXBT. This appears to be a misattributed or fabricated quote; no source could be found crediting it to ZachXBT.

partially supported

2 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Manipulation Mechanics: The Self-Liquidation Attack
    “On-chain analysis by ZachXBT and others identified that wallets 0x20e and 0x67f received funding from centralized exchanges including Binance, OKX, MEXC, and Bybit prior to executing the attack.”
    reviewerOn-chain analysis identified that wallets 0x20e and 0x67f received funding from centralized exchanges including Binance, OKX, MEXC, and Bybit prior to the attackBinance and OKX funding is well corroborated across independent outlets, but the specific cited source does not support the full four-exchange list, and MEXC/Bybit involvement could not be independently confirmed from any source I could fetch. Treated as overstated/cherry-picked rather than fabricated since some secondary aggregation does list all four.
  2. #21[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Systemic Risk: Low-Cap Token Perpetuals on DEXes
    “Security researchers at Halborn and OAK Research noted that the attack required relatively modest capital — approximately $7.17 million deposited — to threaten a $230 million vault.”
    reviewerThe attack required relatively modest capital (~$7.17 million) to threaten a $230 million vault, a 'capital efficiency ratio' cited by Halborn and OAK ResearchThe underlying figures ($7.17M, $230M) are each independently confirmed elsewhere on the page, but the specific framing as attributed analysis from named researchers is not found verbatim in the sources; it reads as the page's own synthesis presented as a researcher finding.

confirmed

17 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Background
    “JellyJelly (ticker: JELLYJELLY, commonly referred to as JELLY) is a Solana-based memecoin launched on January 29, 2025 via Pump.fun by Iqram Magdon-Ismail, co-founder of Venmo, and early investor Sam Lessin.”
    reviewerJellyJelly was launched on January 29, 2025 via Pump.fun by Venmo co-founder Iqram Magdon-Ismail and early investor Sam LessinLaunch date, platform, and named individuals are accurately reported.
  2. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Background
    “By the time of the Hyperliquid manipulation incident in late March 2025, market cap had declined to approximately $10–25 million, creating the conditions for a low-liquidity manipulation attack.”
    reviewerBy the time of the Hyperliquid incident in late March 2025, JELLY's market cap had declined to approximately $10-25 millionThe hedged $10-25M range is consistent with figures across multiple independent reports.
  3. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Manipulation Mechanics: The Self-Liquidation Attack
    “Wallet 0xde9 opened a $4.1 million short position on JELLY perpetuals on Hyperliquid while two counterpart wallets — 0x20e and 0x67f — simultaneously opened long positions of $2.15 million and $1.9 million respectively, for a combined deposit of approximately $7.17 million.”
    reviewerCoordinated wallets 0xde9 ($4.1M short), 0x20e ($2.15M long), 0x67f ($1.9M long) deposited a combined ~$7.17M to execute a self-liquidation attack, pumping JELLY spot price ~429% within an hour, forcing the short onto the HLP vaultWallet labels and dollar figures match the Arkham Intelligence postmortem and are corroborated by Halborn.
  4. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Manipulation Mechanics: The Self-Liquidation Attack
    “The HLP vault, now holding the toxic short as JELLY price continued to climb, accumulated unrealized losses that peaked at approximately $13.5 million. The attacker withdrew roughly $6.26 million before the protocol intervened, leaving approximately $900,000 frozen.”
    reviewerHLP vault unrealized losses peaked at approximately $13.5 million; attacker withdrew ~$6.26 million before intervention, leaving ~$900,000 frozenDirectly confirmed by two independently fetched sources.
  5. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT's Analysis and Criticism
    “ZachXBT alleged that five addresses connected to the manipulation entity held approximately 10% of JELLY's total supply on Solana, valued at roughly $2 million.”
    reviewerFive addresses connected to the manipulation entity held approximately 10% of JELLY's total supply on Solana, valued at roughly $2 millionFigure is corroborated closely enough ($1.9M+ vs. 'roughly $2 million') to be confirmed.
  6. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT's Analysis and Criticism
    “ZachXBT concluded: 'I have little interest in helping Hyperliquid if they have an incident after seeing how they choose to approach them.'”
    reviewerZachXBT contrasted Hyperliquid's rapid response to JELLY with its inaction during the Radiant Capital hack by DPRK-linked actors, and quoted him saying he has 'little interest in helping Hyperliquid'Quote and Radiant Capital comparison both verified directly against the cited source.
  7. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: HLP Vault Exposure and Financial Impact
    “The Hyperliquidity Provider (HLP) vault is Hyperliquid's shared market-making pool, holding approximately $230 million in assets at the time of the incident.”
    reviewerThe HLP vault held approximately $230 million in assets at the time of the incidentDirect WebFetch of ccn.com returned HTTP 403; figure corroborated via search-engine summary of the same article and widely repeated elsewhere (BeInCrypto headline: 'to Avoid $230 Million in Losses').
  8. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: HLP Vault Exposure and Financial Impact
    “This was noted as the second major HLP stress event in March 2025; an earlier ETH liquidation event caused approximately $4 million in losses.”
    reviewerThis was the second major HLP stress event in March 2025; an earlier ETH liquidation event caused approximately $4 million in lossesConfirmed via independent search; the ETH liquidation event is well documented as occurring about two weeks before JELLY.
  9. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: HLP Vault Exposure and Financial Impact
    “The HYPE token, Hyperliquid's native governance token, dropped as much as 22% during the crisis before partially recovering to approximately 10% below pre-incident levels.”
    reviewerThe HYPE token dropped as much as 22% during the crisis before partially recovering to approximately 10% below pre-incident levelsSources disagree on the exact percentage (10-23% depending on outlet and measurement window), but the page's hedged figures fall within the reported range and are corroborated by The Defiant.
  10. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Hyperliquid's Emergency Response and Decentralization Controversy
    “Facing mounting losses, Hyperliquid's validator set convened an emergency vote and reached quorum within approximately two minutes to delist JELLY perpetuals. All open positions were force-settled at a fixed price of $0.0095 — far below the market price of approximately $0.50 at the time of delisting, and coinciding with the original short entry price.”
    reviewerHyperliquid's validator set reached quorum within approximately two minutes to delist JELLY, force-settling positions at $0.0095 versus a market price of ~$0.50, with just 16 validatorsNote: CoinDesk describes $0.50 as the price 'fed to oracles,' which the page renders as 'market price' — a reasonable common paraphrase used by most outlets, not a material error.
  11. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Hyperliquid's Emergency Response and Decentralization Controversy
    “Critics noted that the swift validator intervention — in which just 16 validators effectively reversed market outcomes by resetting the oracle price — exposed that Hyperliquid operates with a level of centralized control inconsistent with its public claims of decentralization.”
    reviewerJust 16 validators effectively reversed market outcomes by resetting the oracle priceDirect WebFetch of blockworks.co returned 403; figure corroborated via independent reporting on validator count.
  12. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Hyperliquid's Emergency Response and Decentralization Controversy
    “Arthur Hayes, BitMEX co-founder, publicly stated 'Let's stop pretending Hyperliquid is decentralized.'”
    reviewerArthur Hayes publicly stated 'Let's stop pretending Hyperliquid is decentralized'Quote confirmed verbatim (capitalization differs trivially).
  13. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Hyperliquid's Emergency Response and Decentralization Controversy
    “Gracy Chen, CEO of Bitget, described Hyperliquid as a 'fake DEX.'”
    reviewerGracy Chen, CEO of Bitget, described Hyperliquid as a 'fake DEX'Confirmed via multiple independent search results even though direct fetch of the cited URL was blocked.
  14. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Hyperliquid's Emergency Response and Decentralization Controversy
    “The incident was characterized by Galois Capital as demonstrating a 'validator put' — an implicit guarantee that if HLP losses grow large enough, validators will intervene to cap them, undermining the principle of market-determined outcomes.”
    reviewerThe incident was characterized by Galois Capital as demonstrating a 'validator put'Corroborated via search synthesis of the cited article despite a direct-fetch block.
  15. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Post-Incident Risk Management Reforms
    “The Liquidator vault within HLP was restructured to hold smaller positions, rebalance less frequently, and employ more sophisticated liquidation handling. Automatic Deleveraging (ADL) was modified to activate only when Liquidator vault losses exceed defined thresholds, preventing cascading fund transfers between vaults. Open Interest caps were made more dynamic to better reflect real-time market conditions and token liquidity.”
    reviewerHyperliquid announced four risk management reforms: Liquidator vault restructuring, ADL threshold changes, dynamic OI caps, and on-chain validator voting for delistingFully confirmed against the cited source.
  16. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “CoinDesk reports on lasting reputational and capital flight impact from the JELLY incident, noting HLP vault deposits declined significantly amid decentralization concerns.”
    reviewerCoinDesk (April 10, 2025) reported HLP vault deposits declined significantly amid decentralization concernsDirectly confirmed; the article actually describes a more dramatic decline (72%) than the page states, but the page's characterization ('declined significantly') is accurate and conservative.
  17. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Token Background
    “The token was positioned as a utility token for the JellyJelly video chat application, which records, captions, and summarizes video calls.”
    reviewerThe JellyJelly app records, captions, and summarizes video callsConfirmed via the app's own App Store listing.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.