← Iranian Crypto Exchanges OFAC Designation — Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, Ramzinex (June 2026)reviewed 2026-09-07 · 20 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Iranian Crypto Exchanges OFAC Designation — Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, Ramzinex (June 2026) against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
4 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #1[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Regulatory Action — June 2, 2026 SDN Designations
“On June 2, 2026, OFAC formally designated Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex under Executive Order 13224 (counterterrorism authority, as amended) and Executive Order 13902 (targeting persons operating in the financial sector of Iran's economy), as well as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.”
reviewerOFAC designated the four exchanges on June 2, 2026 under E.O. 13224 and E.O. 13902The page implies NDAA FY2012 was a legal basis for the SDN designation alongside the two executive orders. The primary source (Treasury press release) cites only E.O. 13224 and E.O. 13902 as the designation authorities; NDAA 2012 operates as a separate, consequential statute triggering secondary sanctions on FFIs once an entity is deemed an Iranian financial institution.Proposed correction (not yet applied)On June 2, 2026, OFAC formally designated Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex under Executive Order 13224 (counterterrorism authority, as amended) and Executive Order 13902 (targeting persons operating in the financial sector of Iran's economy). Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 separately exposes foreign financial institutions to sanctions for significant transactions with the newly designated Iranian financial institutions. - #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Regulatory Action — June 2, 2026 SDN Designations
“Bessent stated: 'While Iran's economy is in free fall, the regime has chosen to co-opt digital asset technologies for its corrupt agenda.'”
reviewerDirect quotation of Treasury Secretary Scott BessentMinor but real misquotation of a direct quote attributed to a named official; the word 'own' is missing from the rendered quote.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Bessent stated: 'While Iran's economy is in free fall, the regime has chosen to co-opt digital asset technologies for its own corrupt agenda.' - #8[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex — Co-Designated Exchanges
“A May 2026 Reuters investigation cited by multiple outlets alleged the platform had processed at least $2.3 billion since 2023 for sanctioned Iranian entities.”
reviewerA May 2026 Reuters investigation found Wallex processed at least $2.3 billion since 2023 for sanctioned Iranian entitiesNo source list entry in this section cites Reuters, and extensive searching found no Reuters report matching this specific claim about Wallex. This appears to conflate or fabricate a detail, possibly confused with the unrelated Shelbit/Reuters $4 billion story from July 2026.Proposed correction (not yet applied)OFAC alleged Wallex facilitated numerous transactions linked to the IRGC. - #12[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: On-Chain Context — Central Bank of Iran and Stablecoin Operations
“The IRGC-Qods Force and Hezbollah were identified as the ultimate beneficial controllers of those wallets.”
reviewerThe IRGC-Qods Force and Hezbollah were identified as the ultimate beneficial controllers of the two frozen walletsThe page overstates a sourced 'linkage' into an ownership/control claim; the cited source attributes the wallets to Iran's central bank, with IRGC-Qods Force/Hezbollah only described as linked.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The IRGC-Qods Force and Hezbollah were identified as having linkages to those wallets, which OFAC designated as property of Iran's central bank.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: On-Chain Context — Central Bank of Iran and Stablecoin Operations
“On April 24, 2026, OFAC updated its existing 2019 CBI designation by adding two TRON-network wallet addresses — TTiDLWE6fZK8okMJv6ijg42yrH6W2pjSr9 and TNiq9AXBp9EjUqhDhrwrfvAA8U3GUQZH81 — to the SDN list. Tether coordinated with U.S. law enforcement to freeze a combined $344 million in USDT held across those two addresses on the same day as the designation, representing the largest known on-chain freeze of Iranian sovereign crypto reserves on public record.”
reviewerOn April 24, 2026, OFAC updated the 2019 CBI designation adding two named TRON wallet addresses, and Tether froze $344 million the same dayCore facts (wallets, amount, designation) are solidly confirmed; the 'same day' framing for the Tether freeze specifically could not be independently pinned down against a primary timestamp and is treated as a minor, unresolved wrinkle rather than a hard error. - #17[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Compliance and Secondary Sanctions Risk
“Blockchain compliance firm GlobalLedger and TRM Labs both noted that the addition of counterterrorism authority (E.O. 13224) beyond the pre-existing Iran financial-sector blocking authority (E.O. 13902) materially escalates the designation severity and widens the universe of potentially sanctionable counterparties.”
reviewerGlobalLedger and TRM Labs both noted that adding E.O. 13224 to E.O. 13902 materially escalates designation severity and widens the universe of sanctionable counterpartiesThe underlying facts (both authorities cited, secondary sanctions exposure real) are accurate, but the specific analytical claim is attributed to two named firms whose cited articles do not actually make that argument.
confirmed
14 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Nobitex — Primary Target
“Nobitex is Iran's largest cryptocurrency exchange, alleged by OFAC and confirmed by multiple blockchain analytics firms to have processed more than 50 percent of all Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025, representing approximately $4.7 billion in volume.”
reviewerNobitex processed >50% of Iran's 2025 digital asset inflows, approximately $4.7 billionBoth the percentage and dollar figure are independently corroborated. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Nobitex — Primary Target
“Elliptic's on-chain analysis found that the four sanctioned exchanges collectively processed at least $40 billion in lifetime cryptoasset transactions, with Nobitex as the dominant actor.”
reviewerThe four exchanges collectively processed at least $40 billion in lifetime cryptoasset transactionsMatches source language closely. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Nobitex — Primary Target
“OFAC designated four Nobitex executives individually: Amir Hossein Rad (chairman, co-founder, and former CEO), Seyed Ali Khoee (current CEO), Seyed Mohammad Ali Aghamir Mohammad Ali (co-founder and blockchain lead), and Seyed Mohammad Aghamir Mohammad Ali (co-founder).”
reviewerOFAC designated four Nobitex executives by name and titleNames and titles match the primary source verbatim. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Nobitex — Primary Target
“The Aghamir co-founders are alleged members of the Kharrazi family, described by Reuters as one of the Islamic Republic's most influential dynasties, with marriage connections to all three of Iran's supreme leaders beginning with Ayatollah Khomeini.”
reviewerThe Aghamir co-founders belong to the Kharrazi family, related by marriage to all three of Iran's supreme leaders beginning with Khomeini, and used an alternative family name to conceal the affiliationVerified via secondary reporting on the underlying Reuters investigation; the 'three supreme leaders' claim is accurate given Mojtaba Khamenei's ascension in early 2026, not an error as it might initially appear. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex — Co-Designated Exchanges
“Wallex is Iran's second-largest digital asset exchange by 2025 volume, having received an alleged 12 percent of all Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025 (approximately $1.45 billion).”
reviewerWallex received 12% of Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025 (~$1.45B) and Bitpin received 10% (~$821M)Both percentage and dollar figures for Wallex and Bitpin are independently corroborated by TRM Labs. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex — Co-Designated Exchanges
“Ramzinex, a Tehran-based exchange founded in 2018, processed an alleged $2.45 billion in lifetime transactions, including activity tied to the IRGC and a government-backed Iranian financial institution.”
reviewerRamzinex processed an alleged $2.45 billion in lifetime transactionsFigure and founding detail both corroborated, though note this is a lifetime total, not comparable to the 2025-specific figures given for the other three exchanges (see coverage_gaps). - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Context — Central Bank of Iran and Stablecoin Operations
“Blockchain analytics firm Elliptic published a report on January 21, 2026, documenting that the Central Bank of Iran had acquired at least $507 million in USDT stablecoin, with funds routed primarily through Nobitex until approximately June 2025.”
reviewerElliptic published a report on January 21, 2026 documenting the Central Bank of Iran acquiring at least $507 million in USDT, routed primarily through Nobitex until June 2025Date and figure independently corroborated. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“The action forms the third layer of a five-month OFAC enforcement campaign that began in January 2026 and has frozen nearly $500 million in regime-linked cryptocurrency.”
reviewerThe June 2026 action forms the third layer of a five-month enforcement campaign beginning January 2026, freezing nearly $500 million cumulativelyConfirmed as accurate as of the June 2026 action; note that subsequent enforcement (Shelbit/Aban Tether, August 2026) extended the campaign further — see coverage_gaps. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Prior Enforcement — January 2026 Zedcex and Zedxion Designations
“On January 30, 2026, OFAC designated Zedcex Exchange Ltd and Zedxion Exchange Ltd — two UK-registered entities — along with Iranian financier Babak Morteza Zanjani, in what Treasury described as the first-ever designation of an IRGC-linked digital asset exchange.”
reviewerJanuary 30, 2026: OFAC designated Zedcex, Zedxion, and Babak Morteza Zanjani as the first-ever IRGC-linked digital asset exchange designation, with ~$1B in flows 2023-2025, >$10M to Houthi financier al-Jamal, and six wallet addressesAll sub-facts independently corroborated by the cited TRM Labs source. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Nobitex Security Breach — June 2025
“On June 18, 2025, Nobitex suffered a security breach attributed to the pro-Israel hacktivist group Gonjeshke Darande (also known as Predatory Sparrow), resulting in the loss of more than $90 million across multiple cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dogecoin, Ripple, Solana, TRON, and TON.”
reviewerOn June 18, 2025, Gonjeshke Darande (Predatory Sparrow) breached Nobitex, destroying $90M+ across multiple cryptocurrencies, sent to inaccessible vanity addresses with anti-IRGC messaging, root cause compromised private keysWell corroborated across multiple independent tier-1 and tier-2 sources. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Nobitex Security Breach — June 2025
“Gonjeshke Darande characterized Nobitex as 'at the heart of the regime's efforts to finance terror worldwide.'”
reviewerGonjeshke Darande characterized Nobitex as 'at the heart of the regime's efforts to finance terror worldwide'Quote matches contemporaneous reporting. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Compliance and Secondary Sanctions Risk
“The State Department simultaneously announced a $15 million reward under the Rewards for Justice program for information enabling disruption of IRGC financial operations, indicating continued investigative posture.”
reviewerThe State Department announced a $15 million Rewards for Justice reward for information on disrupting IRGC financial operationsMatches primary source. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Iran's Crypto Economy and Enforcement Impact
“According to data aggregated by TRM Labs and Chainalysis, Iran's total attributed cryptocurrency volume in 2025 reached approximately $9.9 billion. The four exchanges designated on June 2, 2026, collectively represented approximately $7.78 billion of that total — roughly 78 percent of the country's attributed crypto volume.”
reviewerIran's total attributed 2025 crypto volume was approximately $9.9 billion, and the four exchanges represented approximately $7.78 billion (78%) of thatFigures match the cited source closely; note the individual per-exchange figures TRM gives (4.7 + 1.45 + 0.821 + 0.739 = 7.71B) use a 2025-specific Ramzinex figure ($739M) that the page never states, instead substituting Ramzinex's lifetime total ($2.45B) elsewhere — see coverage_gaps for the resulting inconsistency. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Scale of Iran's Crypto Economy and Enforcement Impact
“CoinDesk reported the action as part of 'an ongoing war against the country,' citing the continued cat-and-mouse dynamic in which Iran shifted USDT routing to bridges and decentralized exchanges after each enforcement action.”
reviewerCoinDesk reported the action as part of 'an ongoing war against the country'Direct headline match confirmed.
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