Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “ForceBridge launches on Nervos Network mainnet, enabling cross-chain transfers between CKB, Ethereum, Cardano, and Polkadot.”

   reviewerAt its October 2021 mainnet launch, ForceBridge enabled cross-chain transfers between CKB, Ethereum, Cardano, and Polkadot.Both of the page's own cited launch sources say only Ethereum connectivity was live at the October 2021 launch; Cardano and Polkadot were announced as future/planned integrations, not live features. The timeline event overstates what launched.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   ForceBridge launches on Nervos Network mainnet, initially enabling cross-chain transfers between CKB and Ethereum, with support for Cardano and Polkadot announced as planned for a later phase.
   citedwww.cryptoninjas.net/2021/10/14/nervos-f…ardano-polkadot/forkast.news/headlines/nervos-launches-c…in-force-bridge/

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Overview

   “On May 31, 2025, Magickbase announced it would be sunsetting ForceBridge due to low user activity and high maintenance costs, with a withdrawal window running through January 16, 2026.”

   reviewerMagickbase announced the ForceBridge sunset on May 31, 2025 (Overview section).The page's own primary cited source (sunset.forcebridge.com) dates the sunset announcement to June 1, 2025, not May 31 — yet another cited source (Halborn) says May 31. The two cited sources disagree with each other, so this is a genuine sourcing conflict rather than a clean error; notably, a June 1 announcement date would make the page's own 'exploit occurred one day after' framing (exploit June 2) arithmetically exact, whereas May 31 implies two days.
   citedsunset.forcebridge.com/announcement
2. #5[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Suspicious Timing and Attribution

   “Security analysts noted that the exploit occurred just one day after Magickbase publicly announced the bridge's six-month wind-down on May 31, 2025.”

   reviewerThe exploit occurred just one day after Magickbase's May 31, 2025 wind-down announcement.Internally consistent with Halborn's own wording, but the primary sunset-site source conflicts on the exact date. Not a clear page error given the cited source agrees, but flagged for the same underlying date ambiguity.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…e-hack-june-2025
3. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Sunset and Current Status

   “Magickbase announced on May 31, 2025 that ForceBridge and the associated Godwoken EVM-compatible layer would be shut down as part of a strategic pivot toward UTXO-native protocols including RGB++.”

   reviewerMagickbase announced on May 31, 2025 that ForceBridge and Godwoken would be shut down as part of a pivot toward UTXO-native protocols.The pivot rationale (RGB++, low activity, maintenance costs) is accurately drawn from the cited source; only the specific date is in dispute between sources.
   citedsunset.forcebridge.com/announcement
4. #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “2025-05-31”

   reviewerMagickbase announces the sunset of ForceBridge and Godwoken on 2025-05-31.Offered as a possible correction given the primary source's own dating, but this is not certain — Halborn and other secondary reporting independently say May 31. Flagged as the same underlying date ambiguity as the prose occurrences; a human editor should check Magickbase's original X/blog post timestamp before changing this field.
   citedsunset.forcebridge.com/announcement

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Overview

   “The project launched on Nervos mainnet in October 2021.”

   reviewerForceBridge launched on Nervos mainnet in October 2021 (Oct 14, 2021).Both cited launch-era sources confirm the October 2021 mainnet launch date.
   citedwww.cryptoninjas.net/2021/10/14/nervos-f…ardano-polkadot/forkast.news/headlines/nervos-launches-c…in-force-bridge/
2. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Overview

   “It was developed and maintained by Magickbase, a major Nervos community developer.”

   reviewerForceBridge was developed and maintained by Magickbase, a major Nervos community developer.Independent reporting corroborates Magickbase as the operator/maintainer of ForceBridge.
3. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2025 Exploit

   “On June 2, 2025, ForceBridge suffered a critical security breach.”

   reviewerForceBridge was exploited on June 2, 2025.Some outlets (e.g. Rekt) place the drain on June 1; the majority of cited, contemporaneous sources (Cyvers/Hacken via crypto.news, mpost) place it June 2, consistent with the page.
   citedmpost.io/cyvers-alerts-detects-3m-exploi…d-investigation/crypto.news/nervos-network-suffers-major…om-force-bridge/
4. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2025 Exploit

   “The attacker made several failed attempts over a six-hour period before succeeding, with a small test drain of approximately $25 at 02:23 UTC and the full-scale exploit executing at 07:36 UTC.”

   reviewerA small test drain of approximately $25 occurred at 02:23 UTC and the full-scale exploit executed at 07:36 UTC.Exact UTC timestamps independently corroborated.
5. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2025 Exploit

   “Total estimated losses ranged from approximately $3.7 million to $3.9 million across both chains: roughly $3.1 million on Ethereum and $600,000–$800,000 on BNB Chain.”

   reviewerTotal estimated losses ranged from approximately $3.7 million to $3.9 million across both chains.Figures are consistent across Magickbase's own statement (via okx.com) and independent security analyses.
   citedwww.okx.com/en-us/news/article/magickbas…k-45867251099680crypto.news/nervos-network-suffers-major…om-force-bridge/
6. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2025 Exploit

   “Assets stolen included 539.09 ETH, 898,300 USDC, 257,800 USDT, 60,400 DAI, and 0.79 WBTC.”

   reviewerAssets stolen included 539.09 ETH, 898,300 USDC, 257,800 USDT, 60,400 DAI, and 0.79 WBTC.Per-asset figures confirmed by a tier-1 outlet (The Block) exactly.
7. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2025 Exploit

   “The attacker exploited an access control vulnerability — according to multiple security analysts, this was achieved by accessing privileged functions within the protocol's smart contracts, most likely through compromised private keys rather than a smart contract logic flaw.”

   reviewerThe exploit was caused by an access control vulnerability, most likely compromised private keys rather than a smart contract logic flaw.Directly confirmed by the cited security-firm analysis.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…e-hack-june-2025
8. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2025 Exploit

   “Stolen funds were swapped to ETH and laundered through Tornado Cash and FixedFloat across multiple newly created wallets.”

   reviewerStolen funds were swapped to ETH and laundered through Tornado Cash and FixedFloat across multiple newly created wallets.Corroborated by two independently fetched sources.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…e-hack-june-2025
9. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Suspicious Timing and Attribution

   “Halborn's post-exploit analysis observed that the timing suggests either an insider threat or someone who had previously obtained privileged credentials and waited for an optimal moment to act, noting that available bridge funds would only decrease as the wind-down proceeded.”

   reviewerHalborn's analysis observed the timing suggests either an insider threat or someone with privileged credentials who waited for an optimal moment, since available funds would only decrease during wind-down.Faithful, appropriately hedged characterization of Halborn's commentary.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…e-hack-june-2025
10. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Team Response and Law Enforcement

    “Magickbase paused all ForceBridge smart contracts and issued a public statement via X: 'We've detected abnormal activity on #ForceBridge and have paused the service as a precaution. Our team is investigating.'”

    reviewerMagickbase stated via X: 'We've detected abnormal activity on #ForceBridge and have paused the service as a precaution. Our team is investigating.'Core quote independently confirmed verbatim via direct fetch.
    citedmpost.io/cyvers-alerts-detects-3m-exploi…d-investigation/
11. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Team Response and Law Enforcement

    “The organization subsequently disclosed that approximately $3.7 million in user funds were affected and stated it was actively cooperating with local law enforcement agencies and partner exchanges to investigate the incident.”

    reviewerMagickbase disclosed ~$3.7 million affected and stated it was cooperating with local law enforcement and partner exchanges.Directly confirmed via fetch of the cited source.
    citedwww.okx.com/en-us/news/article/magickbas…k-45867251099680
12. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Team Response and Law Enforcement

    “The official sunset hub at sunset.forcebridge.com was updated to reflect the bridge's extended wind-down deadlines — Force Bridge closure moved to January 16, 2026.”

    reviewerThe Force Bridge withdrawal deadline was extended to January 16, 2026.Directly confirmed via fetch.
    citedsunset.forcebridge.com/
13. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory and Legal Status

    “No regulatory actions by the SEC, CFTC, DOJ, or other government bodies related to ForceBridge or Magickbase have been identified in available sources as of May 2026.”

    reviewerNo regulatory actions by the SEC, CFTC, DOJ, or other government bodies related to ForceBridge or Magickbase have been identified as of May 2026; no arrests or indictments publicly reported.Independent searches as of October 2026 likewise found no SEC/CFTC/DOJ/OFAC action, arrest, or indictment tied to ForceBridge or Magickbase, consistent with the page's hedged negative claim.