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Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Fake GIWA Mainnet / Bridge Scam (impersonation of GIWA L2, listed by DYORSWAP) against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

unverifiable 2partially supported 3confirmed 40 corrections pending · 0 applied

unverifiable

2 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Novel Attack Pattern and Systemic Risk
    “As CryptoSlate reported, the incident 'highlights that chain verification can become a security risk before users interact with any DeFi application.'”
    reviewerQuoted CryptoSlate sentence about chain verificationDirect quotation not found in the fetched CryptoSlate text; it may be from another outlet or paraphrased. The closest wording is a DYORSWAP statement.
  2. #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: DYORSWAP's Role and Response
    “The platform recorded 1,479 operations on the fake chain, involving 298 wallets and 104 pools, with 1,148 successful transactions.”
    reviewerDYORSWAP platform recorded 1,479 operations, 298 wallets, 104 pools, 1,148 successful transactions; compensation address 0xdf25...Statistics and address not found in the sources I could read. PANews and Gokhshtein were not checked. Verify the address before keeping it, since a wrong address is a phishing risk.

partially supported

3 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “Fake GIWA mainnet infrastructure reportedly launched approximately 11 hours after this funding.”
    reviewerFake infrastructure launched ~11 hours after deployer funding (conflicts with 8.5 hours in same entry)The same entry says 8.5 hours and 11 hours. Sources differ (possibly different wallets); the page should reconcile or attribute.
  2. #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Timeline of the Attack
    “Post-drain, on-chain records showed 177 ETH was routed through Tornado Cash and 589 ETH spread across four wallets.”
    reviewer177 ETH routed through Tornado Cash; ~589 ETH spread across four walletsFigures are a snapshot attributed to Stablemark, not 'on-chain records' as stated. Later movement unverified.
  3. #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Background: The Real GIWA Project
    “In April 2026, Dunamu announced a partnership with Hana Financial and POSCO International to pilot a GIWA Chain-based cross-border remittance system.”
    reviewerHana Financial and POSCO International partnership in April 2026April is supported; the year is inferred, and 'announced' versus 'agreed to test' is slightly stronger than the source.

confirmed

4 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Impact
    “Approximately 1,335 wallet addresses deposited a combined 767.65 ETH into the fraudulent bridge.”
    reviewer1,335 addresses deposited 767.65 ETH and 766.25 ETH was drained (~$2M)Figures match multiple outlets.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Timeline of the Attack
    “The fake bridge was deployed at approximately 02:10:59 UTC+8 on September 27, 2026, corresponding to Ethereum block 26063331.”
    reviewerFake bridge deployed 02:10:59 UTC+8 on Sept 27, 2026; deployer funded ~0.045 ETH via ChangeHero ~8.5 hours before; drain at block 26067309Core timing and drain block corroborated via KuCoin; CryptoTimes itself was blocked.
  3. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: DYORSWAP's Role and Response
    “The platform paid over 200 ETH — approximately 26% of stolen funds — in compensation from its own treasury before investigation completion.”
    reviewerDYORSWAP paid over 200 ETH (~26% of stolen funds) from own treasury; 40% refund under 5 ETH200/766 is about 26%, a derived figure. Note that the 40% refund plan and the 200 ETH paid are separate statements; a later DYORSWAP statement said final criteria are still to be announced.
  4. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background: The Real GIWA Project
    “A Sepolia testnet (chain ID 91342) launched in September 2025, but as of the time of the attack in September 2026, GIWA's production mainnet had not gone live.”
    reviewerSepolia testnet chain ID 91342 launched September 2025Supported.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.