easy-day-js / Mastra npm Supply Chain Attack
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anchored·HmGSnn…hQZqSummary
[MERGED] Consolidated into /mastra-ai-npm-supply-chain-attack-june-2026 on 2026-10-27. This page's content is preserved in its history.
Timeline(8 events)
29 May 2026
An identical loader to the easy-day-js dropper was detected on public malware sandboxes, approximately 19 days before the Mastra attack, indicating prior toolkit testing or use.
JFrog Security Research16 June 2026
npm account sergey2016 published easy-day-js@1.11.21 at 07:05 UTC — a clean, fully functional copy of the legitimate dayjs library with no malicious code, establishing a credible package history.
StepSecurity / JFrog17 June 2026
easy-day-js@1.11.22 published at 01:01 UTC by sergey2016 with obfuscated malicious postinstall dropper (setup.cjs). TLS verification disabled; C2 download from 23.254.164.92:8000.
StepSecurity / Socket17 June 2026
Beginning at 01:12 UTC, compromised ehindero account mass-published 141–144 trojanized @mastra packages over 88 minutes (through approximately 02:39 UTC), each listing easy-day-js@^1.11.21 as a dependency.
Socket / StepSecurity17 June 2026
Mastra team became aware of the attack at approximately 8:45 PM PT (June 16 US time) and contacted npm and Socket Security. Began unpublishing compromised packages.
Mastra GitHub Issue #1806117 June 2026
By 11:57 PM PT: 110 malicious packages unpublished; 6 packages deprecated (npm prevented full unpublishing). Safe versions published via PR #18056 around 1:00 AM PT. MFA token bypass vulnerability removed.
Mastra GitHub Issue #1806117 June 2026
Compromised maintainer confirmed as an active Mastra employee whose account was hijacked via social phishing through a fraudulent LinkedIn message. Attacker had changed the ehindero account email to ehindero2016@tutamail.com.
Mastra GitHub Issue #18061 / Snyk17 June 2026
Multiple security firms (StepSecurity, Socket, OX Security, JFrog, Snyk, Phoenix Security) published public technical analyses of the attack. JFrog flagged all compromised versions within 24 hours of detection.
Multiple security research firmsDecision Log
- slot 427111768 · hash EQ3Wx6xGDUJsQstGtUCpFDHnvooVLGoDhE3T6iv32fLx
This investigation is cryptographically anchored to the Solana blockchain (1 decision). 10 of 10 cited source URLs have an Internet Archive snapshot.
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
generated: 6/17/2026, 5:03:53 PM
last updated: 6/17/2026, 5:03:53 PM
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