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← DYORSwapreviewed 2026-11-17 · 7 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read DYORSwap against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

confirmed 70 corrections pending · 0 applied

confirmed

7 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Fake GIWA Bridge Incident (September 2026)
    “According to DYORSwap's own reconstruction, 1,335 addresses bridged a combined total of approximately 767.65 ETH to the fraudulent contract, of which about 766.25 ETH was subsequently withdrawn by the attackers and moved toward Tornado Cash, a mixing service.”
    reviewer1,335 addresses bridged about 767.65 ETH to the fraudulent contract, about 766.25 ETH was withdrawn, total losses roughly $2 millionFigures match Protos and Cointelegraph.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Fake GIWA Bridge Incident (September 2026)
    “reusing GIWA's intended chain ID of 9134 so the fake network appeared legitimate during DYORSwap's internal verification process”
    reviewerFake chain reused GIWA's chain ID 9134 so it passed DYORSwap's verificationMatches Protos and the DYORSwap quote in search results.
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Fake GIWA Bridge Incident (September 2026)
    “DYORSwap stated that this was not the result of a vulnerability in its own DYOR contracts but was caused by a fraudulent network impersonating the real GIWA chain.”
    reviewerDYORSwap says contracts not compromisedSupported.
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: DYORSwap Response and Compensation
    “addresses that bridged less than 5 ETH to the fake contract would receive a uniform 40% reimbursement of the bridged amount, while addresses that bridged more than 5 ETH would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis”
    reviewerOver 200 ETH paid; 40% reimbursement for addresses bridging under 5 ETH, case-by-case for largerSupported. Page notes this is DYORSwap's own statement.
  5. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: GIWA's Denial and Its Timing
    “Protos reports that this denial came shortly before the fake bridge finished being drained, meaning it did not prevent the losses”
    reviewerGIWA denied mainnet launch shortly before the drain completedPage correctly attributes the timing to Protos alone.
  6. #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit Status and TVL Data Quality
    “DefiLlama's protocol listing for DyorSwap AMM records no smart-contract audits (audit count 0, with no audit links)”
    reviewerDefiLlama records no audits for DyorSwap AMMAPI confirms. TVL range claim not checked (large payload truncated).
  7. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “2026-09-27”
    reviewerDYORSwap confirmed fake chain on 2026-09-27Consistent with Protos; KuCoin page not fetched directly.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.