Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Dexible V2 against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
3 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: February 2023 Exploit — selfSwap Vulnerability
“The team stated that 'a few whales' accounted for approximately 85% of total losses.”
reviewerTeam stated a few whales accounted for about 85% of lossesNot in the REKT article; not checked against the post-mortem itself. - #4[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Status and Ongoing Approval Risk
“The vulnerable contract address on Ethereum was identified as 0xde62e1b0edaa97e4ef25f0d140f1bf044d663091daf.”
reviewerVulnerable contract address on EthereumThe string has 43 hex characters after 0x; a valid Ethereum address has 40, so it is malformed. Not verified against BlockApex. - #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“2023-12-31”
reviewerDexible listed as permanently closed; protocol ceased operations; dated 2023-12-31Crunchbase was not fetched (bot-walled, unarchived). The date appears arbitrary, as a year-end placeholder, and no source dates the closure. Searches found no confirmation of shutdown beyond the contracts being paused.
partially supported
1 claimThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #2[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: February 2023 Exploit — selfSwap Vulnerability
“draining approximately $2 million from 17 user accounts across Ethereum and Arbitrum”
reviewerFunds drained from 17 user accountsReporting I found gives 18 affected wallets (13 + 5), not 17. Count differs by source and I could not confirm 17. The same figure appears in the summary-level timeline entry.
confirmed
5 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: February 2023 Exploit — selfSwap Vulnerability
“Approximately $1.5 million was stolen on Ethereum mainnet and $450,000 on Arbitrum.”
reviewerExploit on Feb 17 2023; about $1.5M on Ethereum and $450K on Arbitrum; attacker addressAmounts and attacker address match REKT. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Absence of Formal Security Audit
“The post-mortem stated: 'a formal audit was not performed on the latest set of contracts.'”
reviewerNo formal audit performed on the latest contractsMatches REKT. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: February 2023 Exploit — selfSwap Vulnerability
“roughly $1.4 million in TRU tokens (18 million TRU)”
reviewerBlockTower lost about $1.4M in 18M TRUMatches. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Delayed Incident Response
“On-chain security firm PeckShield raised an alarm via Twitter approximately five hours before the Dexible team issued any official public statement.”
reviewerPeckShield alarm about five hours before official statement; official announcement after more than nine hoursConsistent with REKT. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Fund Laundering via Tornado Cash
“The Arbitrum portion (approximately $450,000) was first bridged to Binance Smart Chain before also being laundered through Tornado Cash.”
reviewerLaundering through Tornado Cash, Arbitrum funds bridged to BSCMatches.