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← CrediX Financereviewed 2026-11-04 · 5 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read CrediX Finance against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

unverifiable 2partially supported 1confirmed 20 corrections pending · 0 applied

unverifiable

2 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #2[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: The $4.5 Million Exploit (August 4, 2025)
    “On August 4, 2025 at approximately 09:10 UTC, CrediX Finance was drained of approximately $4.5 million in user funds.”
    reviewerExploit occurred at approximately 09:10 UTC on August 4, 2025The date and amount are supported. The 09:10 UTC time was not found in the source I fetched.
  2. #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: The $4.5 Million Exploit (August 4, 2025)
    “Approximately 630 ETH (approximately $2.8 million at the time) remained in attacker-controlled wallets.”
    reviewerAbout 630 ETH (about $2.8M) remained in attacker walletsThe 630 ETH figure was not found in the QuillAudits article. I did not check the other cited sources for it.

partially supported

1 claim

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Stability DAO Response and Legal Action
    “Additional affected protocols — including Sonic Labs, Euler Finance, Beets, and Trevee (Rines Protocol) — joined the coordinated response.”
    reviewerSonic Labs, Euler, Beets and Trevee joined the coordinated responseOnly part of the claim is confirmed by the cited Decrypt article. The Euler, Beets and Trevee details would have to come from the other cited sources.

confirmed

2 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The $4.5 Million Exploit (August 4, 2025)
    “The attacker was granted five critical roles: POOL_ADMIN_ROLE (complete lending pool control), BRIDGE_ROLE (cross-chain minting capabilities), ASSET_LISTING_ADMIN_ROLE (authority to list new assets), EMERGENCY_ADMIN_ROLE (protocol shutdown powers), and RISK_ADMIN_ROLE (risk parameter authority).”
    reviewerAdmin EOA granted five roles; minted 2.5M acUSDC and 3.25M acscUSD via BRIDGE_ROLERoles, tx hash, mint amounts and stolen-asset breakdown match QuillAudits. The breakdown sums to about 4.64M, which the source does not reconcile with the 4.5M headline.
  2. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Stability DAO Response and Legal Action
    “Critically, Stability DAO confirmed it had obtained know-your-customer (KYC) documentation for two CrediX team members and indicated these identities would be included in the formal legal submission.”
    reviewerStability DAO obtained KYC for two team members and is filing a legal reportSupported by Decrypt, published Aug 8, 2025.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.