← Compound V2reviewed 2026-10-16 · 29 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Compound V2 against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
6 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #12[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2024 Governance Attack — Golden Boys / Humpy ($24M COMP Treasury)
“Proposals 118 (May 2024) and 247 (early July 2024) failed due to community opposition and insufficient quorum.”
reviewerThree separate governance proposals were submitted over several months; Proposals 118 (May 2024) and 247 (early July 2024) failed due to community opposition and insufficient quorum, before Proposal 289 passedThe on-chain Proposal 118 is an unrelated 2022 Gauntlet risk-parameter vote, not a Golden Boys treasury proposal. The real sequence was Proposal 247 (May 2024, failed) then Proposal 279 (July 2024, failed) before Proposal 289 passed. The page appears to have picked up a secondary-source misnumbering.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Proposals 247 (May 2024) and 279 (July 2024) failed due to community opposition and insufficient quorum. - #13[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Golden Boys submit Proposal 118 seeking 5% COMP treasury transfer; proposal fails after community raises concerns.”
reviewerGolden Boys submit Proposal 118 seeking 5% COMP treasury transfer in May 2024; proposal failsSame underlying numbering error as the section-3 finding.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Golden Boys submit Proposal 247 seeking 5% COMP treasury transfer; proposal fails after community raises concerns. - #14[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Golden Boys submit Proposal 247 via goldCOMP vault mechanism; fails to reach quorum.”
reviewerGolden Boys submit Proposal 247 via goldCOMP vault mechanism in early July 2024; fails to reach quorumThis timeline entry is dated 2024-07 but describes Proposal 247, which actually occurred in May 2024 per on-chain and Rekt reporting; the real July failed attempt was Proposal 279.Proposed correction (not yet applied)Golden Boys submit Proposal 279 via goldCOMP vault mechanism (following the prior "Trust Setup" pledge); fails to pass. - #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2024 Governance Attack — Golden Boys / Humpy ($24M COMP Treasury)
“For Proposal 289, five wallets coordinated to withdraw approximately 230,333 COMP from the Bybit exchange and delegate voting power to the Golden Boys' delegate.”
reviewerFor Proposal 289, five wallets coordinated to withdraw approximately 230,333 COMP from Bybit and delegate it to the Golden Boys' delegate, giving the group over 81% of the 400,000 COMP quorum thresholdThe specific Bybit-withdrawal/81%-of-quorum mechanic described by the page's own topically-relevant source (despread.io) is attributed to the earlier Proposal 247 episode, not to Proposal 289 as the page states.Proposed correction (not yet applied)In the run-up to Proposal 247, five wallets coordinated to withdraw approximately 230,333 COMP from the Bybit exchange and delegate voting power to a delegate linked to the Golden Boys. - #23[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Smart Contract Architecture Risks — Shared Pool Model and Fork Exploits
“On May 16, 2024, Sonne Finance lost approximately $20 million to the same class of vulnerability.”
reviewerOn May 16, 2024, Sonne Finance lost approximately $20 million to the same class of empty-pool exchange-rate manipulation vulnerabilityThe core facts (Compound V2 fork, exchange-rate/empty-market manipulation, ~$20M loss) are well corroborated, but the specific date is off by two days per CertiK's incident report.Proposed correction (not yet applied)On May 14, 2024, Sonne Finance lost approximately $20 million to the same class of vulnerability. - #24[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Sonne Finance, a Compound V2 fork, loses ~$20M to the known empty-pool exchange rate manipulation vulnerability.”
reviewerSonne Finance, a Compound V2 fork, loses ~$20M to the known empty-pool exchange rate manipulation vulnerability on May 16, 2024Timeline date field currently reads 2024-05-16; should be 2024-05-14 per CertiK's analysis.
unverifiable
5 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #4[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“Compound V2 is a legacy Ethereum-based decentralized lending protocol launched in May 2019 and formally deprecated in December 2025 in favor of Compound V3 (Comet).”
reviewerOn December 7, 2025, a governance vote passed with 99.99% in favor to pause all new V2 borrows/mints and set reserve factors to 100%, formally deprecating V2Extensive search (Tally, DefiLlama governance, news) turned up a Sept-Oct 2025 'V2 deprecation temperature check' with 100% of votes in favor on a much smaller turnout (347,291 votes), and a real but differently-scoped Feb 2026 reserve-management proposal -- but no source corroborating the specific Dec 7, 2025 date, 99.99% margin, or 'reserve factors to 100%' mechanic as stated. Not clearly contradicted, but not independently confirmed either; the general direction (V2 wound down by late 2025/early 2026) is plausible. - #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview and Deprecation Status
“On December 7, 2025, a governance proposal to pause all new borrows and mints on V2 and set reserve factors to 100% passed with 99.99% of votes in favor.”
reviewerOn December 7, 2025, a governance proposal to pause all new borrows and mints on V2 and set reserve factors to 100% passed with 99.99% of votes in favorSame unresolved claim as in the summary; see that finding for detail. Flag for a human to pull the exact on-chain proposal ID. - #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Governance proposal to pause all new borrows and mints on Compound V2 and set reserve factors to 100% passes with 99.99% of votes in favor, formally beginning V2 wind-down.”
reviewerGovernance proposal passes Dec 7 2025 pausing V2 borrows/mints, reserve factors to 100%, 99.99% in favor, beginning formal wind-downTimeline entry carries the same unverified specifics as the summary and section-1 claims; grouped under the same defect. - #21[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: 2023 X (Twitter) Account Hack — $4.4M in LINK Stolen
“Cybersecurity researcher Officer's Notes identified the scam post within approximately 17 minutes of its publication.”
reviewerCybersecurity researcher Officer's Notes identified the scam post within approximately 17 minutes of its publicationCould not locate independent confirmation of the precise 17-minute figure; not contradicted either. - #28[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Risk Assessment — Legacy Protocol in Wind-Down
“by late 2025 V2 retained approximately $139–153M in deposits from users who had not yet migrated.”
reviewerBy late 2025, V2 retained approximately $139-153M in deposits from users who had not yet migratedDirectionally plausible (small residual TVL consistent with a wound-down protocol) but I could not confirm the specific $139-153M range against a dated snapshot.
partially supported
1 claimThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #20[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: 2023 X (Twitter) Account Hack — $4.4M in LINK Stolen
“ZachXBT traced funds stolen via the phishing site and reported that approximately $4.4 million worth of Chainlink (LINK) tokens were taken from victims.”
reviewerZachXBT traced funds stolen via the 2023 Compound X-account phishing site and reported approximately $4.4 million worth of LINK tokens taken from victimsThe page states the $4.4M LINK link to the Compound hack as settled fact; the primary reporting treats the connection as reported/plausible but not explicitly confirmed by ZachXBT himself.
confirmed
17 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview and Deprecation Status
“Compound V2 was deployed to Ethereum mainnet in May 2019 by Compound Labs, founded by Robert Leshner and Geoffrey Hayes.”
reviewerCompound V2 was deployed to Ethereum mainnet in May 2019Widely corroborated fact; no contradicting source found. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview and Deprecation Status
“Governance over protocol parameters was delegated to COMP token holders beginning in May 2020.”
reviewerCOMP governance token launched and governance transferred to token holders beginning May 2020Confirmed by general governance history record. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview and Deprecation Status
“Compound V3 (Comet) launched in August 2022 as its successor, featuring an isolated collateral architecture that addressed structural risks present in V2's shared pool model.”
reviewerCompound V3 (Comet) launched in August 2022 as V2's successor with isolated collateral architectureConfirmed. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: October 2021 COMP Token Distribution Bug (~$80M)
“Up to 280,000 COMP tokens, worth approximately $80 million at prevailing prices, were at risk of being claimed incorrectly; estimates of tokens already distributed to incorrect recipients reached approximately 168,000 COMP (~$50 million).”
reviewerCompound Proposal 062 (Sept 28, 2021) contained a '>' vs '>=' bug causing ~280,000 COMP (~$80M) to be at risk, with no admin override and a mandatory 7-day governance fix processCore facts confirmed; minor variance across secondary outlets in total dollar estimate is normal for a fast-moving incident and does not contradict the cited sources. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: October 2021 COMP Token Distribution Bug (~$80M)
“A second related incident occurred on October 3, 2021, when approximately $22 million more flowed from the still-vulnerable contract before a remediation proposal could take effect.”
reviewerA second incident on October 3, 2021 drained approximately $22 million more from the still-vulnerable contract before remediation took effectConfirmed against the cited primary source. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: October 2021 COMP Token Distribution Bug (~$80M)
“Only two users voluntarily returned a combined 37,493 COMP (~$12 million).”
reviewerOnly two users voluntarily returned a combined 37,493 COMP (~$12 million)The figure is accurate per independent reporting, but the page's own cited Oct 3 CoinDesk source describes a similar-looking but distinct number (COMP claimed, not returned) -- a corrector should ensure citation points to coverage of the actual return, not this article. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: November 2020 Oracle Manipulation and Mass Liquidations (~$89M)
“A manipulation of the DAI price on Coinbase Pro caused the oracle to report DAI trading at approximately $1.30 — a 30% premium above its $1.00 peg.”
reviewerIn November 2020, approximately $89 million in collateral was liquidated following a DAI oracle manipulation on Coinbase Pro (DAI reported at ~$1.30)Confirmed, though other contemporaneous outlets gave slightly different totals ($88.4M-$103M), which is normal variance and doesn't contradict the cited figure. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: November 2020 Oracle Manipulation and Mass Liquidations (~$89M)
“The protocol's third-largest COMP farmer was liquidated for approximately $46–$49 million in a single event.”
reviewerThe protocol's third-largest COMP farmer was liquidated for approximately $46-49 million in the November 2020 eventConfirmed. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2024 Governance Attack — Golden Boys / Humpy ($24M COMP Treasury)
“Proposal 289 passed on July 28, 2024 with 682,191 votes in favor to 633,636 against.”
reviewerProposal 289 passed on July 28, 2024 with 682,191 votes in favor to 633,636 againstConfirmed. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2024 Governance Attack — Golden Boys / Humpy ($24M COMP Treasury)
“COMP's price fell 6.7% upon news of the passage.”
reviewerCOMP's price fell 6.7% upon news of Proposal 289's passageConfirmed. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2024 Website Hijack — ZachXBT Warning (Phishing)
“Compound Labs confirmed the breach the same day via the protocol's official X account, stating: 'The Compound Labs website (compound[.]finance) has been compromised. Please do not visit the website or click any links until further notice.'”
reviewerCompound Labs confirmed the July 11, 2024 website breach via X, stating 'The Compound Labs website (compound[.]finance) has been compromised. Please do not visit the website or click any links until further notice.'Confirmed and quote verified verbatim. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: 2023 X (Twitter) Account Hack — $4.4M in LINK Stolen
“Compound Labs recovered control of the account within four hours.”
reviewerIn 2023, Compound's X account was hacked, promoted a Pink Drainer phishing site, and was recovered within four hoursConfirmed; note the incident specifically dates to late December 2023 (Dec 29-30), which is consistent with the page's year-level timeline precision. - #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Smart Contract Architecture Risks — Shared Pool Model and Fork Exploits
“On April 30, 2022, Rari Capital lost approximately $80 million when an attacker exploited a missing reentrancy guard in borrowed V2 code.”
reviewerOn April 30, 2022, Rari Capital lost approximately $80 million to an attacker exploiting a missing reentrancy guard in borrowed V2 codeConfirmed, including the fork relationship to Compound's codebase. - #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Smart Contract Architecture Risks — Shared Pool Model and Fork Exploits
“Compound V2 has been audited by Trail of Bits and OpenZeppelin and formally verified by Certora.”
reviewerCompound V2 has been audited by Trail of Bits and OpenZeppelin and formally verified by CertoraConfirmed via the page's own cited primary source. - #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Governance Structure Weaknesses
“Proposals require a quorum of approximately 400,000 COMP and a minimum 7-day voting period before execution, with an additional timelock delay.”
reviewerProposals require a quorum of approximately 400,000 COMP and a minimum 7-day voting period before execution, with an additional timelock delayConfirmed as the general/baseline governance parameter; note elsewhere on the page this baseline figure is also used for a specific-proposal claim (Proposal 289) where a higher, proposal-specific quorum actually applied -- see the related disputed finding above. - #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Current Risk Assessment — Legacy Protocol in Wind-Down
“Risk analysis firm Hindenrank assigned Compound V2 a C+ grade at the time of active operations.”
reviewerRisk analysis firm Hindenrank assigned Compound V2 a C+ gradeThe grade itself is confirmed against the cited site, but I could not independently corroborate Hindenrank as an established, widely-recognized risk-rating firm via other sources -- treat its grading as a single-source opinion rather than an industry consensus. - #29[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2024 Governance Attack — Golden Boys / Humpy ($24M COMP Treasury)
“Humpy had previously been accused of analogous governance attacks on the Balancer and SushiSwap protocols.”
reviewerHumpy had previously been accused of analogous governance attacks on the Balancer and SushiSwap protocolsConfirmed.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.