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← Cetus CLMMreviewed 2026-11-02 · 14 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Cetus CLMM against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 2unverifiable 4partially supported 1confirmed 72 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

2 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #1[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Sui Validator Freeze Controversy
    “concluding ahead of the scheduled deadline on May 29, 2025”
    reviewerThe Sui governance vote was scheduled to end on May 29, 2025 and concluded ahead of that deadlineThe vote did conclude on May 29 with 90.9% yes, but May 29 was the early-close date, not the scheduled deadline. Sui's own post gives June 3.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    concluding on May 29, 2025, ahead of the scheduled deadline of June 3, 2025
    citedblog.sui.io/cetus-incident-response-onch…-community-vote/
  2. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “2025-05-26”
    reviewerSui Foundation published the governance proposal on 2025-05-26Sui's blog dates the vote start to May 27. The May 26 date is unsupported; the entry also has no source.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    2025-05-27

unverifiable

4 claims

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

  1. #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: The May 2025 Exploit
    “On May 22, 2025, at approximately 10:30 UTC”
    reviewerExploit began at approximately 10:30 UTC on May 22, 2025Date confirmed; the time of day was not found in the sources I fetched (Halborn, Cyfrin, Dedaub). Other cited sources may state it.
    citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…us-hack-may-2025
  2. #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Recovery
    “Cetus allocated 15% of the total CETUS token supply to a dedicated compensation contract.”
    reviewer15% of CETUS supply allocated to compensation, including 10% unvested team tokens; 5% immediate, 10% linear over 12 months from June 10, 2025The primary source is behind a 403. The 12-month linear vesting is corroborated; the percentages are not.
    citedmedium.com/@CetusProtocol/cetus-relaunch…ead-9fc0f8bd5c41
  3. #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Recovery
    “The protocol reported restoring over 50% of its pre-exploit TVL shortly after relaunch”
    reviewerProtocol restored over 50% of pre-exploit TVL shortly after relaunchThe Defiant is archive-blocked (forbidden). I did not fetch it directly. CoinDesk's TVL figures neither confirm nor refute.
    citedthedefiant.io/news/defi/cetus-protocol-r…-million-exploit
  4. #14[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: The May 2025 Exploit
    “This is the largest DeFi exploit of 2025 and the second-largest overall crypto hack of that year, behind the $1.46 billion Bybit incident.”
    reviewerLargest DeFi exploit of 2025 and second-largest crypto hack of the year behind BybitI did not check year-end rankings. Later 2025 incidents may have changed the ranking as of 2026, so the claim may be stale.
    citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…us-hack-may-2025

partially supported

1 claim

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #12[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “Cetus offers $5 million bug bounty to attacker for return of funds”
    reviewerTimeline: Cetus offered a $5 million bug bounty on 2025-05-22Search-result headlines show a $5M bounty and a later $6M offer for roughly $56M ETH. I did not fetch either article. The entry has no source.

confirmed

7 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Sui Validator Freeze Controversy
    “The measure passed with validators representing 90.9% of total stake voting yes”
    reviewerVote passed with 90.9% yes, Sui Foundation stake excluded, funds moved to 4-of-6 multisig with Cetus (2), Sui Foundation (2), OtterSec (2)Confirmed by Sui's own post and Cointelegraph.
    citedblog.sui.io/cetus-incident-response-onch…-community-vote/
  2. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The May 2025 Exploit
    “comparing values against 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF << 192 rather than the correct threshold of 0x1 << 192”
    reviewerFlawed checked_shlw compared against 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF << 192 instead of 0x1 << 192Consistent across Halborn and Dedaub.
    citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…us-hack-may-2025
  3. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The May 2025 Exploit
    “deliberately narrow tick ranges (for example, ticks 300000 to 300200)”
    reviewerAttack added liquidity with ticks 300000-300200 and minted ~10,365,647,984,364,446,732,462,244,378,333,008 liquidity for ~1 unit of token ADedaub matches the figures. The page says 10,024,321 haSUI; Dedaub says about 10 million, consistent.
    citeddedaub.com/blog/the-cetus-amm-200m-hack-…tastrophic-loss/
  4. #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Sui Validator Freeze Controversy
    “Sui validators coordinated to freeze approximately $162 million in attacker-controlled funds”
    reviewerRoughly $162M frozen on Sui, ~$60M bridged to Ethereum, total ~$223MFigures consistent.
    citedwww.cyfrin.io/blog/inside-the-223m-cetus…-impact-analysis
  5. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Evidence
    “bridge 61 million USDC from Sui to Ethereum across more than 60 discrete transactions over a 90-minute window”
    reviewerZachXBT: attacker bridged 61M USDC via CCTP in 60+ transactions over 90 minutes; Circle blacklisted the address about a month later after conversion to ETH; $420M across 15 incidentsMatches The Block. The 2026-04-03 timeline date matches the article date.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/396296/blockchain-s…on-illicit-funds
  6. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Recovery
    “The relaunch was supported by a $30 million USDC loan from the Sui Foundation and $7 million in Cetus's own protocol reserves.”
    reviewerRelaunch on June 8, 2025 with $30M Sui Foundation USDC loan and $7M Cetus reserves; LPs restored 85-99%Confirmed. The 03:00 UTC time is not stated in The Block or CoinDesk.
    citedwww.theblock.co/post/357386/sui-dex-cetu…-million-exploit
  7. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
    “Zellic completes audit of Cetus codebase; no critical vulnerabilities identified”
    reviewerZellic April 2025 audit found no critical vulnerabilities; MoveBit and OtterSec audited in 2023Supported by Dedaub. Dedaub also says OtterSec flagged a similar unvalidated-shift issue in the Aptos variant, which is a nuance relative to the page's description of its suggestion.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.