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← Celsius Networkreviewed 2026-09-06 · 24 claims checked

Fact-check findings

What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Celsius Network against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.

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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.

“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.

Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.

disputed 2partially supported 3confirmed 192 corrections pending · 0 applied

disputed

2 claims

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

  1. #6[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Risk Management Failures
    “Celsius also lost approximately $22 million as a result of the BadgerDAO DeFi protocol hack in December 2021, and was found by a blockchain analyst to have forfeited restitution payments from the incident.”
    reviewerCelsius lost approximately $22 million as a result of the BadgerDAO hack in December 2021, and was found by a blockchain analyst to have forfeited restitution payments from the incident.The page conflates two distinct events: the actual BadgerDAO hack loss to Celsius (reported at $50-54 million) and a separate, later forfeiture of $22 million in restitution tokens after Celsius bungled a March 2022 withdrawal and was denied re-deposit by the BadgerDAO community. The $22M figure is real but is not 'the loss from the hack' as stated.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    Celsius also lost approximately $54 million as a result of the BadgerDAO DeFi protocol hack in December 2021, and separately forfeited a further $22 million in restitution payments after a subsequent withdrawal error in March 2022, according to a blockchain analyst.
  2. #7[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
    “BadgerDAO hack; Celsius loses approximately $22 million and later forfeits restitution payments”
    reviewerBadgerDAO hack; Celsius loses approximately $22 million and later forfeits restitution payments.Same defect as the Risk Management Failures section: conflates the $50-54M hack loss with the separate $22M restitution forfeiture.
    Proposed correction (not yet applied)
    BadgerDAO hack; Celsius loses approximately $54 million in the hack itself and separately forfeits a further $22 million in restitution payments after a March 2022 withdrawal error

partially supported

3 claims

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

  1. #8[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Risk Management Failures
    “When the Terra/Luna ecosystem collapsed in May 2022, Celsius withdrew more than $535 million in crypto assets from Anchor, accelerating platform-wide liquidity pressure.”
    reviewerWhen Terra/Luna collapsed in May 2022, Celsius withdrew more than $535 million in crypto assets from Anchor Protocol.The $535 million figure is real and traceable to on-chain analysis, but multiple accounts describe it as Celsius's cumulative exposure to Anchor rather than the amount actually withdrawn during the escape, which is more commonly cited around $463 million. Could not confirm definitively without the original on-chain dataset.
  2. #12[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: CEL Token Manipulation
    “Blockchain analytics firm Arkham Intelligence estimated that Celsius had spent approximately $350 million purchasing CEL since July 2019.”
    reviewerArkham Intelligence estimated that Celsius had spent approximately $350 million purchasing CEL since July 2019.The $350M figure is accurately attributed to Arkham's July 2022 report, but the page omits that the later, more authoritative court-appointed examiner's report found a considerably higher figure ($558M), which understates the scale of the buyback scheme.
  3. #13[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: CEL Token Manipulation
    “The examiner found that Mashinsky had sold over $68 million worth of CEL since 2018. Co-founder Daniel Leon sold at least $9.7 million worth of CEL, and co-founder Nuke Goldstein sold approximately $2.8 million. Former Chief Revenue Officer Roni Cohen-Pavon sold at least $3.6 million.”
    reviewerMashinsky sold over $68 million worth of CEL since 2018; Daniel Leon sold at least $9.7 million; Nuke Goldstein sold approximately $2.8 million; Roni Cohen-Pavon sold at least $3.6 million.The dollar figures themselves ($68.7M Mashinsky, $2.8M Goldstein, $9.74M Leon, $3.6M Cohen-Pavon) are independently corroborated as coming from the court-appointed examiner's report, but the specific source cited on the page (Calcalist) does not discuss CEL sales at all -- it reports a different, unrelated set of pre-collapse crypto withdrawal figures. This is a citation mismatch rather than a factual error in the numbers themselves.

confirmed

19 claims

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

  1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Founding
    “Celsius Network was founded in 2017 by Alex Mashinsky, Daniel Leon, and Hanoch 'Nuke' Goldstein and headquartered in Hoboken, New Jersey.”
    reviewerCelsius Network was founded in 2017 by Alex Mashinsky, Daniel Leon, and Hanoch 'Nuke' Goldstein, headquartered in Hoboken, New Jersey.Widely and consistently reported founding facts; no contradicting sources found.
  2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Founding
    “In March 2018, Celsius conducted an initial coin offering (ICO) of its native CEL token, raising approximately $50 million. CEL began trading on cryptocurrency exchanges in April 2018.”
    reviewerIn March 2018, Celsius conducted an ICO of CEL, raising approximately $50 million; CEL began trading in April 2018.Amount and timing match independent CoinDesk historical reporting.
  3. #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Business Model and How Celsius Worked
    “By May 2022, Celsius reported approximately $12 billion in assets under management; at its peak it reportedly managed over $20 billion. The platform had issued more than $8 billion in loans.”
    reviewerBy May 2022, Celsius reported approximately $12 billion in AUM; at its peak it reportedly managed over $20 billion; the platform had issued more than $8 billion in loans.Figures are consistent with independent reporting, though peak AUM estimates vary by source ($20B-$25B) depending on the date referenced.
  4. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Growth and Marketing
    “Celsius reported approximately 1.7 million users at the time of its collapse.”
    reviewerCelsius reported approximately 1.7 million users at the time of its collapse.Confirmed by multiple independent sources.
  5. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Risk Management Failures
    “In June 2021, Celsius suffered a loss of at least 35,000 ETH (worth approximately $50 million) when custodian StakeHound disclosed it had lost the private keys to staked ETH deposits held on behalf of clients. Celsius did not publicly disclose this loss to its customers.”
    reviewerIn June 2021, Celsius lost at least 35,000 ETH (worth approximately $50 million) via StakeHound's lost private keys, and did not disclose this to customers.Non-disclosure to customers is corroborated by multiple outlets reporting the loss was concealed for roughly a year.
  6. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The Collapse: Withdrawal Freeze and Bankruptcy
    “On June 12, 2022, Celsius published a brief announcement stating it was pausing all withdrawals, swaps, and transfers between accounts, citing 'extreme market conditions.'”
    reviewerOn June 12, 2022, Celsius froze all withdrawals, swaps, and transfers citing 'extreme market conditions,' trapping approximately $4.7 billion in customer funds.Well documented and uncontroversial.
  7. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: The Collapse: Withdrawal Freeze and Bankruptcy
    “Bankruptcy filings disclosed a $1.2 billion deficit: the company held approximately $4.3 billion in assets against $5.5 billion in liabilities.”
    reviewerCelsius filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 13, 2022, disclosing a $1.2 billion deficit ($4.3B assets vs $5.5B liabilities); CEL was listed as a $600 million asset against a ~$170 million actual market cap.All figures in this section (assets, liabilities, deficit, CEL overvaluation) are corroborated by independent reporting.
  8. #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Fraud and Misrepresentation
    “He admitted that in 2019 he was actively selling CEL tokens even while publicly denying doing so, knowing customers would draw 'false comfort' from his claimed inaction.”
    reviewerFederal prosecutors alleged, and Mashinsky admitted, that he falsely claimed Celsius had regulatory consent and that he was not selling his own CEL holdings, and that he was in fact selling CEL in 2019 while denying it.Matches DOJ's own account of the guilty plea allocution.
  9. #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: CEL Token Manipulation
    “In his December 2024 guilty plea, Mashinsky admitted to the commodity fraud counts related to CEL manipulation and agreed to forfeit approximately $48 million.”
    reviewerIn his December 2024 guilty plea, Mashinsky admitted to the commodity fraud counts related to CEL manipulation and agreed to forfeit approximately $48 million.Consistent with contemporaneous reporting on the plea agreement's forfeiture terms.
  10. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Criminal Charges and DOJ Action
    “A federal grand jury indicted Mashinsky on seven counts: securities fraud, commodities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to manipulate the price of the CEL token. Mashinsky was arrested in New York, pleaded not guilty, and was released on a $40 million bond.”
    reviewerOn July 13, 2023, DOJ indicted Mashinsky on seven counts; he was arrested, pleaded not guilty, released on $40 million bond; Cohen-Pavon was charged separately; DOJ entered a non-prosecution agreement with Celsius itself.Confirmed via DOJ's own press release and contemporaneous news coverage.
  11. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Criminal Charges and DOJ Action
    “On December 3, 2024, Mashinsky reversed course and pleaded guilty to two of the seven counts: commodities fraud and the fraudulent scheme to manipulate CEL's price.”
    reviewerOn December 3, 2024, Mashinsky pleaded guilty to two of the seven counts: commodities fraud and the fraudulent scheme to manipulate CEL's price.Minor terminology variance exists across sources on how to label the second count, but the substantive description (commodities fraud plus the CEL manipulation scheme) is corroborated.
  12. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Criminal Charges and DOJ Action
    “On May 8, 2025, U.S. District Judge John Koeltl sentenced Mashinsky to 12 years in federal prison, plus three years of supervised release and a $48.4 million forfeiture — one of the longest sentences arising from the 2022 crypto lending crisis. Federal prosecutors had sought at least 20 years. Mashinsky was ordered to self-report to prison in September 2025.”
    reviewerOn May 8, 2025, Judge John Koeltl sentenced Mashinsky to 12 years, plus 3 years supervised release and $48.4 million forfeiture; prosecutors sought at least 20 years; Mashinsky was ordered to self-report in September 2025.All specific figures and dates in this claim are independently corroborated, including the precise $48,393,446 forfeiture amount and the September 12, 2025 self-report date.
  13. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: SEC, CFTC, and FTC Actions
    “The SEC alleged that the Earn Interest Program constituted an unregistered offer and sale of securities from at least 2018, that Celsius and Mashinsky made false and misleading statements to investors, and that Celsius and Mashinsky engaged in market manipulation through undisclosed CEL buybacks.”
    reviewerSEC charged Celsius/Mashinsky alleging the Earn Interest Program was an unregistered securities offering from at least 2018, false/misleading statements, and market manipulation via undisclosed CEL buybacks.Verified directly against the primary regulatory source.
  14. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: SEC, CFTC, and FTC Actions
    “The CFTC filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York charging Mashinsky and Celsius with fraud and material misrepresentations in connection with a commodity pool scheme, and with operating as an unregistered commodity pool operator.”
    reviewerCFTC charged Mashinsky/Celsius with fraud, material misrepresentation in a commodity pool scheme, and operating as an unregistered commodity pool operator.Verified directly against the primary regulatory source.
  15. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: SEC, CFTC, and FTC Actions
    “The FTC entered into a settlement agreement with Celsius under which a judgment of $4.7 billion was imposed — suspended to allow funds to be returned to customers through the bankruptcy proceeding — and permanently banned Celsius from offering any crypto deposit or investment product. The FTC's case against Mashinsky personally proceeded separately; in 2025 Mashinsky reached a $10 million settlement with the FTC and received a lifetime ban from the financial services industry.”
    reviewerFTC settled with Celsius for a $4.7 billion judgment (suspended, to allow bankruptcy recovery) and a permanent ban on crypto deposit/investment products; in 2025 Mashinsky separately reached a $10 million FTC settlement with a lifetime industry ban.Both the 2023 corporate settlement and the 2025 personal settlement with Mashinsky are corroborated by independent reporting.
  16. #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Bankruptcy Proceedings and Creditor Recovery
    “In November 2023, the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan that had been approved by approximately 98% of voting account holders. The plan projected a recovery of between 67% and 85% of customer holdings, primarily distributed in Bitcoin and Ether.”
    reviewerCelsius completed a court-supervised auction in May 2023, selecting Fahrenheit LLC; in November 2023 the court confirmed a plan approved by ~98% of voting account holders projecting 67%-85% recovery; Celsius emerged from bankruptcy January 31, 2024, distributing over $3 billion; the plan created Ionic Digital with mining managed by Hut 8 under a four-year agreement.All elements of the bankruptcy resolution narrative are independently corroborated, including the precise November 9, 2023 confirmation date.
  17. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Victim Impact
    “Federal prosecutors at sentencing described Mashinsky as a 'predator' whose victims lost access to money they could not afford to lose.”
    reviewerAt the time of the freeze, Celsius owed approximately $4.7 billion to approximately 1.7 million users; funds remained frozen from June 12, 2022 until early 2024 distributions began; federal prosecutors described Mashinsky as a 'predator' at sentencing.Direct quote/characterization is corroborated by independent sentencing coverage.
  18. #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Red Flags and Lessons
    “Multiple state regulators had issued cease and desist letters to Celsius in 2021 and 2022 over unregistered securities offerings, a fact that was publicly available but not prominently disclosed to depositors.”
    reviewerMultiple state regulators had issued cease and desist letters to Celsius in 2021 and 2022 over unregistered securities offerings.Corroborated by contemporaneous coverage naming at least five state securities regulators.
  19. #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Contagion and Broader Crypto Lending Collapse
    “The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago characterized the 2022 events as a 'crypto run' analogous in structure to a traditional bank run, noting that the fundamental vulnerability was maturity and liquidity mismatches between short-term customer withdrawal rights and long-term or illiquid asset deployments.”
    reviewerThe cascading failures of Celsius, 3AC, and Voyager Digital demonstrated systemic interconnection risk; the Chicago Fed characterized 2022 events as a 'crypto run' analogous to a bank run.High-credibility primary source directly supports the characterization.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.