Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #1[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits

   “On February 23, 2026, an attacker exploited the YieldBlox DAO Pool”

   reviewerThe exploit occurred on February 23, 2026Multiple sources place the exploit at 00:25 UTC on 2026-02-22; Feb 23 appears to be a publication date.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   On February 22, 2026, an attacker exploited the YieldBlox DAO Pool
   citedblocksec.com/blog/yieldblox-dao-incident…bled-a-10m-drain
2. #2[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “2026-02-23”

   reviewerTimeline: exploit date 2026-02-23Same date error as in the Security & Audits section.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   2026-02-22

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “2026-02-23”

   reviewerTimeline: validator freeze date 2026-02-23Freeze is confirmed; its exact date was not found.
2. #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Background

   “As of early 2026, Blend Pools V2 carried approximately $94.85 million in total value locked (TVL) across 10 active lending pools on Stellar, with $39.27 million in active loans.”

   reviewerRoughly $94.85M TVL across 10 pools with $39.27M in active loansDefiLlama is a dynamic page and I did not fetch it. The TVL figure is a point-in-time value and cannot be checked historically.
   citeddefillama.com/protocol/blend-pools-v2
3. #12[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Team & Ownership

   “Script3 does not have administrative upgrade keys over deployed pool contracts”

   reviewerScript3 has no admin upgrade keys over deployed pool contracts / contracts are immutableNo cited source was checked against this claim. The 'immutable' assertion is not supported by a specific cited page.

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #6[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits

   “Stellar Tier 1 validators intervened and froze approximately 48 million XLM (valued at roughly $7.2 million) before the attacker could complete the bridge.”

   reviewerTier 1 validators froze about 48M XLM (about $7.2M)The freeze is confirmed. Rekt reports that funds were bridged to Base, Ethereum and BNB Chain anyway, so 'before the attacker could complete the bridge' overstates; only the frozen portion was stopped.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…ck-february-2026
2. #7[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “net user loss estimated at approximately $3.6M after frozen XLM is accounted for”

   reviewerNet user loss about $3.6M$3.6M is derived ($10.8M minus $7.2M). No source states it, and Halborn's inputs imply about $3.0M. The Feb 25 date for both post-mortems is also unconfirmed, since Halborn published Feb 26.
3. #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Security & Audits

   “Despite a clean core-contract posture, the protocol's most significant security event occurred in February 2026.”

   reviewerCertora audit published Jan 25, 2024, covering emitter, pools and backstop; it supports a 'clean core-contract posture' for V2The date and scope are confirmed. The page itself says no findings were confirmed, and the audit predates the V2 launch, so 'clean' is not established. No V2-specific audit was identified.
   citedwww.certora.com/reports/blend

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security & Audits

   “the attacker borrowed 61.25 million XLM and 1 million USDC from the YieldBlox pool”

   reviewerAttacker borrowed 61.25M XLM and 1M USDC; total about $10.8MAmounts match. Total loss estimates range from $10.2M (Halborn, Web3 Is Going Great) to $10.97M (Rekt); $10.8M is within that range.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…ck-february-2026
2. #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security & Audits

   “inflating the reported USTRY price from approximately $1.05 to approximately $106 — a 100x inflation”

   reviewerPrice inflated from about $1.05 to about $106 with a sell order at 501 USDCConsistent across sources within rounding.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…ck-february-2026
3. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security & Audits

   “The YieldBlox Security Council offered a 10% white-hat bounty with a 72-hour deadline; the attacker did not respond.”

   reviewerYieldBlox Security Council offered a 10% bounty with a 72-hour deadlineMatches. The offer was an on-chain message sent to the attacker.
   citedwww.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-…ck-february-2026
4. #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security & Audits

   “'This incident was not a Blend V2 core-contract issue. It was a pool-operator (YieldBlox DAO) configuration issue.'”

   reviewerBlockSec quote that this was not a core-contract issueSupported.
   citedblocksec.com/blog/yieldblox-dao-incident…bled-a-10m-drain