← Bittensorreviewed 2026-10-16 · 19 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Bittensor against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
1 claimThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #3[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
“approximately 70% of circulating TAO staked within the network”
reviewerAs of 2024, approximately 70% of circulating TAO was staked within the network.The cited Metalamp source gives no staking percentage at all. Independent tokenomics data (exchange-published, as of December 2024) puts staked TAO at approximately 80.95% of circulating supply (~5.97M of ~7.38M TAO), not 70%. The cited source does not support the 70% figure, and a more specific contemporaneous figure is higher.Proposed correction (not yet applied)approximately 81% of circulating TAO staked within the network
unverifiable
2 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: PyPI Supply Chain Attack (July 2024)
“The Opentensor Foundation's post-mortem concluded that the attacker had either gained access to the Bittensor PyPI publishing account or injected code into the Bittensor codebase prior to the release being packaged.”
reviewerThe Opentensor Foundation's post-mortem concluded that the attacker had either gained access to the Bittensor PyPI publishing account or injected code into the Bittensor codebase prior to the release being packaged.None of the three cited sources attribute this dual-hypothesis conclusion specifically to the Opentensor Foundation's own post-mortem; Halborn and rekt.news offer similar reasoning as their own inference, and The Block does not address the access method at all. Could not access the official blog.bittensor.com post directly (403) to confirm original wording. - #10[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Impact
“Subsequent investigation by ZachXBT and litigation filings placed the total stolen amount at approximately 61,793.90 TAO tokens across 32 Bittensor wallets, valued at approximately $28–$30 million across the full attack window of May 22 to July 2, 2024, based on token prices at the time.”
reviewerSubsequent investigation placed the total stolen amount at approximately 61,793.90 TAO tokens across 32 Bittensor wallets, valued at approximately $28-$30 million.The CaseMine docket page returned a 403 and could not be independently fetched; the Justia PDF link was also unreachable through available tools. The $28-30M range and 32-wallet count are independently corroborated (BlockTribune, Bloomberg Law via news.bgov.com), but the precise 61,793.90 TAO figure could not be confirmed against a source I could actually read.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview
“with a market capitalization in the billions of dollars and approximately 70% of circulating TAO staked within the network”
reviewerAs of 2024, Bittensor had a market capitalization in the billions of dollars.The cited Metalamp article gives no market cap figure at all, so the specific number is not supported by its own citation, though the billions-of-dollars order of magnitude is independently plausible/well known for TAO in 2024. Treated separately from the staking-percentage error above, which has a clear contradicting figure. - #9[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Impact
“The Opentensor Foundation initially reported that approximately 32,000 TAO tokens valued at roughly $8 million were stolen.”
reviewerThe Opentensor Foundation initially reported that approximately 32,000 TAO tokens valued at roughly $8 million were stolen.The Block attributes the initial $8M/32,000 TAO figure to ZachXBT's Telegram update, not explicitly to an Opentensor Foundation report, though the Foundation's own July 3 community update also cites ~$8 million. The attribution to 'Opentensor Foundation' as the originator of this specific figure is not squarely supported; it is a minor mischaracterization of sourcing rather than a factual error in the dollar amount itself.
confirmed
14 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“In July 2024, the protocol was the target of a supply chain attack via a malicious version of its official PyPI package, resulting in the theft of approximately $28 million in TAO tokens from 32 wallets.”
reviewerBittensor is a decentralized AI network; TAO rewards contributors; July 2024 PyPI supply chain attack stole ~$28M in TAO from 32 wallets; Jan 2025 lawsuit alleges former Opentensor employees orchestrated it; ZachXBT identified a suspect via NFT wash-trade analysis and Railgun de-mixing.Multiple independent sources (BlockTribune, Bloomberg Law via news.bgov.com) corroborate a ~$28-30M theft from 32 wallets tied to a malicious PyPI package. Exact figure varies $28M-$30.3M across reporting dates as TAO price moved, consistent with the page's phrasing. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“A civil lawsuit filed in January 2025 alleges that former Opentensor Foundation employees orchestrated the attack”
reviewerA civil lawsuit filed in January 2025 alleges that former Opentensor Foundation employees orchestrated the attack.Confirmed via BlockTribune: JustM2J LLC filed suit January 27, 2025 against Ayden Brewer, Jon Litz, Jason St. George alleging they orchestrated the theft using expertise gained as former/prospective Opentensor personnel. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: PyPI Supply Chain Attack (July 2024)
“The malicious package was available for download from May 22 to May 29, 2024, a window during which an unknown number of users installed it.”
reviewerA malicious version of the Bittensor PyPI package (v6.12.2) was available for download from May 22 to May 29, 2024.rekt.news confirms the May 22-29 window during which Bittensor==6.12.2 downloads were compromised. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: PyPI Supply Chain Attack (July 2024)
“A separate campaign identified by GitLab in August 2025 employed typosquatted package names (such as 'bitensor' and 'bittenso') and a similar stake_extrinsic function hijack to target Bittensor users”
reviewerA separate campaign identified by GitLab in August 2025 employed typosquatted package names (such as 'bitensor' and 'bittenso') and a similar stake_extrinsic function hijack.GitLab's blog confirms five typosquatted packages (bitensor, bittenso-cli, qbittensor, bitensor, bittenso) published within a 25-minute window on August 6, 2025, hijacking the stake_extrinsic function to drain wallets. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Impact
“The theft unfolded over approximately three hours on July 2, 2024, beginning at 7:06 PM UTC.”
reviewerThe theft unfolded over approximately three hours on July 2, 2024, beginning at 7:06 PM UTC; abnormality detected 7:25 PM UTC; safe mode at 7:41 PM UTC.The official Opentensor community update timeline (confirmed via independent coverage quoting it) states the attack began 7:06 PM UTC, abnormality detected 7:25 PM UTC, safe mode activated 7:41 PM UTC, matching the page's figures precisely. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Impact
“The TAO token declined approximately 15% in value in the immediate aftermath of the publicly disclosed halt.”
reviewerThe TAO token declined approximately 15% in value in the immediate aftermath of the publicly disclosed halt.Independently corroborated: Yahoo/other coverage reports TAO falling from ~$265 to ~$225, a 15% decline, in the aftermath of the exploit disclosure. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Network Halt and Opentensor Foundation Response
“The foundation also proposed a 10% supply burn to stabilize the TAO token following the exploit, though the status of that proposal's implementation was subject to community governance.”
reviewerThe foundation also proposed a 10% supply burn to stabilize the TAO token following the exploit.CryptoSlate confirms OTF proposed a 10% supply burn and put it to a community vote; no source confirms whether the burn was ultimately implemented, matching the page's hedged phrasing. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: ZachXBT Investigation and Suspect Identification
“One recipient address was linked through on-chain activity to a Bittensor community member known as 'Rusty,' the operator of Skrtt Racing, a cryptocurrency betting platform for toy car races. Court records identified this individual as Ayden Brewer. Brewer acknowledged ownership of the connected wallets but denied involvement in the theft.”
reviewerZachXBT traced funds via the Bittensor native bridge to Ethereum, into instant exchanges converting to Monero, with ~$4.94M into Railgun, de-mixed to three recipient addresses, one linked to 'Rusty' of Skrtt Racing, court-identified as Ayden Brewer, who denied involvement but confirmed wallet ownership.Independently verified via Protos and CoinPaper: both confirm 'Rusty'/Skrtt Racing (crypto betting on toy car races), identification as 'Ayden B' in court filings, and his denial of involvement while confirming wallet ownership. The page's fuller surname 'Brewer' matches the named defendant in the BlockTribune lawsuit coverage, a reasonable and consistent inference connecting the two. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Civil Litigation — JustM2J LLC v. Brewer et al.
“On January 27, 2025, JustM2J LLC filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (Case No. 2:25-cv-00380-DAD-SCR) against Ayden Brewer, Jon Litz, Jason St. George, and unidentified individuals.”
reviewerOn January 27, 2025, JustM2J LLC filed a civil complaint in the US District Court for the Eastern District of California (Case No. 2:25-cv-00380-DAD-SCR) against Ayden Brewer, Jon Litz, Jason St. George, and unidentified individuals.BlockTribune confirms filing date (Monday, Jan 27, 2025), venue, and all three named defendants. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Civil Litigation — JustM2J LLC v. Brewer et al.
“Ayden Brewer is alleged to have been employed by Opentensor as a developer until February 29, 2024. Jason St. George is alleged to have worked for Opentensor until April 12, 2024.”
reviewerAyden Brewer is alleged to have been employed by Opentensor as a developer until February 29, 2024. Jason St. George is alleged to have worked for Opentensor until April 12, 2024.Matches BlockTribune's reported employment end dates exactly, and is consistent with the corresponding timeline entries. - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Civil Litigation — JustM2J LLC v. Brewer et al.
“On August 19, 2025, the court denied a motion by the defendants to stay discovery.”
reviewerOn August 19, 2025, the court denied a motion by the defendants to stay discovery.BlockTribune confirms the court denied the stay-discovery motion on Tuesday, August 19, 2025 (while staying jurisdictional discovery specifically). - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Civil Litigation — JustM2J LLC v. Brewer et al.
“On November 14, 2025, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, allowing key fraud claims to survive.”
reviewerOn November 14, 2025, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, allowing key fraud claims to survive.BlockTribune and an independent Bloomberg Law report confirm the November 14, 2025 ruling, which let Wiretap Act, fraud, unjust enrichment, and other claims survive while dismissing the CFAA claim. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Ongoing Supply Chain Threat Surface
“GitLab's Vulnerability Research team identified a separate, subsequent campaign in August 2025 in which five typosquatted PyPI packages mimicking Bittensor (including 'bitensor,' 'bittenso,' and 'bittensor-cli' variants) were published within a 25-minute window.”
reviewerGitLab's Vulnerability Research team identified a separate, subsequent campaign in August 2025 in which five typosquatted PyPI packages mimicking Bittensor were published within a 25-minute window.Confirmed directly against GitLab's blog: five packages, 25-minute window, August 6, 2025. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Ongoing Supply Chain Threat Surface
“A separate report from StepSecurity documented a compromise of the bittensor-wallet 4.0.2 package on PyPI, in which a backdoor was inserted to exfiltrate private keys.”
reviewerA separate report from StepSecurity documented a compromise of the bittensor-wallet 4.0.2 package on PyPI, in which a backdoor was inserted to exfiltrate private keys.Confirmed: StepSecurity reports a backdoor in compiled Rust code (keyfile.rs) that exfiltrates private keys upon wallet decryption, uploaded March 15, 2026 and yanked March 17, 2026. The page does not claim this used the same stake_extrinsic mechanism as the GitLab campaign, correctly treating it as a separate technique.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.