Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Belt Finance against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
5 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #3[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: May 2021 Flash Loan Exploit
“The attacker deployed a smart contract that borrowed approximately 385 million BUSD from PancakeSwap via flash loans”
reviewerAttack borrowed ~385 million BUSD from PancakeSwap via flash loansCited source that likely carries the figure returned 503; Decrypt and Halborn do not give the amount. - #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Compensation Plan
“The team committed 67% of the unlocked portion of its build allocation — approximately 864 BELT per day — toward the r4BELT compensation fund.”
reviewerCompensation: 67% of unlocked build allocation, ~864 BELT per day toward r4BELT fund; BELT dumped 54%The CoinDesk piece confirms r4BELT and the $3M buyback but not the 67%/864 BELT figure. Other cited outlets (BeInCrypto, Yahoo, crypto.news) were not fetched, so this is not scored as disputed. - #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“BELT token dumps approximately 54% in the immediate aftermath of the exploit becoming public.”
reviewerBELT token dumped ~54% in the aftermath, sourced to DecryptThe cited Decrypt article does not contain the 54% figure; no other source was found. - #9[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Belt Finance V4 launches (delayed two weeks from original December 2023 date), adding Ethereum, Polygon support and dropping HECO.”
reviewerBelt Finance V4 launched January 4, 2024 (timeline) adding Ethereum and Polygon supportSection text says V4 was 'announced' for Jan 4, 2024, while the timeline says it 'launches'; I found no confirmation it launched on that date. The two parts of the page are inconsistent in certainty.citedbelt.fi/ - #11[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“KLAYswap, another Ozys-developed protocol, is exploited for approximately $2 million.”
reviewerOzys incidents: KLAYswap Feb 2022 ~$2M; Orbit Bridge Dec 31, 2023 $81.5M; former CISO departed Dec 6, 2023The cited URL is a Blockworks story on Orbit Bridge, which is a poor source for a Feb 2022 KLAYswap incident; it could not be read. Orbit's Dec 31, 2023 hack is widely reported, but I did not verify the CISO and Klaytn Governance Council claims.
partially supported
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #2[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: May 2021 Flash Loan Exploit
“The total loss to the beltBUSD pool was approximately $50 million, comprising roughly $43.8 million in fees and the $6.23 million directly extracted.”
reviewerTotal loss about $50M comprising ~$43.8M fees and $6.23M extracted; vault users lost 21.36%, pool users 5.51%The figures match, but the 'fees' are largely transaction/swap costs the attacker paid across the pool, so calling this pool 'loss' overstates actual user loss; the summary's 'estimated $50 million in total pool losses' has the same framing. Actual user losses were the 21.36% / 5.51% shares. - #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: May 2021 Flash Loan Exploit
“consistent with a class of oracle manipulation attacks previously seen on Harvest Finance in October 2020.”
reviewerHalborn described root cause as faulty assumption of balanced strategies, consistent with Harvest Finance Oct 2020 oracle manipulationThe Halborn quote is accurate. The Harvest Finance comparison is not in the cited Halborn post, so it is the page's own (or another source's) framing. - #10[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Protocol Status
“Current total value locked (TVL) per DefiLlama stands at approximately $12.17 million, predominantly on BSC.”
reviewerCurrent TVL about $12 million / $12.17M as of 2025TVL is in the right range and the protocol still has meaningful TVL, but the figure is dated; DefiLlama snippet shows about $13.09M in Oct 2026.
confirmed
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2021 Flash Loan Exploit
“The attack contract was executed eight times in succession, yielding approximately 6,234,753 BUSD (approximately $6.23 million) in profit to the attacker.”
reviewerAttacker netted about $6.23M BUSD via flash loan on May 29, 2021, running the contract eight timesTwo news sources agree on eight executions and $6.23M. Halborn (also cited) says seven; the discrepancy is noted but the majority and primary incident figures support the page. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“Halborn publishes post-mortem analysis of the Belt Finance hack, identifying the root cause as a faulty valuation assumption in the multi-strategy vault.”
reviewerHalborn published post-mortem on 2021-06-03Date format is ambiguous but consistent with June 3, 2021. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: HECO Chain Exposure (2023)
“HECO Network formally ceased operations on January 15, 2025, removing that deployment from service entirely.”
reviewerHECO Network formally ceased operations January 15, 2025Date supported by independent reporting, though the cited CoinMarketCap academy URL is flagged unarchivable (not-found) by the archiver and could not be verified as live. Note DefiLlama still lists Heco among Belt's chains.