Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Atlantis Loans against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
3 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Governance Attack and Exploit (June 2023)
“the proposal passed without opposition after the mandatory 172,800-second (48-hour) timelock elapsed.”
reviewer48-hour timelock, Proposal 49 etc., ATL burn pledge, hosting through 2025Rekt and Halborn do not mention the timelock. The Medium sources that probably carry it were not checked, since Medium is unarchived and I did not fetch it. - #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Financial Losses
“DeFiLlama labels the protocol as having conducted a rug pull with the website down.”
reviewerTVL about $2,902 and DeFiLlama labels it a rug pullDeFiLlama is a dynamic page and I did not fetch it. Separately, the page frames the exploit as a governance attack on users' approvals while also saying 'rug pull', which is a loose characterisation. - #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Venus Protocol Connection
“researchers alleged a connection between the founder of Atlantis Loans and the original Venus Protocol deployer address on BSC.”
reviewerAlleged link between Atlantis founder and Venus deployerMedium source not fetched. The page already hedges this as an allegation, which is appropriate.
partially supported
1 claimThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Attacker continues draining unrevoked approvals. PeckShield reports total losses exceeding $2.5 million. Web3 Is Going Great documents the incident.”
reviewerTotal losses reached $2.5M per PeckShield on 2023-06-12The $2.5M total is supported, but Rekt places it about a week after the initial exploit, so the 06-12 date looks too early. I could not fetch a source with the exact date, so I give no correction.
confirmed
3 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Governance Attack and Exploit (June 2023)
“On June 7, 2023, an unknown attacker submitted a malicious governance proposal (Proposal ID 52) through the GovernorBravo contract.”
reviewerAttacker submitted Proposal 52 on June 7, 2023Rekt confirms proposal 52 on June 7 and an April 12 failed attempt. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Governance Attack and Exploit (June 2023)
“The attacker was initially funded from Binance on Ethereum.”
reviewerAttacker initially funded from Binance on Ethereum; attacker addressMatches Rekt. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Financial Losses
“Initial reports placed losses from the June 10, 2023 governance attack at approximately $1.1 million.”
reviewerInitial losses approx $1.1MThe $1.1M figure is confirmed. The exact June 10 execution date is not confirmed by the sources I could read, though Halborn and ImmuneBytes titles point to it.