← AscendEX (BitMax)reviewed 2026-09-06 · 44 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read AscendEX (BitMax) against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
unverifiable
1 claimNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #25[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“The exchange detected a series of unauthorized transfers from one of its hot wallets at approximately 22:00 UTC on December 11, 2021.”
reviewerUnauthorized transfers detected at approximately 22:00 UTC on December 11, 2021The date is well corroborated, but no source consulted specifies a 22:00 UTC detection time; could not confirm or refute this granular detail.
link rot
2 claimsA cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.
- #43[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://web.archive.org/web/20260726232048/https://blockonomi.com/binance-coin-bnb-analysis-what-investors-need-to-know-before-buying/”
reviewerBlockonomi source's archived snapshot corresponds to the cited AscendEX articleThe stored archive_url for this Blockonomi source resolves to an unrelated Binance Coin (BNB) price-analysis article, not the AscendEX withdrawal-freeze article it is supposed to back up. The live primary URL itself is fine and supports the claim; only the archived snapshot pointer is broken/mismatched and should be removed or re-archived correctly. - #44[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources
“https://web.archive.org/web/20260727001950/https://moneycheck.com/21shares-slashes-crypto-price-targets-for-2026-despite-continued-institutional-accumulation/”
reviewerMoneyCheck source's archived snapshot corresponds to the cited AscendEX articleThe stored archive_url for this MoneyCheck source resolves to an unrelated '21Shares slashes crypto price targets' article, not the AscendEX liquidity-concerns article it is supposed to back up. Same defect pattern as the Blockonomi entry above — both should be re-archived or the bad archive_url removed.
partially supported
2 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: On-Chain Hot Wallet Analysis
“The exchange's transparency rating on RootData was reported at 46%, classified as C-level.”
reviewerAscendEX's transparency rating on RootData was 46%, C-levelThe 46%/C-level figure is accurate, but it is sourced to ChainCatcher, which is cited only in a different section (Operational Background) and not among this section's own listed sources. This is a citation-placement mismatch rather than a factual error. - #34[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Regulatory Status and Jurisdiction
“The exchange was founded in 2018 by George (Jing) Cao and Ariel Ling.”
reviewerThe exchange was founded in 2018 by George (Jing) Cao and Ariel Ling (as stated in the Regulatory Status section)The fact itself is accurate, but none of this section's three cited sources (FCA, TradersUnion, AscendEX countries page) address founders — this is a citation-placement issue, not a factual error.
confirmed
39 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“AscendEX (formerly BitMax), a mid-tier centralized cryptocurrency exchange founded in 2018, came under acute scrutiny on June 26, 2026, when on-chain investigator ZachXBT publicly flagged the platform after widespread user reports of withdrawals frozen in an 'initiating' state for weeks with no on-chain transaction hashes generated.”
reviewerAscendEX (formerly BitMax) is a mid-tier centralized exchange founded in 2018Founding year, prior name, and the June 26, 2026 ZachXBT flag are corroborated across multiple independent outlets. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“On-chain analysis of the exchange's publicly known hot wallets via Arkham and TRM found minimal balances of major assets including ETH, USDT, USDC, and SOL, leading ZachXBT to state the exchange is 'likely facing liquidity issues.'”
reviewerOn-chain analysis via Arkham and TRM found minimal balances of ETH, USDT, USDC, and SOL, leading ZachXBT to call it a likely liquidity issueQuote wording matches independent secondary reporting of ZachXBT's original post closely. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“As of the date of ZachXBT's disclosure, AscendEX had issued no public statement addressing the allegations, no proof of reserves, and no withdrawal restoration timeline.”
reviewerAs of ZachXBT's disclosure, AscendEX had issued no statement, no proof of reserves, and no restoration timelineAccurate and correctly scoped to the June 26, 2026 disclosure date. Note: the page never updates past this date even though the entity's situation materially changed afterward (see coverage_gaps) — this specific sentence itself remains true as written. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“ZachXBT examined AscendEX's known hot wallet addresses across Ethereum, Tron, and Solana networks using Arkham and TRM analytics platforms and found minimal holdings of major cryptocurrencies.”
reviewerZachXBT examined hot wallets across Ethereum, Tron, and Solana via Arkham/TRMConsistent with multiple independent reports of the methodology. - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“He stated the exchange's hot wallets 'appear to lack large cap tokens such as ETH, USDT, USDC, SOL, etc indicating they likely are facing liquidity issues.'”
reviewerZachXBT's exact quote about hot wallets lacking large-cap tokensQuote is corroborated verbatim across independent secondary reporting of the original ZachXBT post. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“ZachXBT issued a public advisory: 'No one should deposit funds to this CEX,' and directly challenged AscendEX management to explain why withdrawals were being delayed and why hot wallets lacked liquid assets.”
reviewerZachXBT issued advisory 'No one should deposit funds to this CEX' and challenged AscendEX managementVerified against the original source post text via search indexing. - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“He also made an unverified sarcastic remark that 'perhaps all of the private jet charters and luxury goods purchases caught up to them.'”
reviewerZachXBT made a sarcastic remark about private jet charters and luxury goodsPage appropriately labels this as an unverified sarcastic remark rather than an established fact. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“A critical analytical caveat noted across multiple reports is that centralized exchanges typically hold the majority of customer funds in cold storage wallets that are not publicly labeled or trackable, meaning depleted hot wallets alone do not constitute definitive proof of insolvency.”
reviewerDepleted hot wallets do not constitute definitive proof of insolvency because CEXs keep funds in untracked cold storageThis methodological caveat is consistently reported across independent outlets and appropriately hedges the liquidity-issue framing. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“Specific documented user cases include a USDT withdrawal delayed over 3.5 days with no transaction ID, and a PAXG withdrawal stuck for approximately 10 days.”
reviewerSpecific user cases: USDT withdrawal delayed 3.5+ days, PAXG withdrawal stuck ~10 daysBoth specific figures are independently corroborated. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Withdrawal Freeze and Liquidity Allegations (June 2026)
“AscendEX's own help center documentation states users should receive a transaction ID within two hours of requesting a withdrawal, a threshold the exchange appeared to be systemically missing.”
reviewerAscendEX help center states withdrawal tx IDs should be issued within two hoursDirect fetch of the AscendEX help center article was blocked by a 403/bot-detection response, but the two-hour figure is corroborated by an independent secondary source. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: On-Chain Hot Wallet Analysis
“No independently verifiable proof of reserves has been published by AscendEX to address or rebut these findings.”
reviewerNo independently verifiable proof of reserves has been published to address these findingsRemains true through the exchange's later cessation of operations; no PoR was ever published. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Absence of Exchange Response and Proof of Reserves
“As of June 26, 2026, AscendEX had not issued any public statement addressing the liquidity allegations or the systemic withdrawal delays.”
reviewerAs of June 26, 2026, AscendEX had not issued a public statement on the allegationsAccurate and correctly scoped to that date. - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Absence of Exchange Response and Proof of Reserves
“The exchange's help center documentation acknowledged that 'deposits and withdrawals may be suspended during blockchain network issues, platform upgrades or other operational events,' but no specific communication was issued regarding the scale or timeline of the ongoing delays.”
reviewerAscendEX help center boilerplate on suspensions during network issues/upgrades/operational eventsDirect fetch of the help center was bot-blocked but the boilerplate language is corroborated via indexed search results of AscendEX's own FAQ. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Absence of Exchange Response and Proof of Reserves
“AscendEX has not published cryptographic proof of reserves or any third-party attestation of reserves as of mid-2026.”
reviewerAscendEX has not published cryptographic proof of reserves or third-party attestation as of mid-2026Confirmed and remains true as of this review (September 2026). - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“In a separate incident in May 2026, AscendEX suspended deposits, withdrawals, and trading for two stablecoins — USDR and EURR, issued by StablR — following a governance exploit.”
reviewerStablR incident: AscendEX suspended USDR/EURR trading following a governance exploit in May 2026Confirmed by multiple independent sources. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“On approximately May 24–26, 2026, an attacker exploited a 1-of-3 multisig wallet vulnerability in StablR's minting contract.”
reviewer1-of-3 multisig vulnerability exploited around May 24-26, 2026Date range and multisig mechanism confirmed. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“The attacker compromised a single signing key, added themselves as an administrator, removed legitimate signers, and minted approximately $13.5 million in unbacked USDR and EURR tokens.”
reviewerAttacker compromised a signing key, added self as admin, removed legitimate signers, minted ~$13.5M unbacked tokensMechanism and amount confirmed across independent technical write-ups. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“The attacker then sold these tokens on decentralized exchanges with low liquidity, netting approximately $2.8 million.”
reviewerAttacker sold minted tokens on low-liquidity DEXs, netting ~$2.8 millionConfirmed across multiple independent outlets. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“EURR's price fell sharply to $0.548 (against a euro pegged value of approximately $1.16), and USDR briefly depegged to $0.994.”
reviewerEURR fell to $0.548, USDR briefly depegged to $0.994Both price figures independently corroborated; EUR/USD reference rate of ~1.16 is plausible for the period but not independently pinned down. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“StablR's circulating supply was temporarily not backed 1:1 as required under the EU's Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation.”
reviewerStablR's circulating supply was temporarily not backed 1:1 under MiCAConfirmed. - #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“AscendEX suspended the affected stablecoin pairs at the request of the StablR project team.”
reviewerAscendEX suspended the affected pairs at StablR's requestDirect fetch of the AscendEX help-center announcement returned a 403 (likely bot-blocking) and it could not be archived by the Wayback Machine, but the underlying fact is corroborated independently. - #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: May 2026 StablR Hack and Stablecoin Trading Suspension
“StablR engaged external cybersecurity firms and law enforcement and planned to notify Malta's financial regulator under MiCA and Digital Operational Resilience Act obligations.”
reviewerStablR engaged cybersecurity firms/law enforcement and planned to notify Malta's regulator under MiCA/DORAConfirmed. - #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“On December 11–12, 2021, AscendEX suffered a significant security breach targeting its hot wallets.”
reviewerDecember 11-12, 2021 breach targeted AscendEX hot walletsConfirmed. - #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“According to blockchain analytics firm PeckShield, approximately $77.7 million in cryptocurrency was stolen across three blockchain networks: $60 million on Ethereum, $9.2 million on Binance Smart Chain, and $8.5 million on Polygon.”
reviewerPeckShield estimated $77.7M stolen: $60M Ethereum, $9.2M BSC, $8.5M PolygonOne lower-quality secondary source cited a $71.25M figure, but the $77.7M PeckShield-sourced figure is the consensus figure across multiple credible outlets and is treated as confirmed. - #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“The cold wallets were not affected.”
reviewerCold wallets were not affectedConfirmed directly from the exchange's own contemporaneous statement. - #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“AscendEX pledged 100% reimbursement to affected users and engaged Chainalysis and Ledger in the investigative response.”
reviewerAscendEX pledged 100% reimbursement and engaged Chainalysis and LedgerConfirmed. - #29[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“Stolen funds were subsequently traced to Binance, Bitfinex, and OKEx.”
reviewerStolen funds traced to Binance, Bitfinex, and OKExConfirmed. - #30[confirmed][no action needed]in section: December 2021 Lazarus Group Hack ($77.7 Million)
“Multiple on-chain security agencies attributed the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group, though the specific primary source for this attribution is cited broadly across industry reports rather than from a single authoritative filing.”
reviewerMultiple security agencies attributed the attack to Lazarus GroupThe page's hedge about attribution provenance is itself accurate — the Lazarus link is broadly repeated but not traceable to one authoritative source. - #31[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Status and Jurisdiction
“The exchange is not registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), or FinCEN.”
reviewerAscendEX is not registered with SEC, CFTC, or FinCENConfirmed via secondary research aggregator; no primary SEC/CFTC/FinCEN registry filing was found for AscendEX, consistent with the claim. - #32[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Status and Jurisdiction
“The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has separately warned that AscendEX is not authorized or registered to provide financial services in the United Kingdom.”
reviewerFCA warned AscendEX is not authorized to provide financial services in the UKDirectly confirmed against the primary regulator source. - #33[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Regulatory Status and Jurisdiction
“AscendEX restricts access to users from the United States and a number of other jurisdictions including Nepal, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and several others.”
reviewerAscendEX restricts access from the US and jurisdictions including Nepal, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, SyriaDirect fetch returned 403 (bot-blocking) but search-indexed content of the same page corroborates every named jurisdiction. - #35[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Operational Background and Prior Incidents
“AscendEX was founded in 2018 under the name BitMax by George (Jing) Cao and Ariel Ling and later rebranded to AscendEX.”
reviewerAscendEX founded 2018 as BitMax by Cao and Ling, later rebrandedConfirmed. - #36[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Operational Background and Prior Incidents
“Neither incident led to observable adoption of industry-standard reserve transparency practices such as Merkle tree proof-of-reserves attestations, which are now offered by most tier-one exchanges following the collapse of FTX in November 2022.”
reviewerNeither incident led to adoption of Merkle-tree proof-of-reserves practices standard since FTX's Nov 2022 collapseConfirmed; AscendEX never published a Merkle-tree or third-party PoR attestation. - #37[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Operational Background and Prior Incidents
“Observers in the ChainCatcher analysis of the situation noted that the AscendEX case illustrates a broader 'survival dilemma' facing small and medium centralized exchanges that lack the liquidity depth, regulatory cover, and brand trust of dominant platforms.”
reviewerChainCatcher's 'survival dilemma' framing of small/medium exchangesThe framing is a fair, attributed characterization of the cited article's argument. - #38[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“AscendEX founded under the name BitMax by George (Jing) Cao and Ariel Ling.”
reviewerAscendEX founded under the name BitMax by George (Jing) Cao and Ariel Ling (timeline entry)Confirmed. - #39[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“AscendEX detects unauthorized transfers from a hot wallet. Approximately $77.7 million in cryptocurrency is stolen across Ethereum ($60M), Binance Smart Chain ($9.2M), and Polygon ($8.5M). Multiple on-chain security agencies later attributed the attack to North Korea's Lazarus Group. Exchange pledges 100% user reimbursement.”
reviewerTimeline: Dec 11, 2021 hack detection, $77.7M stolen, Lazarus attribution, 100% reimbursement pledgeConsistent with the corresponding section finding above. - #40[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“StablR stablecoin protocol suffers a governance exploit exploiting a 1-of-3 multisig vulnerability. Attacker mints approximately $13.5M in unbacked USDR and EURR tokens, netting ~$2.8M. EURR depeg reaches as low as $0.548. AscendEX suspends USDR/EURR trading, deposits, and withdrawals at the project team's request.”
reviewerTimeline: May 24, 2026 StablR governance exploit and AscendEX suspensionConsistent with the corresponding section finding above. - #41[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“User withdrawal complaints begin surfacing on public platforms. Reports describe withdrawals stuck in an 'initiating' state for multiple days with no transaction IDs generated.”
reviewerTimeline: June 22, 2026 withdrawal complaints begin surfacingConfirmed. - #42[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“ZachXBT publicly flags AscendEX after analyzing known hot wallets via Arkham and TRM, finding minimal balances of ETH, USDT, USDC, and SOL. States the exchange is 'likely facing liquidity issues.' Issues public advisory: 'No one should deposit funds to this CEX.' AscendEX issues no public response.”
reviewerTimeline: June 26, 2026 ZachXBT publicly flags AscendEXConfirmed.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.