{"investigation":{"slug":"yearn-ether","entity_name":"Yearn Ether","trust_score":58,"severity_base":null,"score_modifier":30,"confidence":0.88,"status":"published","content_type":"investigation","summary":"Yearn Ether (yETH) is a liquid staking token aggregation vault developed by Yearn Finance, launched under YIP-72 as a self-governed, permissionless product. On November 30, 2025, the yETH weighted stableswap pool was exploited via an arithmetic underflow and stale cache vulnerability, resulting in approximately $9 million in losses — the third major security incident involving a Yearn product since 2021. Approximately $2.4 million was partially recovered; roughly $6.6 million remains unrecovered, with a significant portion laundered through Tornado Cash.","sections":[{"content":"On November 30, 2025, at approximately 21:11 UTC (Ethereum block 23,914,086), an attacker exploited a critical arithmetic vulnerability in Yearn Finance's yETH weighted stableswap pool. The attacker minted approximately 235 septillion (2.354 x 10^56) yETH LP tokens by depositing only 16 wei — a value of roughly $0.000000000000000045 — and drained approximately $9 million in liquid staking tokens (LSTs) from the pool.\n\nThe stolen assets included approximately 128 ETH, 48.96 cbETH, 203.55 rETH, 742.63 frxETH, 857.48 pxETH, and 167.67 stETH. The attacker converted assets to ETH via Uniswap V3 and other decentralized exchanges, repaid flash loans borrowed from Balancer and Aave, and subsequently transferred approximately 1,000 ETH (roughly $3 million) to Tornado Cash in repeated 100 ETH increments for laundering purposes. The attacker's primary address is identified on-chain as 0xa80d3f2022f6bfd0b260bf16d72cad025440c822, with initial funding traced to Railgun.\n\nYearn's v2 and v3 vaults and other products were confirmed not affected. The attack was isolated to the yETH custom stableswap contract.","heading":"2025 yETH Exploit — $9 Million Infinite Mint Attack","sources":[{"url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/16-wei/","name":"research.checkpoint.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/9-million-stolen-analysis-of-the-yearn-yeth-pool-vulnerability-557237092054","name":"slowmist.medium.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/yearn-finance-suffers-usd9-million-exploit","name":"thedefiant.io","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://coinpaper.com/12778/yearn-finance-hit-by-9-m-y-eth-exploit-attacker-funnels-eth-through-tornado-cash","name":"coinpaper.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-yeth-exploit-3m-sent-tornado-cash-2025/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Security researchers at Check Point Research and SlowMist independently analyzed the vulnerability and identified two compounding flaws in the yETH pool contract.\n\nFirst, the pool used packed_vbs[] storage variables to cache virtual balance calculations for gas efficiency. When all LP tokens were burned (supply == 0), the supply counter correctly reset to zero, but the cached virtual balance values were never explicitly cleared. This left 'phantom balances' in contract storage that persisted after pool drainage.\n\nSecond, the _calc_supply function used unsafe_sub and unsafe_mul arithmetic operations without overflow or underflow guards. During the bootstrapping phase — a code path intended only for the pool's initial deployment — an attacker depositing minimal 'dust' liquidity into an emptied pool could trigger an underflow, causing the supply calculation to produce an astronomically large value (2.354 x 10^56).\n\nThe attack proceeded in six phases: flash loan capital acquisition from Balancer and Aave; repeated deposit-withdrawal cycles to accumulate residual state; full pool drainage to reset supply to zero while cached values persisted; 16-wei dust deposit triggering first-deposit bootstrap logic; minting of 235 septillion yETH tokens via the arithmetic flaw; and final extraction through DEX swaps followed by Tornado Cash laundering.\n\nCheck Point Research noted this as 'one of DeFi's most capital-efficient exploits' given the near-zero upfront cost. ChainSecurity had previously audited the yETH smart contracts and found no critical or high severity issues, though they recommended extending the test suite given the system's complexity. The audit did flag a 'Possible to Frontrun the First Deposit in Pool' concern, which bears conceptual similarity to the bootstrap logic ultimately exploited.","heading":"Technical Root Cause — Stale Cache and Unsafe Arithmetic","sources":[{"url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/16-wei/","name":"research.checkpoint.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/9-million-stolen-analysis-of-the-yearn-yeth-pool-vulnerability-557237092054","name":"slowmist.medium.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/yearn-yeth-smart-contracts","name":"chainsecurity.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/yearn-finance-yeth-pool-exploit/","name":"infosecurity-magazine.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On December 1, 2025, Yearn Finance coordinated with the Plume and Dinero teams to recover 857.49 pxETH (approximately $2.39 million). The recovery was possible because these assets had not yet been mixed or converted by the attacker at the time of intervention. The pxETH was subsequently re-minted and returned to the Redacted Cartel multisig wallet. Approximately $6.6 million in stolen assets remains unrecovered, with a substantial portion presumed laundered through Tornado Cash.\n\nIn response to the exploit, Yearn governance put forward YIP-90 (authored by 0xPickles), titled the 'yETH Optimistic Recovery Plan.' The proposal does not distribute treasury principal directly; instead it deploys approximately 1,600 ETH of existing treasury ETH holdings to generate yield, directing proceeds toward affected depositors over time. Key parameters include: an immediate recovery floor of approximately 30.38% of pre-hack positions; treasury forfeiture of 334.807 ETH (~$1 million) to boost this floor; a temporary revenue split adjustment allocating 10% of protocol revenue to the recovery pool; and issuance of tradeable ERC-20 recovery tokens allowing affected users to either exit early at a discount or hold for fuller recovery.\n\nCritically, Yearn invoked the 'Use at Own Risk' clause from YIP-72 (the original yETH launch proposal), stating that Yearn contributors and YFI governance are 'not liable for reimbursement.' Full restitution is not guaranteed; depositors bear the opportunity cost of time and may not recover the remaining ~70% of their losses absent further asset tracing.","heading":"Partial Recovery and Depositor Restitution (YIP-90)","sources":[{"url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573","name":"gov.yearn.fi","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-recovers-2-4m-yeth-exploit-2025/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/yearn-finance-begins-clawback-after-9m-hack/","name":"cryptopolitan.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-72-launch-yeth/13158","name":"gov.yearn.fi","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"The November 2025 yETH exploit is at minimum the third direct security incident involving a Yearn Finance product since 2021, with a fourth following shortly after.\n\nIn February 2021, Yearn's v1 DAI vault was exploited via flash loan in 160 nested transactions spanning multiple DeFi platforms (dYdX, Aave, Compound, Curve). The attacker borrowed approximately 116,000 ETH from dYdX and 99,000 ETH from Aave, used the collateral to borrow stablecoins from Compound, and manipulated the Curve 3pool DAI price on which the vault depended. The vault sustained $11 million in losses, though the attacker captured approximately $2.8 million net; Tether froze $1.7 million in USDT involved in the attack.\n\nIn April 2023, a misconfigured legacy yUSDT contract was exploited for approximately $11.54 million. The fulcrum address in the yUSDT contract incorrectly pointed to the Fulcrum USDC contract rather than the Fulcrum USDT contract. An attacker used a 10,000 USDT deposit and flash loans to mint more than 1.2 quadrillion yUSDT, draining stablecoin reserves. Proceeds were laundered through Tornado Cash. Yearn's v2 vaults were not affected. Separately, Yearn suffered an estimated $1.4 million in indirect losses from the March 2023 Euler Finance attack.\n\nOn December 17, 2025 — weeks after the yETH exploit — Yearn's legacy v1 TUSD vault ('iearn TUSD') was exploited for approximately $300,000. The attacker used a flash loan and price oracle manipulation ('donation attack') to distort share prices in the outdated contract. PeckShield reported the incident; losses were converted to approximately 103 ETH.","heading":"Pattern of Exploits — Yearn Finance Security History","sources":[{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/02/04/yearn-finance-dai-vault-has-suffered-an-exploit-11m-drained","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/04/13/defi-protocols-aave-yearn-finance-likely-impacted-in-exploit-peckshield","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-yearn-finance-hack-april-2023","name":"halborn.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://coingeek.com/hackers-mint-1-quadrillion-yusdt-in-11-6m-yearn-finance-exploit/","name":"coingeek.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-hit-by-fourth-exploit-as-attacker-drains-legacy-v1-vault/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/yearn-finance-exploit-4","name":"web3isgoinggreat.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/yearn-finance-tusd-vault-hacked/","name":"cryptopolitan.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On-chain analysis confirms that the attacker responsible for the November 30, 2025 yETH exploit transferred approximately 1,000 ETH (approximately $3 million at the time of transfer) to the Tornado Cash cryptocurrency mixer in repeated 100 ETH batches. The transfers were traced to attacker address 0xa80d3f2022f6bfd0b260bf16d72cad025440c822, which was initially funded via Railgun (another privacy protocol). At the time of published reports, approximately $6 million in additional stolen assets remained in the attacker's wallet across staked ETH positions (frxETH, stETH, cbETH, rETH), limiting prospects for full recovery.\n\nThe 2023 yUSDT exploit attacker similarly used Tornado Cash to launder a portion of stolen stablecoins. The repeated use of privacy mixers in Yearn-related exploit proceeds has complicated asset recovery efforts across multiple incidents.","heading":"Proceeds Laundering via Tornado Cash","sources":[{"url":"https://finance.yahoo.com/news/yearn-finance-yeth-suffers-major-044612480.html","name":"finance.yahoo.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://coinpaper.com/12778/yearn-finance-hit-by-9-m-y-eth-exploit-attacker-funnels-eth-through-tornado-cash","name":"coinpaper.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-yeth-exploit-3m-sent-tornado-cash-2025/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://coinlaw.io/yearn-finance-3m-exploit-tornado-cash/","name":"coinlaw.io","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"yETH was launched under YIP-72, which classified it as a permissionless, self-governed product. Under that governance framework, yETH depositors — not Yearn Finance contributors or YFI governance — bear ultimate responsibility for the product's operation and associated risks. Section 8 of YIP-72 includes an explicit 'Use at Own Risk' clause that Yearn cited following the exploit to disclaim reimbursement liability.\n\nThe decentralized governance structure means that recovery and restitution are subject to community vote rather than any binding obligation. YIP-90's voluntary recovery plan was proposed but does not guarantee full compensation. The plan distributes treasury yield rather than principal, and recovery tokens may trade at a discount reflecting the uncertainty of full recovery.\n\nThis governance arrangement — combined with the product's track record — presents a material risk to depositors who may not fully appreciate that smart contract losses are treated as user risk rather than protocol liability.","heading":"Governance Structure and Liability Disclaimers","sources":[{"url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-72-launch-yeth/13158","name":"gov.yearn.fi","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573","name":"gov.yearn.fi","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://99bitcoins.com/news/altcoins/everything-you-need-to-know-about-yearn-finance-exploit/","name":"99bitcoins.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Following the November 2025 exploit, Yearn Finance published a post-mortem and detailed a technical remediation plan for future pool deployments. Announced changes include: enforcing explicit domain checks on the solver and treating a virtual balance product (Pi) of zero as a fatal error condition; replacing unsafe_sub and unsafe_mul arithmetic operations with checked arithmetic in all critical sections; gating or permanently disabling bootstrap initialization logic once a pool is live; introducing hard caps tying LP token issuance to the verified value of user deposits; and expanding testing methodology with adversarial numerical fuzzing, invariant testing, and differential testing against reference implementations.\n\nWhether these changes have been fully implemented and independently re-audited as of the time of this investigation has not been independently confirmed. Legacy v1 contracts containing similar arithmetic patterns remain deployed on Ethereum.","heading":"Remediation and Post-Exploit Changes","sources":[{"url":"https://www.bitget.com/news/detail/12560605101839","name":"bitget.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/16-wei/","name":"research.checkpoint.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/381740/yearn-finance-9-million-yeth-exploit-confirms-partial-recovery-outlines-remediation","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"}],"timeline":[{"date":"2020-07-17","event":"Yearn Finance launches, founded by Andre Cronje. YFI governance token distributed with no pre-mine or team allocation.","source":""},{"date":"2021-02-04","event":"Yearn v1 DAI vault exploited via flash loan attack across 160 nested transactions. $11 million drained from vault; attacker nets approximately $2.8 million. Tether freezes $1.7 million USDT.","source":"CoinDesk","source_url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/02/04/yearn-finance-dai-vault-has-suffered-an-exploit-11m-drained"},{"date":"2023-04-13","event":"Legacy yUSDT contract exploited due to misconfigured Fulcrum address. Attacker mints 1.2 quadrillion yUSDT; approximately $11.54 million drained and laundered via Tornado Cash. V2 vaults unaffected.","source":"CoinDesk / Halborn","source_url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/04/13/defi-protocols-aave-yearn-finance-likely-impacted-in-exploit-peckshield"},{"date":"2023-03-13","event":"Yearn Finance suffers estimated $1.4 million indirect loss from Euler Finance attack.","source":"Web3 Is Going Great","source_url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/yearn-finance-hack-2023"},{"date":"2025-11-30","event":"yETH weighted stableswap pool exploited at block 23,914,086 (~21:11 UTC). Attacker deposits 16 wei, mints 235 septillion yETH via stale cache + arithmetic underflow vulnerability. Approximately $9 million in LSTs drained.","source":"The Defiant / Check Point Research","source_url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/yearn-finance-suffers-usd9-million-exploit"},{"date":"2025-12","event":"Yearn Finance coordinates with Plume and Dinero teams to recover 857.49 pxETH ($2.39 million). Attacker transfers first batches totaling 1,000 ETH to Tornado Cash in 100 ETH increments.","source":"crypto.news / coinpaper","source_url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-recovers-2-4m-yeth-exploit-2025/","date_original":"2025-12-01"},{"date":"2025-12-17","event":"Yearn v1 legacy TUSD vault ('iearn TUSD') exploited via flash loan donation attack for approximately $300,000 (~103 ETH). Fourth exploit of a Yearn product in recent history.","source":"crypto.news / web3isgoinggreat","source_url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-hit-by-fourth-exploit-as-attacker-drains-legacy-v1-vault/"},{"date":"2025-12","event":"Yearn publishes official yETH exploit post-mortem and announces technical remediation plan.","source":"Yearn Finance (X/Twitter)","source_url":"https://x.com/yearnfi/status/1997110690763661805","date_original":"2025-12-01"},{"date":"2026","event":"YIP-90 'yETH Optimistic Recovery Plan' proposed. Treasury to deploy ~1,600 ETH in yield-bearing strategies to fund gradual depositor restitution; immediate recovery floor set at approximately 30.38% of pre-exploit positions.","source":"Yearn Governance Forum","source_url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573","date_original":"2026-01-01"}],"sources_used":[{"url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/16-wei/","name":"research.checkpoint.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260608151912/https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/16-wei/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-06-08T15:19:12+00:00"},{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/9-million-stolen-analysis-of-the-yearn-yeth-pool-vulnerability-557237092054","name":"slowmist.medium.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260210005520/https://slowmist.medium.com/9-million-stolen-analysis-of-the-yearn-yeth-pool-vulnerability-557237092054","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-10T00:55:20+00:00"},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/yearn-finance-suffers-usd9-million-exploit","name":"thedefiant.io","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251208201521/https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/yearn-finance-suffers-usd9-million-exploit","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-12-08T20:15:21+00:00"},{"url":"https://coinpaper.com/12778/yearn-finance-hit-by-9-m-y-eth-exploit-attacker-funnels-eth-through-tornado-cash","name":"coinpaper.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260215014430/https://coinpaper.com/12778/yearn-finance-hit-by-9-m-y-eth-exploit-attacker-funnels-eth-through-tornado-cash","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-15T01:44:30+00:00"},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-yeth-exploit-3m-sent-tornado-cash-2025/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251228002400/https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-yeth-exploit-3m-sent-tornado-cash-2025/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-12-28T00:24:00+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/yearn-yeth-smart-contracts","name":"chainsecurity.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260508081229/https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/yearn-yeth-smart-contracts","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-08T08:12:29+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/yearn-finance-yeth-pool-exploit/","name":"infosecurity-magazine.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260618201610/https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/yearn-finance-yeth-pool-exploit/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-06-18T20:16:10+00:00"},{"url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573","name":"gov.yearn.fi","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260113152626/https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-01-13T15:26:26+00:00"},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-recovers-2-4m-yeth-exploit-2025/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251213154530/https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-recovers-2-4m-yeth-exploit-2025/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-12-13T15:45:30+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/yearn-finance-begins-clawback-after-9m-hack/","name":"cryptopolitan.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260829181003/https://www.cryptopolitan.com/yearn-finance-begins-clawback-after-9m-hack/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T18:10:03+00:00"},{"url":"https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-72-launch-yeth/13158","name":"gov.yearn.fi","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260218003834/https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-72-launch-yeth/13158","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-18T00:38:34+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2021/02/04/yearn-finance-dai-vault-has-suffered-an-exploit-11m-drained","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/04/13/defi-protocols-aave-yearn-finance-likely-impacted-in-exploit-peckshield","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260725170101/https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/04/13/defi-protocols-aave-yearn-finance-likely-impacted-in-exploit-peckshield","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-07-25T17:01:01+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-yearn-finance-hack-april-2023","name":"halborn.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260516235030/https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-yearn-finance-hack-april-2023","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-16T23:50:30+00:00"},{"url":"https://coingeek.com/hackers-mint-1-quadrillion-yusdt-in-11-6m-yearn-finance-exploit/","name":"coingeek.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260610161036/https://coingeek.com/hackers-mint-1-quadrillion-yusdt-in-11-6m-yearn-finance-exploit/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-06-10T16:10:36+00:00"},{"url":"https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-hit-by-fourth-exploit-as-attacker-drains-legacy-v1-vault/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260117072040/https://crypto.news/yearn-finance-hit-by-fourth-exploit-as-attacker-drains-legacy-v1-vault/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-01-17T07:20:40+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/yearn-finance-exploit-4","name":"web3isgoinggreat.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260113123828/https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/single/yearn-finance-exploit-4","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-01-13T12:38:28+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/yearn-finance-tusd-vault-hacked/","name":"cryptopolitan.com","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829180937/https://www.cryptopolitan.com/yearn-finance-tusd-vault-hacked/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T18:09:37+00:00"},{"url":"https://finance.yahoo.com/news/yearn-finance-yeth-suffers-major-044612480.html","name":"finance.yahoo.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251201162433/https://finance.yahoo.com/news/yearn-finance-yeth-suffers-major-044612480.html","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-12-01T16:24:33+00:00"},{"url":"https://coinlaw.io/yearn-finance-3m-exploit-tornado-cash/","name":"coinlaw.io","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251214225622/https://coinlaw.io/yearn-finance-3m-exploit-tornado-cash/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-12-14T22:56:22+00:00"},{"url":"https://99bitcoins.com/news/altcoins/everything-you-need-to-know-about-yearn-finance-exploit/","name":"99bitcoins.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260108222842/https://99bitcoins.com/news/altcoins/everything-you-need-to-know-about-yearn-finance-exploit/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-01-08T22:28:42+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.bitget.com/news/detail/12560605101839","name":"bitget.com","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829083629/https://www.bitget.com/news/detail/12560605101839","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T08:36:29+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/381740/yearn-finance-9-million-yeth-exploit-confirms-partial-recovery-outlines-remediation","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260419203951/https://www.theblock.co/post/381740/yearn-finance-9-million-yeth-exploit-confirms-partial-recovery-outlines-remediation","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-19T20:39:51+00:00"}],"source_tags":["defillama"],"addresses":[],"reviewed":true,"reviewed_by":null,"model_used":"claude-sonnet-4-6","created_at":"2026-05-04T02:54:20.078243+00:00","updated_at":"2026-08-29T23:26:11.83761+00:00"}}