{"investigation":{"slug":"fortress-loans","entity_name":"Fortress Loans","trust_score":50,"severity_base":50,"score_modifier":0,"confidence":0.82,"status":"published","content_type":"investigation","summary":"Fortress Loans (also called Fortress Protocol) was an algorithmic lending protocol on BNB Chain run by the JetFuel Finance team. In May 2022 an attacker bought enough FTS tokens to pass a malicious governance proposal and exploited an unprotected Umbrella Network oracle function, draining about $2.98 million that was laundered through Tornado Cash and never recovered. A partial compensation plan was announced, but the protocol has been effectively defunct since, with TVL near zero.","sections":[{"content":"Fortress Loans (fortress.loans), also referred to as Fortress Protocol, was a decentralized algorithmic money market and lending protocol on BNB Chain (Binance Smart Chain), operated as the lending arm of JetFuel Finance. It was developed and launched by the JetFuel Finance team in April 2021. Users could supply and borrow assets including BNB, USDC, USDT, BUSD, ETH, BTC and several others. Its governance and rate-modification token was FTS (Fortress Lending), a BEP-20 token with a total supply of 10,000,000; SlowMist's analysis dates the FTS issuance to 21 April 2022. The protocol also featured a synthetic stablecoin called FAI. The JetFuel Finance team cited over 30 years of combined DeFi experience. The protocol was audited by Hash0x and EtherAuthority before the exploit.","heading":"Overview","sources":[{"url":"https://bsc.news/post/fortress-credit-and-lending-project-insight","name":"bsc.news","type":"news_article","credibility":3},{"url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/how-to-use-the-fortress-protocol-lending-borrowing-and-collecting-fts-rewards-aa6812389b9b","name":"jetfuelfinance.medium.com","type":"official","credibility":3},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/fortress-loans","name":"defillama.com","type":"on_chain","credibility":3},{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c","name":"SlowMist: Fortress Protocol Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"In May 2022 an attacker drained the protocol of approximately $2.98 million by combining a governance takeover with manipulation of the Umbrella Network price oracle the protocol relied on. Sources differ on the date: the Fortress Loans analysis places the exploit on 8 May 2022, while SlowMist, Rekt News and The Record place the draining on 9 May 2022, after the malicious proposal executed. Using the inflated FTS price as collateral, the attacker borrowed virtually all available assets from every fToken market, including BNB, USDC, USDT, BUSD, BTCB, ETH, LTC, XRP, ADA, DAI, DOT and SHIB. The proceeds ended up as approximately 1,048.1 ETH (about $2.58 million) and 400,000 DAI (about $400,000), which were deposited into Tornado Cash. The FTS token price fell more than 45% after the breach was disclosed. No stolen funds were recovered.","heading":"May 2022 exploit","sources":[{"url":"https://rekt.news/fortress-rekt","name":"Fortress Protocol — Rekt News","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://therecord.media/defi-protocol-fortress-announces-3-million-hack","name":"DeFi protocol Fortress announces $3 million hack — The Record (Recorded Future)","type":"news_article","credibility":2},{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c","name":"SlowMist: Fortress Protocol Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK — Fortress Loans Incident Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://medium.com/coinmonks/examination-of-the-fortress-protocol-hack-e261c96ea450","name":"Examination of the Fortress Protocol Hack — Coinmonks / Medium","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://cryptopotato.com/fortress-protocol-hacked-for-3-million-drained-of-all-funds/","name":"cryptopotato.com","type":"news_article","credibility":3}],"severity":"critical"},{"content":"Fortress's on-chain governance (the Fortress Governor Alpha contract) required a proposer to hold at least 400,000 FTS, 4% of the 10,000,000 total supply, and this quantity-based threshold also satisfied quorum. Because the FTS price was depressed, the attacker could buy that stake cheaply. Reports differ on the cost: the Fortress Loans page gives roughly $8,000 (also written as about 11 ETH), while the Fortress Protocol page, citing CertiK and SlowMist, gives about 11.4 ETH, or approximately $22,000 at the time. The attacker submitted proposal FIP-11 (Proposal #11) on 4 May 2022 to change the FTS collateral factor from 0% to 70% (encoded as 700000000000000000). The governance contract required no participation beyond the proposer's own holdings and had no timelock long enough for community review. The attacker voted for their own proposal, the three-day voting period ended on 7 May with no votes against, and after a two-day implementation delay the proposal executed, making FTS usable as collateral.","heading":"Governance attack mechanism","sources":[{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c","name":"SlowMist: Fortress Protocol Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK — Fortress Loans Incident Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://medium.com/coinmonks/examination-of-the-fortress-protocol-hack-e261c96ea450","name":"Examination of the Fortress Protocol Hack — Coinmonks / Medium","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"critical"},{"content":"Fortress relied on Umbrella Network's oracle for the FTS price. The submit() function of Umbrella's Chain contract, used to update on-chain price feeds, was publicly callable: a required signature-verification statement (on line 142) had been commented out, so the contract did not check whether a caller was authorized to feed a price. After FIP-11 passed, the attacker called submit() with an arbitrary price. Reports differ on the inflated value: close to $1 trillion according to the Fortress Loans page and Rekt News, and in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars per token according to SlowMist. The attacker then posted about 100 FTS, worth roughly $4.50 at real market prices, as collateral, and the protocol accepted the manipulated price.","heading":"Oracle price manipulation (Umbrella Network)","sources":[{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c","name":"SlowMist: Fortress Protocol Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/fortress-protocol-oracle-vulnerability-explained-8650cdd27448/","name":"Fortress Protocol Oracle Vulnerability Explained — SolidityScan","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://blockmagnates.com/oracle-manipulation-attack-on-fortress/","name":"Oracle Manipulation Attack on Fortress — Block Magnates","type":"research","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK — Fortress Loans Incident Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://rekt.news/fortress-rekt","name":"Fortress Protocol — Rekt News","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"critical"},{"content":"In a post-mortem on Medium, Umbrella Network acknowledged the vulnerability as an internal process failure: the faulty contract had been introduced in August 2021 and went unaudited because of a lean development team and inadequate peer review. It stated that 'relentless pursuit has led to process breakdowns when it came to proper and consistent peer reviews and code audits.' Umbrella said the bug affected two protocols, Fortress Loans (about $2.2 million) and MahaDAO (about $700,000). It deployed a hotfix the same day and compensated Fortress with $500,000 USDC and 10,000,000 UMB tokens vesting linearly over one year; MahaDAO received $500,000 USDC and 2,500,000 UMB. Umbrella also pledged a Security Subcommittee, quality-assurance hiring, slower development rollouts and third-party audit partnerships.","heading":"Oracle provider responsibility","sources":[{"url":"https://medium.com/umbrella-network/update-on-umbrella-oracle-exploit-67ac0fe4414b","name":"medium.com","type":"official","credibility":3},{"url":"https://therecord.media/defi-protocol-fortress-announces-3-million-hack","name":"DeFi protocol Fortress announces $3 million hack — The Record (Recorded Future)","type":"news_article","credibility":2}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Fortress had been audited by Hash0x and EtherAuthority. Neither audit found the oracle flaw, which sat in Umbrella Network's contract rather than in Fortress's own code and so was outside the scope of the Fortress-specific audits. CertiK's analysis traced the exploit to the commented-out signature check in Umbrella's submit() function and stated that both weaknesses, the governance threshold and the oracle access-control gap, would have been identifiable in a comprehensive audit covering all integrated dependencies. Security researchers cite the case as an example of how per-protocol audits can leave external integrations unexamined.","heading":"Audit failures and scope gaps","sources":[{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK — Fortress Loans Incident Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://sayfer.io/blog/3-hacks-an-audit-could-not-find/","name":"3 Hacks an Audit Could Not Find — Sayfer","type":"research","credibility":3},{"url":"https://fortress.loans/audit_hash0x.pdf","name":"fortress.loans","type":"research","credibility":3},{"url":"https://rekt.news/fortress-rekt","name":"Fortress Protocol — Rekt News","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"high"},{"content":"SlowMist found the attacker began preparing about 19 days before execution. The Fortress Loans page dates the attacker's first interaction with the protocol, deploying an unverified custom contract, to 19 April 2022. On 29 April 2022 the attacker obtained 20 ETH via Tornado Cash on Ethereum and bridged 12.4 ETH to BNB Chain with cBridge. After the exploit, according to SlowMist, the borrowed assets were converted to approximately 3 million USDT on BNB Chain, bridged to Ethereum via Anyswap (Multichain) and cBridge, swapped for ETH and DAI, and 1,048.1 ETH and 400,000 DAI were deposited into Tornado Cash, making tracing impractical. The attacker's externally owned account is 0xA6AF2872176320015f8ddB2ba013B38Cb35d22Ad, the attack contract is 0xcd337b920678cf35143322ab31ab8977c3463a45, and the primary attack transaction hash is 0x13d19809b19ac512da6d110764caee75e2157ea62cb70937c8d9471afcb061bf. No individual or group has been publicly identified or charged, and no law-enforcement action has been announced.","heading":"Attack preparation and fund laundering","sources":[{"url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c","name":"SlowMist: Fortress Protocol Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2022/05/10/cybercriminals-hack-fortress-protocol-steal-its-funds-and-launder-them-through-tornado-cash/","name":"Cybercriminals hack Fortress Protocol — Security Newspaper","type":"news_article","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK — Fortress Loans Incident Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://rekt.news/fortress-rekt","name":"Fortress Protocol — Rekt News","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"high"},{"content":"The JetFuel Finance team disabled supply and borrow in the Fortress Loans UI, announced the attack, and alerted Binance, Umbrella Network, BitMart and other centralized exchanges, while engaging security firms and Tornado Cash tracing specialists and asking the community and partners to help freeze and recover the funds. A compensation plan described as over $1 million in total comprised $300,000 USDC for immediate distribution, a further $200,000 USDC held in reserve for unrecoverable losses, and the 10,000,000 UMB tokens from Umbrella vesting over one year; if UMB reached $0.18 per token, the plan said the full stolen amount could theoretically be covered. Sources differ on who funded the immediate payment: the Fortress Loans page says the $300,000 USDC was dispersed by the JetFuel team, while the Fortress Protocol page attributes the full package, including the $300,000, to Umbrella Network. Remaining shortfalls were to be met from JetFuel ecosystem revenue, including IJO proceeds, DEX fees, partnerships and treasury investments. The team scheduled a protocol restart with remediated contracts for 13-14 May 2022 and a proposal to remove on-chain governance entirely for passage on 16-17 May 2022. There is no publicly verifiable record that full compensation reached all affected users.","heading":"Team response and compensation","sources":[{"url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/fortress-attack-update-and-compensation-e7a66621cfe6","name":"Fortress Attack Update and Compensation — JetFuel Finance / Medium","type":"official","credibility":2},{"url":"https://therecord.media/defi-protocol-fortress-announces-3-million-hack","name":"DeFi protocol Fortress announces $3 million hack — The Record (Recorded Future)","type":"news_article","credibility":2},{"url":"https://cryptopotato.com/fortress-protocol-hacked-for-3-million-drained-of-all-funds/","name":"cryptopotato.com","type":"news_article","credibility":3}],"severity":"high"},{"content":"The protocol is considered effectively defunct. The FTS token has declined roughly 100% from its all-time high; CoinMarketCap and CoinGecko list a market capitalization of approximately $13,900. DefiLlama recorded TVL of approximately $1,168 as of 2024, down from several million dollars before the hack, with zero active loans. The fortress.loans domain appears to redirect to a for-sale page. JetFuel Finance's wider ecosystem, including the JetSwap DEX, also appears to have declined sharply in activity after the incident.","heading":"Token and protocol status","sources":[{"url":"https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/fortress-lending/","name":"coinmarketcap.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/fortress-loans","name":"defillama.com","type":"on_chain","credibility":3},{"url":"https://coingecko.com/en/coins/fortress","name":"coingecko.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"high"},{"content":"The exploit is widely cited as a case study of governance attacks on low-liquidity tokens. Post-mortems identify a quorum threshold set in token quantity rather than a share of circulating liquidity or USD value, which made quorum achievable for a few thousand dollars; no guardian multisig or veto able to block a malicious proposal during the timelock; no monitoring of unusual proposals affecting collateral parameters; and reliance on a single external oracle without circuit breakers for anomalous price moves. Security firms recommend timelocks of at least 48-72 hours for critical parameter changes, multi-party oracle validation, and emergency pause mechanisms controlled by independent multisigs.","heading":"Governance security lessons","sources":[{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK — Fortress Loans Incident Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/fortress-protocol-governance-updates-1d9a8799e64c","name":"Fortress Protocol Governance and Updates — JetFuel Finance / Medium","type":"official","credibility":2},{"url":"https://www.coinbase.com/blog/exploiting-governance-with-metamorphic-proposals","name":"Exploiting governance with metamorphic proposals — Coinbase Blog","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"medium"}],"timeline":[{"date":"2021-04","event":"Fortress Loans launches on Binance Smart Chain as an algorithmic lending protocol developed by JetFuel Finance.","source":"bsc.news","source_url":"https://bsc.news/post/fortress-credit-and-lending-project-insight"},{"date":"2021-08","event":"Umbrella Network introduces the faulty oracle contract code later exploited; the code goes unaudited.","source":"Umbrella Network (Medium)","source_url":"https://medium.com/umbrella-network/update-on-umbrella-oracle-exploit-67ac0fe4414b"},{"date":"2022-04","event":"FTS governance token issued with a total supply of 10,000,000 (dated 21 April 2022 by SlowMist).","source":"SlowMist Hack Analysis","source_url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c"},{"date":"2022-04","event":"Attacker first interacts with Fortress Loans, deploying an unverified custom contract.","source":"CertiK","source_url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit"},{"date":"2022-04","event":"Attacker obtains 20 ETH via Tornado Cash and bridges 12.4 ETH to BNB Chain via cBridge, about 19 days before the exploit.","source":"SlowMist Hack Analysis","source_url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"Attacker buys ~400,000 FTS (4% of supply) and submits governance proposal FIP-11 to raise the FTS collateral factor from 0% to 70%.","source":"CertiK","source_url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"FIP-11 three-day vote ends with only the attacker's votes; proposal passes.","source":"SlowMist Hack Analysis","source_url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-fortress-protocol-hack-analysis-19af24af723c"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"FIP-11 executes; attacker manipulates the Umbrella oracle to inflate the FTS price and drains about $2.98 million from all fToken markets (dated 8 May by one page, 9 May by SlowMist and Rekt News).","source":"Rekt News","source_url":"https://rekt.news/fortress-rekt"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"Stolen funds bridged to Ethereum via Anyswap and cBridge; 1,048.1 ETH and 400,000 DAI deposited into Tornado Cash. FTS price falls over 45%.","source":"The Record","source_url":"https://therecord.media/defi-protocol-fortress-announces-3-million-hack"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"JetFuel Finance disables supply/borrow in the UI and alerts Binance and Umbrella Network; Umbrella deploys an oracle hotfix.","source":"JetFuel Finance (Medium)","source_url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/fortress-attack-update-and-compensation-e7a66621cfe6"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"JetFuel Finance announces a compensation plan: $300,000 USDC immediately, $200,000 USDC in reserve and 10,000,000 UMB on one-year vesting (dated 10 May by one page, 14 May by the other).","source":"JetFuel Finance (Medium)","source_url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/fortress-attack-update-and-compensation-e7a66621cfe6"},{"date":"2022-05","event":"Protocol restart scheduled for 13-14 May; proposal to remove on-chain governance scheduled for 16-17 May.","source":"JetFuel Finance (Medium)","source_url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/fortress-attack-update-and-compensation-e7a66621cfe6"},{"date":"2024","event":"DefiLlama records Fortress Loans TVL at approximately $1,168 with zero active loans; FTS market cap approximately $13,900.","source":"DefiLlama","source_url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/fortress-loans"}],"sources_used":[{"url":"https://bsc.news/post/fortress-credit-and-lending-project-insight","name":"bsc.news","type":"news_article","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260310162712/https://bsc.news/post/fortress-credit-and-lending-project-insight","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-03-10T16:27:12+00:00"},{"url":"https://jetfuelfinance.medium.com/how-to-use-the-fortress-protocol-lending-borrowing-and-collecting-fts-rewards-aa6812389b9b","name":"jetfuelfinance.medium.com","type":"official","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:no-request","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/fortress-loans","name":"defillama.com","type":"on_chain","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20250905145658/https://defillama.com/protocol/fortress-loans","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-09-05T14:56:58+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/k6eZOpnK5Kdde7RfHBZgw-fortress-loans-exploit","name":"CertiK 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