{"investigation":{"slug":"dexodus-finance","entity_name":"Dexodus Finance","trust_score":49,"severity_base":49,"score_modifier":0,"confidence":0.62,"status":"published","content_type":"investigation","summary":"Dexodus Finance is a decentralized perpetual-derivatives protocol that operated primarily on Base, with smaller deployments on Ethereum, BSC and Cronos. On May 26, 2025, it suffered an oracle/signature-replay exploit that drained its liquidity pool of roughly $291,000–$300,000; the project said it would investigate and refund users, but no independent, on-chain confirmation that users were fully repaid could be found. By late 2025 the protocol's tracked total value locked had collapsed to near zero and its website was flagged as inactive, and no verifiable information about its founders or corporate registration could be confirmed.","sections":[{"content":"On May 26, 2025, Dexodus Finance's pool-based leverage module was exploited on Base. According to a hack analysis by QuillAudits, the attacker took a flash loan of approximately $10,500 from a Balancer vault, then replayed an old, previously valid Chainlink price-feed signature to set the on-chain ETH index price at roughly $1,816. Using this manipulated price, the attacker opened a heavily leveraged long position with the flash-loaned collateral, restored the correct market price, and closed the position for a profit before repaying the flash loan, draining the protocol's liquidity pool in the process. A separate analysis by SolidityScan describes the same incident as stemming from a missing freshness check in the contract's performUpkeep() function, which allowed a stale Chainlink report to be accepted, and estimates the loss at approximately $291,000; QuillAudits and DeFiLlama's incident tracker put the figure closer to $300,000. The on-chain attack transaction identified by QuillAudits is 0x6ffb494293fc5c32c5a6ab7dc3fff1fcc6e90fba9a6d6e486ba0a15ce518147e on Base, originating from wallet 0x863d3b920a6d98d5689d2cb8bb0d61e90a91e0dc. QuillAudits further reports that the attacker bridged part of the proceeds to Ethereum via Stargate and later sent approximately 107 ETH to a multisig wallet that QuillAudits describes as 'owned by the team,' while a smaller remainder (about 6.2 ETH) moved to a separate wallet and on to Binance, which QuillAudits speculates was 'likely' a bounty payment to the attacker rather than a confirmed one. Because this characterization rests on a single source's interpretation of wallet labels and transaction flow, it should be treated as the publisher's analysis rather than an independently confirmed fact.","heading":"May 2025 Exploit","sources":[{"url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit","name":"QuillAudits hack analysis of the Dexodus Finance exploit","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c/","name":"SolidityScan - Dexodus Finance Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dexodus-finance","name":"DeFiLlama hack/incident tracker entry for Dexodus Finance","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"critical"},{"content":"SolidityScan's writeup states that the Dexodus team 'worked with various security teams to investigate the incident and promptly recover the funds,' and that affected users 'will be refunded soon.' DeFiLlama's hacks dataset likewise records $300,000 in returned funds against a $300,000 loss and states that 'Dexodus recovered 100% of affected liquidity within 24 hours.' However, no primary-source confirmation — such as an on-chain refund transaction, an official project statement, or independent audit of the treasury — could be located to verify that users were actually repaid. The only on-chain movement independently documented by QuillAudits is the attacker's transfer of roughly 107 ETH to a wallet described as a team-controlled multisig; whether that ETH was subsequently distributed back to affected liquidity providers is not established by any source found in this investigation. Given that this recovery claim is the main basis for treating the incident as resolved, its lack of independent on-chain verification is treated here as an open, high-priority gap rather than a confirmed outcome.","heading":"Disputed Recovery Claim","sources":[{"url":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c/","name":"SolidityScan - Dexodus Finance Hack Analysis","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/dexodus-finance","name":"DeFiLlama hack/incident tracker entry for Dexodus Finance","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://api.llama.fi/hacks","name":"DeFiLlama hacks dataset (API)","type":"on_chain","credibility":2}],"severity":"high"},{"content":"Halborn's public case-report listings include two engagements for Dexodus: one covering a contract called 'WeightedLiquidityPool' and a later one covering 'DexodusV2.' Halborn's own audit pages give the WeightedLiquidityPool engagement as November 18-20, 2024 and the DexodusV2 engagement as December 17, 2024 to January 7, 2025, and each states that 100% of reported findings were addressed. These pages render their detailed findings tables via client-side scripts that could not be fully retrieved for this investigation, so the full breakdown of findings by severity was not independently reviewed. Notably, the May 2025 exploit involved a signature-verification and price-feed-freshness issue in the leverage/oracle logic; none of the sources reviewed here state definitively whether that vulnerable code path fell inside the scope of either Halborn engagement, so the audits should not be read as having covered, or failed to cover, the specific flaw that was later exploited.","heading":"Security Audits","sources":[{"url":"https://halborn.com/audits/dexodus/weightedliquiditypool","name":"Halborn audit report listing - Dexodus WeightedLiquidityPool","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/audits/dexodus/dexodusv2","name":"Halborn audit report listing - Dexodus V2","type":"research","credibility":2}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"DeFiLlama's tracker lists Dexodus Finance as a derivatives protocol deployed across Base, Ethereum, BSC and Cronos, with Base holding the large majority of recorded activity. The protocol's all-time-high total value locked was reported at under $600,000 around the time of the May 2025 exploit; by late 2025 DeFiLlama's own data shows total value locked falling to near zero (on the order of a few dollars), and its underlying API record for the protocol flags the project's website as a 'dead URL.' Taken together, these figures indicate the protocol had little to no active usage or liquidity by the second half of 2025, consistent with an abandoned or dormant project following the exploit, though no official statement announcing a shutdown or wind-down was found.","heading":"Current Status and Activity","sources":[{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/5428","name":"DeFiLlama protocol page for Dexodus Finance","type":"research","credibility":2},{"url":"https://api.llama.fi/protocol/dexodus-finance","name":"DeFiLlama API record for Dexodus Finance","type":"on_chain","credibility":2}],"severity":"high"},{"content":"No credible, independently verifiable source could be found describing who founded Dexodus Finance, when the company was formed, or where it is incorporated. Searches for the team's identity, a Barcelona corporate registration, or founder names returned no results from primary company registries, mainstream news coverage, or the project's own official channels. Earlier claims circulated about this project's founding date, incorporation location and named co-founders rested on a business-contact database entry, a Tier 3 source type that this investigation could not corroborate; absent a stronger source, those claims are omitted here rather than repeated unverified.","heading":"Team Identity and Corporate Background","sources":[],"severity":"medium"}],"timeline":[{"date":"2024-11","event":"Halborn conducts a security audit of Dexodus's WeightedLiquidityPool contract (engagement November 18-20, 2024).","source":"Halborn audit report listing","source_url":"https://halborn.com/audits/dexodus/weightedliquiditypool"},{"date":"2025-01","event":"Halborn reports completing a security audit of DexodusV2 contracts, covering an engagement that began in December 2024.","source":"Halborn audit report listing","source_url":"https://www.halborn.com/audits/dexodus/dexodusv2"},{"date":"2025-05-26","event":"Attacker exploits a stale/replayed oracle price-feed signature to open and close a heavily leveraged position, draining Dexodus Finance's liquidity pool of an estimated $291,000–$300,000 on Base.","source":"SolidityScan hack analysis","source_url":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c/","date_evidence":"On May 26, 2025, Dexodus Finance suffered the exploit"},{"date":"2025-05","event":"SolidityScan publishes a technical hack analysis attributing the loss to a missing freshness check on Chainlink oracle reports accepted via performUpkeep().","source":"SolidityScan","source_url":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c/"},{"date":"2025-05","event":"QuillAudits publishes its own hack analysis, describing the exploit as a signature-replay attack and tracing the attacker's bridging of funds to Ethereum and a subsequent transfer of roughly 107 ETH to a wallet it describes as a team-controlled multisig.","source":"QuillAudits","source_url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit"},{"date":"2025-08","event":"DeFiLlama's on-chain TVL data for Dexodus Finance's Ethereum deployment falls sharply toward zero, consistent with declining or abandoned activity following the exploit.","source":"DeFiLlama API record","source_url":"https://api.llama.fi/protocol/dexodus-finance"}],"sources_used":[{"url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit","name":"QuillAudits hack analysis of the Dexodus Finance exploit","type":"research","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260417051734/https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/dexodus-finance-exploit","credibility":2,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-17T05:17:34+00:00"},{"url":"https://blog.solidityscan.com/dexodus-finance-hack-analysis-d699135f575c/","name":"SolidityScan - 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