{"investigation":{"slug":"curve-llamalend","entity_name":"Curve LlamaLend","trust_score":52,"severity_base":null,"score_modifier":0,"confidence":0.78,"status":"published","content_type":"investigation","summary":"Curve LlamaLend (also referred to as the crvUSD lending markets) is a decentralized, permissionless isolated lending protocol built by Curve Finance that allows users to borrow crvUSD against crypto collateral using the LLAMMA soft-liquidation mechanism. The protocol has experienced multiple distinct incidents since launch: a $10 million bad-debt event in June 2024 tied to the founder's oversized leveraged positions, an oracle-manipulation attack on the sDOLA market in March 2026 resulting in approximately $240,000 in borrower losses, an October 2025 market crash that left the CRV-long vault approximately $700,000 underbacked, and a May 2026 third-party exploit (Stake DAO) that forced the sunsetting of an associated Arbitrum LlamaLend market. The protocol's core contracts have not been directly compromised by a code-level hack, but recurring bad-debt events, oracle design flaws in permissionlessly created markets, and governance concentration risks have drawn sustained scrutiny including a flag from on-chain investigator ZachXBT.","sections":[{"content":"Curve LlamaLend is an isolated lending and borrowing platform deployed by Curve Finance that pairs crvUSD — Curve's native overcollateralized stablecoin — with virtually any ERC-20 token as collateral. Each market is unidirectional and isolated: collateral risk does not spill across markets. The protocol's defining technical feature is the LLAMMA (Lending-Liquidating AMM Algorithm), an automated market maker that performs soft liquidations by incrementally converting a borrower's collateral to crvUSD as collateral price falls, and rebying collateral when prices recover. This design is intended to reduce the large discrete liquidations common in Aave or Compound-style protocols. Markets are deployable permissionlessly by any party through a factory contract, meaning newly listed collateral types may not undergo formal risk vetting. According to Curve's official documentation, all new lending markets should be treated as carrying smart-contract, oracle, and liquidity risks specific to each collateral. The protocol is deployed primarily on Ethereum mainnet, with satellite markets on Arbitrum and other EVM chains. As of early 2026, Curve's LlamaLend TVL had grown substantially, with borrowing volume roughly doubling quarter-over-quarter through mid-2025.","heading":"Protocol Overview and Architecture","sources":[{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/lending/overview/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-llamalend","name":"defillama.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://docs.curve.finance/lending/overview/","name":"docs.curve.finance","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://mixbytes.io/blog/modern-defi-lending-protocols-how-its-made-curve-llamalend","name":"mixbytes.io","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On June 13, 2024, Curve Finance founder Michael Egorov suffered cascading liquidations across five DeFi lending platforms — Aave, Inverse Finance, UwU Lend, Fraxlend, and Curve's own LlamaLend — after CRV declined approximately 28–30% in a single day. Egorov had used approximately 427–460 million CRV tokens (representing roughly 47% of circulating supply) as collateral to borrow an estimated $95.7 million in stablecoins. The triggering event was a separate exploit on UwU Lend: an attacker drained CRV from that protocol, deposited it into Curve's LlamaLend, and then abandoned the position, leaving unpaid debt. The rapid CRV price drop that followed — partially caused by the attacker's actions — drove Egorov's LlamaLend position into forced liquidation. Because the position was too large for available market liquidity to absorb at depressed prices, the LlamaLend CRV market accrued $10 million in bad debt. Egorov acknowledged the event publicly the same day. He repaid approximately 93% of the debt within hours by selling 30 million CRV tokens to Christian Seale of NextGen Venture Partners for $6 million USDT, and announced full repayment on June 15, 2024 — roughly 48 hours after the incident. Lenders in the affected market were ultimately made whole. The event nonetheless raised significant concerns about governance concentration risk: a single actor controlling nearly half of circulating CRV supply and using it as collateral posed systemic risk to LlamaLend and connected protocols. CoinDesk subsequently reported that Egorov had also used borrowed proceeds to fund the purchase of two Melbourne, Australia mansion properties totaling approximately AUD 59 million (roughly $40 million USD), purchased in his wife's name. A fact-check by The Crypto Times in April 2026 rated the broad narrative 'Mostly True' but noted the bad debt was fully repaid and users suffered no permanent loss.","heading":"June 2024 Bad-Debt Event: Founder Liquidation and $10 Million Shortfall","sources":[{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-ceo-clarifies-uwu-hack-misinformation","name":"cointelegraph.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-suffers-massive-liquidations","name":"thedefiant.io","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://protos.com/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-hit-amid-22m-crv-liquidation-cascade/","name":"protos.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/232464/curve-finance-ceo-michael-egorov-wife-mansions-australia","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/04/27/fact-check-did-michael-egorov-pull-100m-from-crv-to-buy-mansions-and-leave-bad-debt/","name":"cryptotimes.io","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On March 2, 2026, the sDOLA–crvUSD LlamaLend market on Ethereum was exploited through a flash-loan-based oracle manipulation attack. An attacker used a flash loan to borrow funds, redeem sDOLA, and re-stake the proceeds as a 'donation' to the underlying Inverse Finance sDOLA vault. This artificially inflated the sDOLA-to-DOLA exchange rate from approximately 1.188 to 1.358 — a roughly 14% distortion. The manipulated price signal was consumed by the LlamaLend market's oracle, which classified multiple borrower positions as undercollateralized and triggered their liquidation. The attacker profited approximately $240,000 from the forced liquidations. Lenders in the market were unaffected; borrowers using sDOLA as collateral suffered losses. Non-leveraged sDOLA holders incidentally gained approximately 14% in value from the rate distortion. Curve Finance confirmed the incident on X (formerly Twitter) and stated that the vulnerability arose from a combination of which price oracle was used for sDOLA and how much sDOLA existed outside of collateralized positions in the affected market. The team indicated the pool creator's oracle configuration was a contributing factor, noting that an alternative oracle framework originally designed for two-way LlamaLend markets — not yet deployed — may have been more resistant to donation-style manipulation. CRV declined approximately 3.5% in the 24 hours following the exploit announcement, with the token already down roughly 20% over the prior month.","heading":"March 2026 sDOLA Oracle Manipulation Attack","sources":[{"url":"https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/finance/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","name":"bitcoinethereumnews.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://nulltx.com/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","name":"nulltx.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://x.com/CurveFinance/status/2028427216401342496","name":"x.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/curve-investigates-attack-on-sdola-llamalend-market-63826","name":"phemex.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.mexc.com/news/840010","name":"mexc.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/crv-price-llamalend-exploit-sentiment-support-2026/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On October 10, 2025, a broad cryptocurrency market crash — attributed in part to a tariff announcement from U.S. President Trump that triggered what analysts described as the largest single-day leveraged liquidation event on record, with approximately $19 billion in positions unwound within hours — caused the LlamaLend CRV-long market to accrue bad debt. The CRV-long market allows users to borrow crvUSD against CRV collateral, effectively a leveraged long position on CRV. As CRV prices fell rapidly, automated liquidations were unable to execute in time due to simultaneous network congestion driving up gas costs, leaving lender deposits approximately 70% backed and the vault approximately $700,000 underbacked. Unlike the June 2024 event, no party immediately stepped forward to cover the shortfall. Lenders found themselves unable to withdraw their full deposits. In April 2026, Egorov proposed a permissionless, market-based recovery mechanism: a dedicated Curve Stableswap pool centered around 71% solvency that would allow distressed vault-token holders to sell their claims at a discount to buyers willing to speculate on CRV's eventual recovery. The approach was explicitly positioned as an alternative to coordinated industry bailouts, such as the $160 million DeFi United coalition assembled to cover Aave's concurrent $200-230 million bad debt from the KelpDAO rsETH exploit. As of the time of this investigation, the CRV-long LlamaLend market bad debt remained unresolved pending community adoption of the proposed mechanism.","heading":"October 2025 CRV-Long Market Bad Debt ($700K)","sources":[{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/04/27/curve-founder-pitches-market-based-fix-for-usd700k-bad-debt-in-contrast-to-aave-bailout","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/curves-new-bad-debt-pools-turn-losses-into-tradable-claims/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://blockonomi.com/curve-finance-launches-recovery-path-for-affected-crv-long-llamalend-market-lenders/","name":"blockonomi.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/398958/better-than-bailouts-curve-founder-proposes-market-based-bad-debt-recovery-model-for-defi-lending-amid-kelpdao-fallout","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.panewslab.com/en/articles/019dcc94-42ea-752e-9aab-1c988b2be01f","name":"panewslab.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On May 27, 2026, Stake DAO — a yield optimization protocol that wrapped CRV positions via a liquid locker product — was exploited when an attacker compromised the protocol's deployer private key and used it to reconfigure the LayerZero v2 cross-chain adapter for the vsdCRV token on Arbitrum. The attacker minted approximately 5.4 trillion vsdCRV tokens on Arbitrum, which were technically backed by real vsdCRV on Ethereum mainnet. Because Stake DAO contributors moved quickly to secure the Ethereum-side backing before the attacker could bridge and redeem the tokens, actual extracted value was limited to approximately 43.78 ETH (approximately $91,000) due to near-zero DEX liquidity in vsdCRV pools. The incident directly affected a Curve LlamaLend market on Arbitrum that used asdCRV (Stake DAO's autocompounding CRV product) as collateral. That market was formally sunset, and Stake DAO directed all crvUSD depositors to move funds to other LlamaLend markets. The exploit illustrates the layered third-party risk that permissionless LlamaLend markets can introduce: the core Curve protocol was not compromised, but users of a specific market bore the operational disruption caused by a vulnerable collateral issuer. Stake DAO confirmed that its core products — boosted yields, other liquid lockers, Votemarket, and Morpho-based lending — were unaffected.","heading":"May 2026 Stake DAO vsdCRV Exploit and LlamaLend Market Sunsetting","sources":[{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/28/stake-dao-assures-users-after-vsdcrv-exploit-and-bridge-shutdown/","name":"cryptotimes.io","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/402719/security-researchers-flag-ongoing-stakedao-exploit-vsdcrv","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/stake-dao-exploit-vsdcrv-arbitrum/","name":"cryptobriefing.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://crypto.news/stake-dao-exploit-update-key-products-unaffected-bridge-closed/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://invezz.com/news/2026/05/27/arbitrum-based-stakedao-contract-hit-by-5-4t-vsdcrv-exploit/","name":"invezz.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"While predating LlamaLend's launch, the July 30, 2023 Vyper reentrancy exploit is directly relevant context for assessing Curve Finance's security track record. Multiple Curve Finance liquidity pools — including the CRV/ETH pool — were exploited due to a reentrancy vulnerability in Vyper compiler versions 0.2.15, 0.2.16, and 0.3.0. The bug caused reentrancy guard locks to fail silently, allowing attackers to recursively drain pools. The initial estimated losses reached approximately $70 million across multiple projects, including Alchemix, JPEG'd, and Metronome. White-hat hackers, MEV bots, and community members assisted with fund recovery, ultimately bringing confirmed losses down to roughly $52 million. The CRV/ETH pool alone was exploited twice for over $18.5 million. The incident triggered what became the June 2024 bad-debt cascade, as Egorov had taken on large leveraged borrowing positions in part anticipating that Curve would recover from the 2023 incident. Chainalysis published a detailed flow-of-funds analysis. The exploit did not affect crvUSD's peg stability or LlamaLend markets directly, as LlamaLend launched after the 2023 incident.","heading":"Background: July 2023 Vyper Reentrancy Exploit (Curve Finance Broadly)","sources":[{"url":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/curve-finance-liquidity-pool-hack/","name":"chainalysis.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/01/curve-finances-62m-exploit-exposes-larger-issues-for-defi-ecosystem/","name":"techcrunch.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://blockworks.com/news/curve-suffers-exploit","name":"blockworks.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023","name":"halborn.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.bitget.com/academy/curve-finance-hack","name":"bitget.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"The LLAMMA soft-liquidation mechanism is LlamaLend's most distinctive feature but also introduces user risks that differ materially from traditional lending protocols. Borrowers whose collateral enters the liquidation range experience ongoing collateral conversion between the collateral asset and crvUSD as market prices fluctuate. During periods of sustained price volatility or 'market chop' — repeated oscillations without directional trend — the mechanism continuously buys and sells collateral, accumulating loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) costs in both directions. Additionally, once a position enters soft-liquidation mode, borrowers cannot add collateral or partially withdraw it, limiting their ability to self-manage risk. Curve's official documentation acknowledges that if collateral price drops sharply over a short interval, health can decline rapidly and full liquidation may follow. Cure's LlamaRisk risk management team has published agent-based simulation frameworks for calibrating loan_discount and liquidation_discount parameters per market, and maintains alert systems for suboptimal parameter configurations. The October 2025 bad-debt event demonstrated a key edge case: when gas costs spike simultaneously with a market crash, the arbitrage incentive driving soft-liquidation becomes uneconomical, preventing timely rebalancing and leaving positions underwater. LlamaLend v2 is reportedly under development as of early 2026 and is expected to address some of these edge cases.","heading":"LLAMMA Mechanism: Known Risks and Soft-Liquidation Losses","sources":[{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/risks-security/risks/lending/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.llamarisk.com/research/curve-lending","name":"llamarisk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://llamarisk.com/research/defi-money-risk-parameterization","name":"llamarisk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.ccn.com/analysis/crypto/curve-llamallend-founder-innovation/","name":"ccn.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/crvusd/loan-concepts/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Prior to the launch of LlamaLend, security firm Statemind completed a code audit of the platform's smart contracts, released on April 13, 2024. The audit identified 1 Critical, 1 High, and 4 Medium severity vulnerabilities, all of which were reportedly remediated before deployment. ChainSecurity conducted a separate audit of the Curve Stablecoin smart contracts, which underpin crvUSD and indirectly the LlamaLend infrastructure. While the audited core contracts are considered battle-tested relative to many DeFi protocols, the permissionless market factory model introduces a persistent risk surface: any party can deploy a new LlamaLend market using any token as collateral, and Curve does not formally vet or endorse collateral assets or oracle configurations used in such markets. The sDOLA attack in March 2026 was explicitly linked to the oracle configuration chosen by the market's creator — an improper design that made the oracle susceptible to donation-style manipulation. Curve's documentation warns users that permissionlessly deployed markets may carry exchange-rate volatility, smart contract, and liquidity risks from unvetted collateral.","heading":"Pre-Launch Audit and Permissionless Market Risk","sources":[{"url":"https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2120482","name":"chaincatcher.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://docs.curve.finance/assets/pdf/audits/ChainSecurity_Curve_Curve_Stablecoin_audit_250221.pdf","name":"docs.curve.finance","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/curve-stablecoin","name":"chainsecurity.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/risks-security/risks/lending/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Michael Egorov, Curve Finance's founder and the primary developer behind LlamaLend, has been the subject of sustained governance concentration concerns. At the time of the June 2024 liquidation event, Egorov controlled approximately 427–460 million CRV tokens — representing roughly 47% of circulating supply — and had pledged the majority of this holding as collateral across multiple lending platforms simultaneously. This concentration meant that liquidation pressure on Egorov's positions directly threatened the market stability of CRV itself, creating a circular risk: a CRV price decline could force liquidations that further suppressed CRV prices, destabilizing the very collateral backing LlamaLend's own CRV markets. The Defiant reported that accusations circulated in April 2026 alleging Egorov had engineered an elaborate cash-out scheme using CRV-backed borrowing to acquire personal real estate, then abandoned the community to absorb losses. The Crypto Times fact-check rated the core property acquisition and liquidation claims as verified but found the 'abandoned community' narrative overstated, given that the June 2024 bad debt was fully repaid. The October 2025 CRV-long bad debt, however, remained unresolved as of this investigation. ZachXBT, the pseudonymous blockchain investigator, flagged Curve LlamaLend as a concern, consistent with the recurring bad-debt events and founder conduct scrutiny. No regulatory action by the SEC, CFTC, or other government bodies has been publicly reported against Curve Finance or Michael Egorov as of May 2026.","heading":"Governance Concentration and Founder Conduct Concerns","sources":[{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/michael-egorov-promises-to-develop-curve-amid-accusations-of-elaborate-cash-out","name":"thedefiant.io","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/232464/curve-finance-ceo-michael-egorov-wife-mansions-australia","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/04/27/fact-check-did-michael-egorov-pull-100m-from-crv-to-buy-mansions-and-leave-bad-debt/","name":"cryptotimes.io","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://fintelegram.com/curve-ceo-michael-egorov-and-his-lavish-australian-villas/","name":"fintelegram.com","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"}],"timeline":[{"date":"2023-07-30","event":"Curve Finance liquidity pools exploited via Vyper compiler reentrancy bug (versions 0.2.15, 0.2.16, 0.3.0); initial losses estimated at ~$70M, ultimately ~$52M after white-hat recoveries. LlamaLend not yet deployed.","source":""},{"date":"2024-04-13","event":"Statemind releases pre-launch audit of LlamaLend, identifying 1 Critical, 1 High, and 4 Medium vulnerabilities — all reportedly remediated before deployment.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-13","event":"CRV drops ~28–30% following the UwU Lend exploit. Curve founder Michael Egorov's $95.7M in stablecoin debt backed by ~47% of CRV supply is liquidated across five platforms. LlamaLend CRV market accrues $10M in bad debt.","source":""},{"date":"2024-06-15","event":"Michael Egorov announces full repayment of the $10M LlamaLend bad debt, funded in part by a $6M USDT sale of 30M CRV to NextGen Venture Partners.","source":""},{"date":"2024-12-19","event":"Egorov liquidated again for 918,830 CRV (~$882,000) as CRV falls more than 12% in 24 hours, per CoinDesk reporting.","source":""},{"date":"2025-10-10","event":"Broad market crash — attributed in part to tariff announcement — triggers $19B in global leveraged liquidations. LlamaLend CRV-long market accrues approximately $700,000 in bad debt as gas spikes prevent timely liquidations; lender vault drops to ~70% solvency.","source":""},{"date":"2026-03-02","event":"sDOLA–crvUSD LlamaLend market exploited via flash-loan oracle manipulation attack. Attacker profits ~$240,000; borrowers in the market are liquidated; lenders unaffected. Curve Finance confirms investigation on X.","source":""},{"date":"2026-04-27","event":"Michael Egorov proposes permissionless market-based bad-debt recovery pool for the October 2025 CRV-long LlamaLend bad debt, centered at 71% solvency, as an alternative to bailout mechanisms.","source":""},{"date":"2026-05-27","event":"Stake DAO exploited on Arbitrum; attacker mints 5.4 trillion vsdCRV via compromised deployer key. Actual losses limited to ~$91,000. The Arbitrum asdCRV LlamaLend market is sunset; crvUSD depositors directed to migrate.","source":""}],"sources_used":[{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/lending/overview/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260215065701/https://resources.curve.finance/lending/overview/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-15T06:57:01+00:00"},{"url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-llamalend","name":"defillama.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251012181731/https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-llamalend","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-10-12T18:17:31+00:00"},{"url":"https://docs.curve.finance/lending/overview/","name":"docs.curve.finance","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260208231559/https://docs.curve.finance/lending/overview/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-08T23:15:59+00:00"},{"url":"https://mixbytes.io/blog/modern-defi-lending-protocols-how-its-made-curve-llamalend","name":"mixbytes.io","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260607111818/https://mixbytes.io/blog/modern-defi-lending-protocols-how-its-made-curve-llamalend","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-06-07T11:18:18+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2024/06/13/crv-slides-30-as-loans-tied-to-curves-founder-face-liquidation-risk","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-ceo-clarifies-uwu-hack-misinformation","name":"cointelegraph.com","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829113511/https://cointelegraph.com/news/curve-ceo-clarifies-uwu-hack-misinformation","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T11:35:11+00:00"},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-suffers-massive-liquidations","name":"thedefiant.io","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260409185336/https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-suffers-massive-liquidations","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-09T18:53:36+00:00"},{"url":"https://protos.com/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-hit-amid-22m-crv-liquidation-cascade/","name":"protos.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260316000354/https://protos.com/curve-finance-founder-michael-egorov-hit-amid-22m-crv-liquidation-cascade/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-03-16T00:03:54+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/232464/curve-finance-ceo-michael-egorov-wife-mansions-australia","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:no-request","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/04/27/fact-check-did-michael-egorov-pull-100m-from-crv-to-buy-mansions-and-leave-bad-debt/","name":"cryptotimes.io","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829085652/https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/04/27/fact-check-did-michael-egorov-pull-100m-from-crv-to-buy-mansions-and-leave-bad-debt/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T08:56:52+00:00"},{"url":"https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/finance/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","name":"bitcoinethereumnews.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260829023534/https://bitcoinethereumnews.com/finance/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T02:35:34+00:00"},{"url":"https://nulltx.com/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","name":"nulltx.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260417114746/https://nulltx.com/curve-finance-investigates-sdola-llamalend-attack-as-oracle-design-and-collateral-mechanics-come-under-scrutiny/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-17T11:47:46+00:00"},{"url":"https://x.com/CurveFinance/status/2028427216401342496","name":"x.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://phemex.com/news/article/curve-investigates-attack-on-sdola-llamalend-market-63826","name":"phemex.com","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829040253/https://phemex.com/news/article/curve-investigates-attack-on-sdola-llamalend-market-63826","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T04:02:53+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.mexc.com/news/840010","name":"mexc.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:gone","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://crypto.news/crv-price-llamalend-exploit-sentiment-support-2026/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260308181510/https://crypto.news/crv-price-llamalend-exploit-sentiment-support-2026/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-03-08T18:15:10+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/04/27/curve-founder-pitches-market-based-fix-for-usd700k-bad-debt-in-contrast-to-aave-bailout","name":"coindesk.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260428120255/https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/04/27/curve-founder-pitches-market-based-fix-for-usd700k-bad-debt-in-contrast-to-aave-bailout","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-28T12:02:55+00:00"},{"url":"https://crypto.news/curves-new-bad-debt-pools-turn-losses-into-tradable-claims/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260812100359/https://crypto.news/curves-new-bad-debt-pools-turn-losses-into-tradable-claims/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-12T10:03:59+00:00"},{"url":"https://blockonomi.com/curve-finance-launches-recovery-path-for-affected-crv-long-llamalend-market-lenders/","name":"blockonomi.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/398958/better-than-bailouts-curve-founder-proposes-market-based-bad-debt-recovery-model-for-defi-lending-amid-kelpdao-fallout","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.panewslab.com/en/articles/019dcc94-42ea-752e-9aab-1c988b2be01f","name":"panewslab.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/28/stake-dao-assures-users-after-vsdcrv-exploit-and-bridge-shutdown/","name":"cryptotimes.io","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260808214407/https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/05/28/stake-dao-assures-users-after-vsdcrv-exploit-and-bridge-shutdown/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-08T21:44:07+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/402719/security-researchers-flag-ongoing-stakedao-exploit-vsdcrv","name":"theblock.co","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260527131259/https://www.theblock.co/post/402719/security-researchers-flag-ongoing-stakedao-exploit-vsdcrv","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-27T13:12:59+00:00"},{"url":"https://cryptobriefing.com/stake-dao-exploit-vsdcrv-arbitrum/","name":"cryptobriefing.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260809030329/https://cryptobriefing.com/stake-dao-exploit-vsdcrv-arbitrum/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-09T03:03:29+00:00"},{"url":"https://crypto.news/stake-dao-exploit-update-key-products-unaffected-bridge-closed/","name":"crypto.news","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260601093919/https://crypto.news/stake-dao-exploit-update-key-products-unaffected-bridge-closed/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-06-01T09:39:19+00:00"},{"url":"https://invezz.com/news/2026/05/27/arbitrum-based-stakedao-contract-hit-by-5-4t-vsdcrv-exploit/","name":"invezz.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:no-request","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/curve-finance-liquidity-pool-hack/","name":"chainalysis.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260508084821/https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/curve-finance-liquidity-pool-hack/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-08T08:48:21+00:00"},{"url":"https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/01/curve-finances-62m-exploit-exposes-larger-issues-for-defi-ecosystem/","name":"techcrunch.com","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829120148/https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/01/curve-finances-62m-exploit-exposes-larger-issues-for-defi-ecosystem/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T12:01:48+00:00"},{"url":"https://blockworks.com/news/curve-suffers-exploit","name":"blockworks.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023","name":"halborn.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260516234919/https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-vyper-bug-hack-july-2023","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-16T23:49:19+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.bitget.com/academy/curve-finance-hack","name":"bitget.com","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829043304/https://www.bitget.com/academy/curve-finance-hack","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T04:33:04+00:00"},{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/risks-security/risks/lending/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260215054556/https://resources.curve.finance/risks-security/risks/lending/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-15T05:45:56+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.llamarisk.com/research/curve-lending","name":"llamarisk.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260513062026/https://www.llamarisk.com/research/curve-lending","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-13T06:20:26+00:00"},{"url":"https://llamarisk.com/research/defi-money-risk-parameterization","name":"llamarisk.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260519092502/https://llamarisk.com/research/defi-money-risk-parameterization","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-19T09:25:02+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.ccn.com/analysis/crypto/curve-llamallend-founder-innovation/","name":"ccn.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20250914052727/https://www.ccn.com/analysis/crypto/curve-llamallend-founder-innovation/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-09-14T05:27:27+00:00"},{"url":"https://resources.curve.finance/crvusd/loan-concepts/","name":"resources.curve.finance","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260215065709/https://resources.curve.finance/crvusd/loan-concepts/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-15T06:57:09+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2120482","name":"chaincatcher.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260829044651/https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2120482","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T04:46:51+00:00"},{"url":"https://docs.curve.finance/assets/pdf/audits/ChainSecurity_Curve_Curve_Stablecoin_audit_250221.pdf","name":"docs.curve.finance","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260202104542/https://docs.curve.finance/assets/pdf/audits/ChainSecurity_Curve_Curve_Stablecoin_audit_250221.pdf","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-02T10:45:42+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/curve-stablecoin","name":"chainsecurity.com","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251214195054/https://www.chainsecurity.com/security-audit/curve-stablecoin","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-12-14T19:50:54+00:00"},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/michael-egorov-promises-to-develop-curve-amid-accusations-of-elaborate-cash-out","name":"thedefiant.io","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:no-request","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://fintelegram.com/curve-ceo-michael-egorov-and-his-lavish-australian-villas/","name":"fintelegram.com","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:no-request","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null}],"source_tags":["defillama"],"addresses":[],"reviewed":true,"reviewed_by":null,"model_used":"claude-sonnet-4-6","created_at":"2026-05-04T02:54:18.456921+00:00","updated_at":"2026-08-30T03:54:58.567919+00:00"}}