{"investigation":{"slug":"cetus-clmm","entity_name":"Cetus CLMM","trust_score":18,"severity_base":null,"score_modifier":0,"confidence":1,"status":"published","content_type":"investigation","summary":"Cetus Protocol is a concentrated liquidity market maker (CLMM) and the dominant decentralized exchange on the Sui Network, launched in 2023. On May 22, 2025, an arithmetic overflow vulnerability in its fixed-point math library enabled an attacker to drain approximately $223 million from liquidity pools in the largest DeFi exploit of 2025, of which roughly $162 million was subsequently frozen by Sui validators and later returned to affected users via an on-chain governance vote. The incident raised significant concerns about smart contract security, audit effectiveness, and the degree of decentralization on the Sui network.","sections":[{"content":"Cetus Protocol launched in 2023 concurrent with the Sui and Aptos mainnet launches, positioning itself as the primary concentrated liquidity infrastructure for Move-based blockchains. Its CLMM architecture mirrors Uniswap V3: liquidity providers deposit assets within a chosen price range, achieving higher capital efficiency than traditional AMMs. The CETUS token generation event occurred in May 2023, and the token subsequently listed on major exchanges including Binance and OKX. The project received seed funding from OKX Ventures, KuCoin Ventures, Animoca Ventures, and the Sui Foundation. The founding team has remained pseudonymous. By 2025, Cetus held dominant market position on Sui, serving as the primary liquidity venue and routing layer for the broader Sui DeFi ecosystem. The protocol had undergone multiple security audits prior to the May 2025 exploit, including reviews by MoveBit (April 2023), OtterSec (May 2023), and Zellic (April 2025), none of which identified the arithmetic overflow vulnerability that was later exploited.","heading":"Background","sources":[{"url":"https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-is-the-cetus-protocol-cetus","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.okx.com/en-us/learn/what-is-cetus-protocol","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://dedaub.com/blog/the-cetus-amm-200m-hack-how-a-flawed-overflow-check-led-to-catastrophic-loss/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"On May 22, 2025, at approximately 10:30 UTC, an attacker exploited a critical integer overflow vulnerability in Cetus Protocol's concentrated liquidity smart contracts, draining approximately $223 million from liquidity pools on Sui. This is the largest DeFi exploit of 2025 and the second-largest overall crypto hack of that year, behind the $1.46 billion Bybit incident.\n\nThe root cause was a flawed overflow guard in a function called checked_shlw, part of the protocol's u256 fixed-point arithmetic library. The function was intended to prevent unsafe left-bit-shift operations, but used an incorrect constant — comparing values against 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF << 192 rather than the correct threshold of 0x1 << 192. This permitted certain values that would produce an overflow to pass validation unchecked.\n\nThe attack unfolded in four stages. First, the attacker used a flash loan to acquire approximately 10,024,321 haSUI tokens and swapped a large quantity of SUI to depress pool pricing. Second, they added liquidity to pools using deliberately narrow tick ranges (for example, ticks 300000 to 300200), which triggered the vulnerable math path in the get_delta_a function. Due to the overflow, the protocol calculated the required Token A deposit as approximately 1 unit while simultaneously minting an astronomically large liquidity position (approximately 10,365,647,984,364,446,732,462,244,378,333,008 LP units). Third, the attacker immediately removed the inflated liquidity position, withdrawing real pool reserves. Fourth, this technique was repeated across multiple pools.\n\nThe attacker's Sui address is publicly recorded as 0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06. One identified attack transaction hash is DVMG3B2kocLEnVMDuQzTYRgjwuuFSfciawPvXXheB3x on Suiscan. An example attack transaction shows the attacker minting an effectively unlimited liquidity position from near-zero deposit, then redeeming it for the full pool reserves.\n\nFollowing the exploit, Cetus suspended its smart contracts to halt further losses. The resulting liquidity vacuum caused severe price dislocation across Sui ecosystem assets, with USDC liquidity effectively disappearing and many Sui-native tokens printing extreme drawdowns within minutes.\n\nPrior audits by MoveBit, OtterSec, and Zellic had each reviewed versions of the codebase without flagging this specific arithmetic path as a critical vulnerability. OtterSec's May 2023 audit included a lower-severity suggestion noting that casting u256 return values to u64 could cause arithmetic errors, but this was classified as a suggestion and did not specifically identify the exploitable path in get_delta_a.","heading":"The May 2025 Exploit","sources":[{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-cetus-hack-may-2025","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cyfrin.io/blog/inside-the-223m-cetus-exploit-root-cause-and-impact-analysis","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://blocksec.com/blog/cetus-incident-one-unchecked-shift-drains-223m-largest","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://dedaub.com/blog/the-cetus-amm-200m-hack-how-a-flawed-overflow-check-led-to-catastrophic-loss/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://cointelegraph.com/explained/how-220m-was-stolen-in-minutes-understanding-the-cetus-dex-exploit-on-sui","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cetus-protocol-hacked-for-more-than-200-million","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/cetus-protocol-hack-analysis","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"In the immediate aftermath of the exploit, Sui validators coordinated to freeze approximately $162 million in attacker-controlled funds that remained on the Sui network before they could be bridged out. This emergency action preserved the majority of stolen value but ignited a significant debate about the network's degree of decentralization.\n\nCritics argued that the ability of Sui's 114 validators to collectively block specific addresses and freeze transactions on demand reveals a level of central control incompatible with the decentralization claims made by most blockchain projects. Justin Bons, founder of Cyber Capital, publicly stated that Sui validators were 'colluding to CENSOR the hacker's TXs' and argued that Sui's validator set size and founder token concentration make it effectively centralized. YCC founder Duo Nine wrote that while the freeze may be good in this specific case, it demonstrates that 'SUI network can freeze your funds on demand' and that 'Decentralization is just marketing outside of BTC/ETH.'\n\nSupporters of the validator action argued that rapid coordinated response is a feature in the context of catastrophic theft, and that the alternative — allowing $162 million in stolen funds to bridge to Ethereum unchallenged — would have been far more damaging to the ecosystem.\n\nFollowing the freeze, Sui published an on-chain governance proposal to formally transfer the frozen funds into a multi-signature trust wallet for distribution back to affected users. The vote was conducted via on-chain stake-weighted voting, with the Sui Foundation's stake excluded to reduce perceived conflict of interest. Validators could vote yes, no, or abstain. The measure passed with validators representing 90.9% of total stake voting yes, concluding ahead of the scheduled deadline on May 29, 2025. The frozen funds were moved to a 4-of-6 multisig wallet with keys held by Cetus (2), the Sui Foundation (2), and OtterSec (2).\n\nThe episode drew attention to a structural characteristic of Sui's consensus design: with a relatively small and known validator set, coordinated off-chain action can meaningfully affect on-chain state, raising questions about how this capability could be used in future situations not universally viewed as clear-cut.","heading":"Sui Validator Freeze Controversy","sources":[{"url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/sui-vote-on-162m-frozen-cetus-funds-sparks-decentralization-debate-finance-redefined-may-23-30","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://beincrypto.com/decentralization-trust-shaken-cetus-hack/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://blog.sui.io/cetus-incident-response-onchain-community-vote/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.ainvest.com/news/sui-network-freezes-162-million-cetus-exploit-90-9-validators-approve-return-2505/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/sui-validators-votes-hack-the-cetus-hacker-and-return-160m/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2025/05/24/260m-cetus-hack-sui-freezing-funds-sparks-decentralization-concerns/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://bitcoinist.com/sui-220-m-crypto-hack-centralization-backlash/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"The attacker's primary Sui wallet address is publicly identified as 0xe28b50cef1d633ea43d3296a3f6b67ff0312a5f1a99f0af753c85b8b5de8ff06. On-chain records confirm the exploit began at approximately 10:30 UTC on May 22, 2025.\n\nFollowing the initial drain on Sui, the attacker moved quickly to bridge funds to Ethereum. According to blockchain investigator ZachXBT, the exploiter used Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol (CCTP) to bridge 61 million USDC from Sui to Ethereum across more than 60 discrete transactions over a 90-minute window. The primary Ethereum receiving address is publicly identified as 0x89012a55cd6b88e407c9d4ae9b3425f55924919b. Once on Ethereum, the stolen USDC and other assets were converted to ETH via a decentralized exchange aggregator, further complicating recovery.\n\nZachXBT reported that both the Cetus team and private sector experts requested Circle to freeze the attacker's USDC holdings on Ethereum. However, Circle blacklisted the address approximately one month after the exploit — by which point the stolen USDC had already been converted to ETH, rendering the blacklist ineffective for recovery purposes. ZachXBT subsequently cited the Cetus case as part of a broader pattern, alleging that Circle has declined to freeze or blacklist approximately $420 million in suspicious USDC transactions across 15 incidents dating back to 2022.\n\nThe $162 million in funds frozen on Sui represents the portion that did not successfully bridge out during the 90-minute bridging window. On-chain analytics firms including Elliptic confirmed tracing of the stolen assets through the Wormhole and CCTP bridge infrastructure.","heading":"On-Chain Evidence","sources":[{"url":"https://x.com/zachxbt/status/2040055823804793165","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cetus-protocol-hacked-for-more-than-200-million","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/396296/blockchain-sleuth-zachxbt-accuses-circle-slow-usdc-freezes-420-million-illicit-funds","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-how-a-shared-library-bug-triggered-the-223m-cetus-hack","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Cetus Protocol relaunched on June 8, 2025 at 03:00 UTC, approximately 17 days after the exploit. The relaunch was supported by a $30 million USDC loan from the Sui Foundation and $7 million in Cetus's own protocol reserves.\n\nAffected liquidity providers were offered a recovery rate of 85% to 99% depending on how severely each individual pool was impacted. The remaining shortfall — the approximately $60 million bridged to Ethereum by the attacker and not recovered — was addressed through a token compensation mechanism: Cetus allocated 15% of the total CETUS token supply to a dedicated compensation contract. Of this allocation, the entirety of the team's remaining unvested tokens (10% of total supply) were included. Five percent of the CETUS compensation tokens were made available immediately upon relaunch; the remaining 10% unlock linearly over 12 months beginning June 10, 2025.\n\nThe affected LP position NFTs serve as certificates enabling liquidity providers to claim their proportional CETUS compensation. Post-relaunch, all protocol functionality including swaps, LP management, fee collection, and rewards was restored.\n\nSecurity measures introduced post-exploit included mandatory audits before major releases and after significant codebase changes, audits triggered at key TVL milestones, and re-audits by OtterSec and MoveBit on the updated codebase. Additional audits were described as ongoing at the time of relaunch.\n\nThe protocol reported restoring over 50% of its pre-exploit TVL shortly after relaunch, reflecting a partial but meaningful restoration of user confidence. The $162 million in frozen funds was transferred to the 4-of-6 multisig trust wallet following the validator governance vote, with the Sui Foundation, Cetus, and OtterSec serving as key holders.","heading":"Recovery","sources":[{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/357386/sui-dex-cetus-protocol-restarts-platform-after-recovering-from-223-million-exploit","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/06/09/sui-s-cetus-dex-is-back-online-after-usd223m-exploit","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://unchainedcrypto.com/cetus-relaunches-protocol-after-recovering-162m-from-exploit/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://medium.com/@CetusProtocol/cetus-relaunch-incoming-recovery-plan-and-the-road-ahead-9fc0f8bd5c41","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/cetus-protocol-relaunches-restores-over-50-tvl-after-usd220-million-exploit","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2025/05/28/sui-network-steps-in-to-compensate-cetus-losses-in-full-after-223m-exploit","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"},{"content":"Cetus Protocol carries elevated risk across several dimensions as of mid-2026.\n\nSmart Contract Risk: The May 2025 exploit demonstrated that multiple professional security audits — by MoveBit, OtterSec, and Zellic — failed to identify the critical arithmetic overflow in checked_shlw. The vulnerability resided in a shared fixed-point math library, a class of risk that can affect multiple downstream protocols simultaneously. The protocol has since introduced additional audit requirements and post-exploit re-audits, but the prior track record warrants ongoing scrutiny.\n\nFunds Recovery Risk: Approximately $60 million in user funds was irreversibly lost to the Ethereum-based attacker and converted to ETH. LP compensation for this shortfall is being made via CETUS token emissions, exposing affected users to CETUS token price risk over the 12-month vesting period.\n\nDecentralization / Censorship Risk: The Sui validator action demonstrated that the network can coordinate to freeze or block specific addresses, a capability that resolved favorably in this instance but introduces a structural counterparty risk for all Sui-native assets. Users whose assets are on Sui are exposed to this mechanism being applied in ways they may not sanction in the future.\n\nStablecoin Freeze Dependency: The response also revealed reliance on Circle's willingness to act swiftly on USDC freeze requests. Circle's month-long delay in blacklisting the attacker's Ethereum address allowed the stolen USDC to be converted to ETH. This dependency exists for any protocol that relies on USDC as a primary liquidity asset.\n\nAnonymous Team: The founding team has not publicly identified themselves, limiting accountability in the event of future incidents.\n\nDespite these risks, the protocol demonstrated meaningful resilience: the majority of stolen funds were recovered and returned, the relaunch achieved partial TVL restoration quickly, and post-incident security processes were strengthened. Trust score is assigned at 18/100, reflecting the severity of the exploit, the magnitude of unrecovered funds, the decentralization concerns exposed, and residual uncertainty around long-term security posture.","heading":"Risk Assessment","sources":[{"url":"https://blockworks.co/news/sui-cetus-exploit-dex-security","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.cyfrin.io/blog/inside-the-223m-cetus-exploit-root-cause-and-impact-analysis","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/396296/blockchain-sleuth-zachxbt-accuses-circle-slow-usdc-freezes-420-million-illicit-funds","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3},{"url":"https://beincrypto.com/decentralization-trust-shaken-cetus-hack/","name":"","type":"other","credibility":3}],"severity":"medium"}],"timeline":[{"date":"2023-05","event":"Cetus Protocol launches on Sui mainnet with CLMM architecture; CETUS token generation event conducted","source":"","date_original":"2023-05-01"},{"date":"2023-05","event":"OtterSec and MoveBit complete initial security audits of Cetus smart contracts; arithmetic overflow path in get_delta_a not flagged as critical","source":"","date_original":"2023-05-01"},{"date":"2025-04","event":"Zellic completes audit of Cetus codebase; no critical vulnerabilities identified","source":"","date_original":"2025-04-01"},{"date":"2025-05-22","event":"Exploit begins at approximately 10:30 UTC; attacker exploits checked_shlw overflow bug to drain approximately $223 million from Cetus liquidity pools on Sui","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-22","event":"Attacker bridges approximately $61 million USDC from Sui to Ethereum via CCTP across 60+ transactions over 90 minutes; Ethereum receiving address: 0x89012a55cd6b88e407c9d4ae9b3425f55924919b","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-22","event":"Cetus suspends smart contracts; Sui validators coordinate to freeze approximately $162 million in attacker-controlled funds remaining on Sui","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-22","event":"Cetus team and private sector experts request Circle to freeze stolen USDC on Ethereum; Cetus offers $5 million bug bounty to attacker for return of funds","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-23","event":"Decentralization criticism erupts publicly; Justin Bons (Cyber Capital) and Duo Nine (YCC) argue Sui validator coordination demonstrates centralized fund control","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-26","event":"Sui Foundation publishes on-chain governance proposal to transfer frozen funds to a 4-of-6 multisig trust wallet held by Cetus, Sui Foundation, and OtterSec","source":""},{"date":"2025-05-29","event":"On-chain governance vote concludes early; validators representing 90.9% of stake vote yes; frozen funds transferred to multisig trust","source":""},{"date":"2025-06","event":"Circle blacklists attacker's Ethereum USDC address approximately one month after exploit; stolen USDC had already been converted to ETH, rendering blacklist ineffective for recovery","source":"","date_original":"2025-06-01"},{"date":"2025-06-08","event":"Cetus Protocol relaunches at 03:00 UTC with full functionality restored; Sui Foundation $30 million USDC loan and $7 million protocol reserves deployed to replenish liquidity","source":""},{"date":"2025-06-10","event":"CETUS token compensation vesting begins; 5% of total supply immediately claimable, 10% to unlock linearly over 12 months for affected LPs","source":""},{"date":"2026-04-03","event":"ZachXBT publishes broader analysis alleging Circle failed to freeze approximately $420 million in illicit USDC across 15 incidents including Cetus; Cetus case cited as exhibit of delayed response","source":""}],"sources_used":[{"url":"https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-is-the-cetus-protocol-cetus","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829224520/https://www.binance.com/en/academy/articles/what-is-the-cetus-protocol-cetus","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T22:45:20+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.okx.com/en-us/learn/what-is-cetus-protocol","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829181230/https://www.okx.com/en-us/learn/what-is-cetus-protocol","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T18:12:30+00:00"},{"url":"https://dedaub.com/blog/the-cetus-amm-200m-hack-how-a-flawed-overflow-check-led-to-catastrophic-loss/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260219095745/https://dedaub.com/blog/the-cetus-amm-200m-hack-how-a-flawed-overflow-check-led-to-catastrophic-loss/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-02-19T09:57:45+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-cetus-hack-may-2025","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260317034120/https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-cetus-hack-may-2025","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-03-17T03:41:20+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.cyfrin.io/blog/inside-the-223m-cetus-exploit-root-cause-and-impact-analysis","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260520130027/https://www.cyfrin.io/blog/inside-the-223m-cetus-exploit-root-cause-and-impact-analysis","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-20T13:00:27+00:00"},{"url":"https://blocksec.com/blog/cetus-incident-one-unchecked-shift-drains-223m-largest","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260416014056/https://blocksec.com/blog/cetus-incident-one-unchecked-shift-drains-223m-largest","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-16T01:40:56+00:00"},{"url":"https://cointelegraph.com/explained/how-220m-was-stolen-in-minutes-understanding-the-cetus-dex-exploit-on-sui","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251016185347/https://cointelegraph.com/explained/how-220m-was-stolen-in-minutes-understanding-the-cetus-dex-exploit-on-sui","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-10-16T18:53:47+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cetus-protocol-hacked-for-more-than-200-million","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260511093515/https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cetus-protocol-hacked-for-more-than-200-million","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-11T09:35:15+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/cetus-protocol-hack-analysis","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260515111652/https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/cetus-protocol-hack-analysis","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-15T11:16:52+00:00"},{"url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/sui-vote-on-162m-frozen-cetus-funds-sparks-decentralization-debate-finance-redefined-may-23-30","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260410233646/https://cointelegraph.com/news/sui-vote-on-162m-frozen-cetus-funds-sparks-decentralization-debate-finance-redefined-may-23-30","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-10T23:36:46+00:00"},{"url":"https://beincrypto.com/decentralization-trust-shaken-cetus-hack/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://blog.sui.io/cetus-incident-response-onchain-community-vote/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260417211144/https://blog.sui.io/cetus-incident-response-onchain-community-vote/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-17T21:11:44+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.ainvest.com/news/sui-network-freezes-162-million-cetus-exploit-90-9-validators-approve-return-2505/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/sui-validators-votes-hack-the-cetus-hacker-and-return-160m/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260624212738/https://www.dlnews.com/articles/defi/sui-validators-votes-hack-the-cetus-hacker-and-return-160m/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-06-24T21:27:38+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.cryptotimes.io/2025/05/24/260m-cetus-hack-sui-freezing-funds-sparks-decentralization-concerns/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://bitcoinist.com/sui-220-m-crypto-hack-centralization-backlash/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251005225925/https://bitcoinist.com/sui-220-m-crypto-hack-centralization-backlash/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-10-05T22:59:25+00:00"},{"url":"https://x.com/zachxbt/status/2040055823804793165","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/396296/blockchain-sleuth-zachxbt-accuses-circle-slow-usdc-freezes-420-million-illicit-funds","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260404033139/https://www.theblock.co/post/396296/blockchain-sleuth-zachxbt-accuses-circle-slow-usdc-freezes-420-million-illicit-funds","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-04-04T03:31:39+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-how-a-shared-library-bug-triggered-the-223m-cetus-hack","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260511062523/https://www.merklescience.com/blog/hack-track-how-a-shared-library-bug-triggered-the-223m-cetus-hack","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-05-11T06:25:23+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/357386/sui-dex-cetus-protocol-restarts-platform-after-recovering-from-223-million-exploit","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20260115033659/https://www.theblock.co/post/357386/sui-dex-cetus-protocol-restarts-platform-after-recovering-from-223-million-exploit","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-01-15T03:36:59+00:00"},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/business/2025/06/09/sui-s-cetus-dex-is-back-online-after-usd223m-exploit","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://unchainedcrypto.com/cetus-relaunches-protocol-after-recovering-162m-from-exploit/","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20260829120458/https://unchainedcrypto.com/cetus-relaunches-protocol-after-recovering-162m-from-exploit/","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2026-08-29T12:04:58+00:00"},{"url":"https://medium.com/@CetusProtocol/cetus-relaunch-incoming-recovery-plan-and-the-road-ahead-9fc0f8bd5c41","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"error:no-request","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://thedefiant.io/news/defi/cetus-protocol-relaunches-restores-over-50-tvl-after-usd220-million-exploit","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":null,"credibility":3,"archive_error":"forbiddenaccess","archive_status":"unarchivable","archive_timestamp":null},{"url":"https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2025/05/28/sui-network-steps-in-to-compensate-cetus-losses-in-full-after-223m-exploit","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251117113150/https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2025/05/28/sui-network-steps-in-to-compensate-cetus-losses-in-full-after-223m-exploit","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-11-17T11:31:50+00:00"},{"url":"https://blockworks.co/news/sui-cetus-exploit-dex-security","name":"","type":"other","archive_url":"http://web.archive.org/web/20251107210243/https://blockworks.co/news/sui-cetus-exploit-dex-security","credibility":3,"archive_timestamp":"2025-11-07T21:02:43+00:00"}],"source_tags":["defillama"],"addresses":[],"reviewed":false,"reviewed_by":null,"model_used":"claude-sonnet-4-6","created_at":"2026-05-04T02:54:23.50194+00:00","updated_at":"2026-08-30T03:54:59.823664+00:00"}}