Fact-check findings

The reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.

1. #9[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

   “The stolen funds comprised approximately $289,900 in BUSD and $290,900 in USDT.”

   reviewerThe stolen funds comprised approximately $289,900 in BUSD and $290,900 in USDT.The BUSD figure is overstated by roughly $7,000 against the widely-reported PeckShield breakdown. Using the corrected figure also reconciles better with the page's own $573K headline total ($282,900 + $290,900 ≈ $573,800) than the original figures did (≈$580,800).
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   The stolen funds comprised approximately $282,900 in BUSD and $290,900 in USDT.
   citedbitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-r…tolen-in-attack/
2. #21[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “SlowMist publishes detailed post-mortem of the August 2026 CCTP exploit, flagging systemic cross-chain verification failures and warning of potential for larger attacks on higher-liquidity deployments.”

   reviewerSlowMist publishes detailed post-mortem of the August 2026 CCTP exploit on 2026-08-01, flagging systemic cross-chain verification failures.The stored date (2026-08-01) is impossible on its face: it predates the August 19, 2026 exploit the post-mortem analyzes, and sits out of chronological order relative to the adjacent timeline entry. Contemporaneous reposts place the actual publication around August 22, 2026.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   2026-08-22
   citedslowmist.medium.com/a-cross-chain-attack…ack-32a6183bce08
3. #25[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “Attacker drained ~$289,900 BUSD and ~$290,900 USDT.”

   reviewerAttacker drained ~$289,900 BUSD and ~$290,900 USDT (timeline restatement of the stolen-funds breakdown).Same underlying numeric error as the sections[1] occurrence; grouped under the same defect_group.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   Attacker drained ~$282,900 BUSD and ~$290,900 USDT.
   citedbitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-r…tolen-in-attack/

No source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.

1. #5[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview

   “with the CoinFabrik audit finding no critical issues at the time of review”

   reviewerThe CoinFabrik audit found no critical issues at the time of review.Could not locate the actual CoinFabrik report referenced by LI.FI to confirm severity findings.
   citedli.fi/knowledge-hub/allbridge-a-deep-dive
2. #6[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview

   “The protocol is part of Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol (CCTP) Alliance Program.”

   reviewerThe protocol is part of Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol (CCTP) Alliance Program.Allbridge's integration of CCTP is well documented, but no search turned up any Circle program formally named a 'CCTP Alliance Program.' This may be the page's own paraphrase of 'CCTP launch/ecosystem partner' status rather than a real named program.
3. #7[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Status and Recovery History

   “Allbridge continues to be listed as a participant in Circle's CCTP Alliance Program.”

   reviewerAllbridge continues to be listed as a participant in Circle's CCTP Alliance Program.Same unverified program name as in Protocol Overview; grouped under the same defect_group.

A cited source no longer resolves or no longer says what the page attributes to it.

1. #23[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

   “https://bitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-returns-most-of-the-573k-stolen-in-attack/”

   reviewerAllbridge Exploit: Hacker Returns Majority Of $573K Stolen Funds (BitcoinWorld, cited inline and in timeline).The page's own sources_used record already holds a working archive_url for this piece (Wayback, captured 2026-09-01), but the inline section source and the timeline source_url still point at the dead live URL with no fallback.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   https://web.archive.org/web/20260901073535/https://bitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-returns-most-of-the-573k-stolen-in-attack/
   citedbitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-r…tolen-in-attack/
2. #24[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the timeline

   “https://bitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-returns-most-of-the-573k-stolen-in-attack/”

   reviewerAllbridge BNB Chain exploit — $573K stolen (timeline entry citing the same dead BitcoinWorld URL).Same underlying dead link as the sections[1] occurrence; grouped under the same defect_group.
   Proposed correction (not yet applied)

   https://web.archive.org/web/20260901073535/https://bitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-returns-most-of-the-573k-stolen-in-attack/
   citedbitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-r…tolen-in-attack/
3. #26[link rot][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Status and Recovery History

   “https://lcx.com/en/cryptonews/allbridge-pauses-cross-chain-bridge-after-165m-exploit”

   reviewerAllbridge pauses cross-chain bridge after $1.65M exploit (LCX source, cited inline and in sources_used).No live or archived copy could be found. The same claim (pause after the July 2026 exploit) is independently supported by the NFT Evening source also cited in this section, so removal does not leave the claim unsupported.
   citedlcx.com/en/cryptonews/allbridge-pauses-c…ter-165m-exploit
4. #27[link rot][awaiting moderator]in the cited sources

   “https://lcx.com/en/cryptonews/allbridge-pauses-cross-chain-bridge-after-165m-exploit”

   reviewerAllbridge pauses cross-chain bridge after $1.65M exploit (same dead LCX URL recorded in sources_used).Same dead URL as the sections[5] occurrence; grouped under the same defect_group.
   citedlcx.com/en/cryptonews/allbridge-pauses-c…ter-165m-exploit

The cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.

1. #3[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview

   “Allbridge is headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine, and was founded by Andriy Velykyy.”

   reviewerAllbridge is headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine, and was founded by Andriy Velykyy.None of the four sources cited in this section actually state a founder or HQ. Independent sources (Dealroom, CoinDesk, CB Insights) corroborate Kyiv and confirm Velykyy as a co-founder, but also identify Yuriy Savchenko as a co-founder/CTO whom the page omits, making 'founded by' an overstatement of sole founder.
   citedli.fi/knowledge-hub/allbridge-a-deep-diveallbridge.io/company/
2. #4[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview

   “Security audits have been conducted by Hacken, Kudelski Security, Cossack Labs, and CoinFabrik, with the CoinFabrik audit finding no critical issues at the time of review.”

   reviewerSecurity audits have been conducted by Hacken, Kudelski Security, Cossack Labs, and CoinFabrik.The firm list is corroborated by LI.FI (independent research) but contradicted by omission from Allbridge's own current official audit page, which lists different firms (Quarkslab, Sherlock) not mentioned on this page at all. The specific claim that the CoinFabrik audit found 'no critical issues' could not be verified against any CoinFabrik report; a related CoinFabrik audit of a separate Allbridge-on-Stacks bridge found only medium/minor issues, which is circumstantially consistent but not the same engagement.
   citedli.fi/knowledge-hub/allbridge-a-deep-divehacken.io/audits/allbridge/docs-core.allbridge.io/product/security-audit
3. #11[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

   “Allbridge published a post-mortem in May 2023 committing to a structural fix: deploying a single liquidity pool per blockchain to make same-transaction flash loan manipulation structurally impossible, and adding withdrawal caps tied to LP token balances.”

   reviewerAllbridge published a post-mortem in May 2023 committing to a single liquidity pool per blockchain and withdrawal caps tied to LP token balances, plus a compensation plan.The single-liquidity-pool commitment is well corroborated. The specific detail of 'withdrawal caps tied to LP token balances' could not be independently confirmed in any source consulted — none of the retrieved coverage mentions a withdrawal cap.
   citedcryptonews.net/news/security/20754571/
4. #14[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2026 Flash Loan Exploit (Solana, ~$1.65M) — Repeat Vulnerability

   “According to reporting by CryptoComes and Startup Fortune, the attack was structurally identical to the April 2023 BNB Chain incident.”

   reviewerReporting by CryptoComes and Startup Fortune characterized the attack as structurally identical to the April 2023 BNB Chain incident, with reporting indicating the Solana deployment was not updated with the equivalent protections.The structural-identity claim is well supported. The specific claim that Solana was left unpatched is supported by TechTimes (cited elsewhere on the page) but not by the two outlets the sentence specifically names (CryptoComes/Startup Fortune), which describe the defenses failing without confirming they were absent on Solana.
   citedstartupfortune.com/allbridge-core-loses-…oan-trick-twice/en.cryptonomist.ch/2026/07/20/allbridge-…ash-loan-attack/

The cited evidence supports the claim as written.

1. #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview

   “Allbridge launched in July 2021 under the name Solbridge, initially focused on connecting Solana to other blockchain networks.”

   reviewerAllbridge launched in July 2021 under the name Solbridge, focused on connecting Solana to other blockchains.A CoinDesk speaker bio for co-founder Andriy Velykyy instead says May 2021, but the page's own cited source (LI.FI) matches the page's claim exactly, so this is confirmed against the cited source.
   citedli.fi/knowledge-hub/allbridge-a-deep-dive
2. #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview

   “Allbridge Core, launched in June 2022, focused on cross-chain stablecoin swaps.”

   reviewerAllbridge Core launched in June 2022, focused on cross-chain stablecoin swaps.Matches cited source directly.
   citedli.fi/knowledge-hub/allbridge-a-deep-dive
3. #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

   “On April 1–2, 2023, Allbridge Core's BNB Chain pools were exploited for approximately $570,000 through a flash loan attack.”

   reviewerOn April 1–2, 2023, Allbridge Core's BNB Chain pools were exploited for approximately $570,000 via a flash loan attack in which the attacker acted as both LP and swapper to distort the USDC/USDT (actually BUSD/USDT) pool ratio.Date, amount and mechanism are well corroborated across multiple outlets. Note: the attacked pools' second asset was BUSD, not USDC as the page's prose says elsewhere — see separate finding on the stolen-funds breakdown.
   citedbitcoinworld.co.in/allbridge-exploiter-r…tolen-in-attack/blockchain.news/news/allbridge-recovers-…n-crypto-exploit
4. #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

   “Allbridge paused the protocol, contacted the attacker on-chain with a white-hat bounty offer, and subsequently recovered approximately $465,000 of the stolen amount after the attacker accepted the arrangement.”

   reviewerAllbridge paused the protocol, contacted the attacker on-chain with a white-hat bounty offer, and subsequently recovered approximately $465,000 of the stolen amount.Directly confirmed.
   citedblockchain.news/news/allbridge-recovers-…n-crypto-exploit
5. #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

   “A compensation plan for affected liquidity providers was also announced.”

   reviewerA compensation plan for affected liquidity providers was also announced.Directly confirmed.
   citedblockchain.news/news/allbridge-provides-…for-hacked-users
6. #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Flash Loan Exploit (Solana, ~$1.65M) — Repeat Vulnerability

   “On July 19, 2026, Allbridge Core suffered a second flash loan exploit, this time targeting its Solana deployment.”

   reviewerOn July 19, 2026, Allbridge Core's Solana deployment suffered a flash loan exploit in which the attacker borrowed ~$1.12M USDC from Kamino Finance, distorted the USDC/USDT pool ratio, and netted ~$1.65M; funds were bridged to Ethereum and partially routed through privacy pools.All core mechanics corroborated across CoinDesk and Cointelegraph.
   citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2026/07/20/cro…ash-loan-exploit
7. #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Flash Loan Exploit (Solana, ~$1.65M) — Repeat Vulnerability

   “PeckShield identified the exploit.”

   reviewerPeckShield identified the exploit.Confirmed via independent reporting even though not directly cited inline.
8. #16[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2026 Flash Loan Exploit (Solana, ~$1.65M) — Repeat Vulnerability

   “Allbridge paused operations and asked arbitrageurs who had profited from the resulting pool imbalance to voluntarily return funds to a recovery address.”

   reviewerAllbridge paused operations and asked arbitrageurs who had profited to voluntarily return funds; no formal compensation guarantee was issued for the July 2026 incident.Directly confirmed.
   citedwww.coindesk.com/business/2026/07/20/cro…ash-loan-exploit
9. #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2026 CCTP Router Exploit (Base, ~$191K) — Forged Circle Attestation

   “On August 19, 2026, Allbridge's Base chain CCTP router was exploited for approximately $191,000 in USDC through a sophisticated cross-chain attack that was prepared approximately 24 days in advance.”

   reviewerOn August 19, 2026, Allbridge's Base CCTP router was exploited for ~$191,000; attack prepared ~24 days in advance via a forged MessageTransmitterV2 message on Polygon claiming a 1,000,000 USDC transfer with no actual burn, which Circle attested to.Could not fetch SlowMist's Medium post directly (403), but KuCoin's detailed repost of the same SlowMist analysis independently corroborates every specific figure and mechanic in this section.
   citedslowmist.medium.com/a-cross-chain-attack…ack-32a6183bce08www.kucoin.com/news/flash/slow-mist-reve…ing-verification
10. #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: August 2026 CCTP Router Exploit (Base, ~$191K) — Forged Circle Attestation

    “SlowMist's analysis concluded that the core flaw was that Allbridge 'blindly trusted the amount and message hash data provided by the attacker' without independently verifying that assets were actually minted or that the message originated from a trusted source.”

    reviewerSlowMist's analysis concluded Allbridge 'blindly trusted the amount and message hash data provided by the attacker' and recommended verifying message origin, mint confirmation, and balance changes; SlowMist warned the vulnerability class could enable larger attacks on higher-liquidity deployments.Direct quote attribution is consistent with corroborating secondary coverage of the same SlowMist analysis.
    citedslowmist.medium.com/a-cross-chain-attack…ack-32a6183bce08
11. #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Pattern of Systemic Security Failures

    “Across three separate incidents spanning April 2023 to August 2026, Allbridge has suffered security losses totaling approximately $2.41 million (before recoveries).”

    reviewerAcross three incidents (April 2023–August 2026), Allbridge suffered security losses totaling approximately $2.41 million before recoveries.Internally consistent sum of the page's own reported incident totals. If the BUSD figure correction above is applied, the first-incident total stays at ~$573K, so this sum is unaffected.
12. #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Pattern of Systemic Security Failures

    “These are security failures experienced by the protocol; Allbridge is the victim in each incident, not the perpetrator.”

    reviewerAllbridge is the victim in each incident, not the perpetrator.Consistent with all reporting reviewed; no source alleges insider involvement.
13. #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: April 2023 Flash Loan Exploit (BNB Chain, ~$573K)

    “https://cryptonews.net/news/security/20754571/”

    reviewerAllbridge Hack Response — bridge locked, white-hat bounty offered, LPs opened for withdrawals (source link).Link checked live, resolves and supports the claim as labeled.
    citedcryptonews.net/news/security/20754571/