Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Alchemix Finance against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
2 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #5[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Overview and Mechanism
“The protocol is governed by the ALCX token, an ERC-20 governance and incentive token that launched without a presale or external fundraising.”
reviewerThe ALCX governance token launched without a presale or external fundraising.The 'no public presale' framing holds, but multiple outlets document a ~$4.9M OTC sale of treasury ALCX to named VC funds about a month after launch — directly contradicting 'without...external fundraising.' Notably, eGirl Capital, which the page itself ties to the founder, was one of the investors.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The protocol is governed by the ALCX token, an ERC-20 governance and incentive token that launched without a public presale, though the team sold $4.9 million of treasury ALCX in a March 2021 OTC round to investors including CMS Holdings, Alameda Research, Immutable Capital, and eGirl Capital.citedalchemix.fi/ - #29[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Team and Governance
“The token launched without a presale or external venture capital funding, and does not have a hard cap but follows a defined emissions schedule.”
reviewerThe ALCX token launched without a presale or external venture capital funding.Same underlying error as the Protocol Overview section's funding claim; eGirl Capital, cited two sentences earlier in this same section as linked to the founder, was itself one of the investors in this round.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The token launched without a public presale, though in March 2021 the team sold $4.9 million of treasury ALCX in an OTC round to venture investors including CMS Holdings, Alameda Research, and eGirl Capital, and does not have a hard cap but follows a defined emissions schedule.
unverifiable
3 claimsNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #16[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: July 2023 Curve Finance Vyper Exploit
“Alchemix subsequently committed to using patched Vyper compiler versions in future deployments and worked with Curve on a compensation plan for affected liquidity providers involving recovered funds and vested CRV tokens.”
reviewerAlchemix worked with Curve on a compensation plan for affected liquidity providers involving recovered funds and vested CRV tokens.Could not independently locate reporting on a specific LP compensation plan involving vested CRV tokens; the primary cited source (Medium post-mortem) could not be directly accessed (403 on fetch). - #31[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Operational Status
“The treasury held $12.41 million in assets excluding governance tokens.”
reviewerThe treasury held $12.41 million in assets excluding governance tokens.Could not independently confirm the $12.41M figure; primary source inaccessible (403). - #33[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Operational Status
“The alETH synthetic asset traded at approximately 0.9589 ETH and alUSD at approximately 0.9955 USD at quarter-end.”
revieweralETH traded at approximately 0.9589 ETH and alUSD at approximately 0.9955 USD at quarter-end.Could not independently confirm either precise peg figure.
stale
1 claimThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #26[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“For V3, Alchemix ran a $50,000 USDC crowdsourced audit competition via Cantina and relaunched its Immunefi bug bounty program with rewards up to $300,000.”
reviewerFor V3, Alchemix ran a $50,000 USDC crowdsourced audit competition via Cantina and relaunched its Immunefi bug bounty program with rewards up to $300,000.Two errors: (1) the $50,000 figure belongs to Cantina but 'USDC' denomination is unconfirmed for that contest — the USDC-denominated $100,000 competition was actually hosted on Immunefi, a separate event the page omits; (2) the $300,000 bounty cap cited was accurate as of an April 2026 announcement but has since been reduced to $150,000 per the most recent Immunefi listings, making this figure stale.Proposed correction (not yet applied)For V3, Alchemix ran a $50,000 crowdsourced audit competition via Cantina, a separate $100,000 USDC audit competition via Immunefi, and relaunched its Immunefi bug bounty program, whose maximum reward was later reduced from $300,000 to $150,000.
partially supported
4 claimsThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #19[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Euler Finance Hack — Indirect Exposure (March 2023)
“this indirect exposure was reportedly limited to approximately $1.38 million through Yearn's broader ecosystem.”
reviewerIndirect exposure via yvUSDC/yvUSDT Yearn vaults was limited to approximately $1.38 million.The $1.38M figure is real but represents Yearn's vault-wide indirect exposure, not a number Alchemix itself reported as its own share; the page implies this is Alchemix's exposure when it is really the exposure of the Yearn vaults Alchemix's collateral sits in. - #30[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Operational Status
“As of Q2 2025, Alchemix reported global deposits of approximately $45.35 million in total value locked, representing a 12.9% increase from Q1 2025.”
reviewerAs of Q2 2025, Alchemix reported global deposits of approximately $45.35 million TVL, a 12.9% increase from Q1 2025.The 12.9% growth rate and ~$45M order of magnitude are independently corroborated; the exact $45.35 million figure could not be verified because the primary Medium source returned HTTP 403 on direct fetch. - #32[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Operational Status
“Protocol revenue for Q2 2025 was approximately $780,000, a 17.9% decline from the prior quarter amid broader market conditions.”
reviewerProtocol revenue for Q2 2025 was approximately $780,000, a 17.9% decline from the prior quarter.Direction (decline) confirmed; precise dollar figure and percentage not independently verifiable, and third-party revenue trackers disagree substantially among themselves. - #34[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Current Operational Status
“Recent integrations include an Optimism deployment with a 100,000 OP grant for yield incentives, integration with HAI stablecoin borrowing, and the Holyheld beta debit card on Optimism.”
reviewerRecent integrations include an Optimism 100,000 OP grant, HAI stablecoin borrowing integration, and the Holyheld beta debit card.The OP grant and Holyheld items are independently confirmed by a secondary summary of the same report. No independent source could be found confirming an 'HAI stablecoin borrowing' integration specifically for this quarter.
confirmed
25 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“The protocol has experienced several notable security incidents since its February 2021 launch, including a June 2021 alETH transmuter bug (~2,700 ETH overclaimed), and a July 2023 Curve pool exploit (~$20M stolen and subsequently fully returned).”
reviewerAlchemix has experienced a June 2021 alETH transmuter bug (~2,700 ETH overclaimed) and a July 2023 Curve pool exploit (~$20M stolen and fully returned).Both incident summaries are independently corroborated across multiple outlets; the $20M figure is a defensible midpoint of reported ETH+alETH values ($13.6M-$22.5M). - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in the summary
“Alchemix has maintained operational continuity through each incident and continues to develop a V3 upgrade with an active Immunefi bug bounty program.”
reviewerAlchemix continues to develop a V3 upgrade with an active Immunefi bug bounty program.Confirmed; V3 development and bounty program are active as of the most recent listings found. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview and Mechanism
“Alchemix Finance launched in February 2021 as a self-repaying loan protocol on Ethereum.”
reviewerAlchemix Finance launched in February 2021 as a self-repaying loan protocol on Ethereum.February 2021 is the widely-cited launch month; the specific cited CoinDesk article (Oct 2021) does not itself state the launch date, but other sources corroborate it. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview and Mechanism
“and may borrow synthetic assets (alUSD, alETH) at up to 50% of their deposited value, with no interest charged and no liquidation risk.”
reviewerUsers may borrow alUSD/alETH at up to 50% of deposited value, with no interest and no liquidation risk.Mechanism is correctly described; the cited CoinDesk source doesn't itself state the 50% figure, but the official site and multiple secondary sources do.citedalchemix.fi/ - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Overview and Mechanism
“Alchemix expanded collateral types and yield strategies in subsequent versions, with V2 introducing modular yield adapters and V3 raising the loan-to-value ceiling to 90% for select strategies.”
reviewerV2 introduced modular yield adapters and V3 raised the loan-to-value ceiling to 90% for select strategies.Confirmed by the current official site, which markets the 90% LTV figure.citedalchemix.fi/ - #7[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2021 alETH Transmuter Bug ('Reverse Rug')
“The protocol was left undercollateralized by approximately 2,262–2,700 ETH (estimated at $5.3M–$6.5M at the time).”
reviewerThe protocol was left undercollateralized by approximately 2,262-2,700 ETH (~$5.3M-$6.5M) after the June 2021 bug.Range matches the spread of contemporaneous reporting. - #8[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2021 alETH Transmuter Bug ('Reverse Rug')
“Alchemix paused the alETH contract within approximately 15 minutes of identifying the issue.”
reviewerAlchemix paused the alETH contract within approximately 15 minutes of identifying the issue.Directly confirmed by the cited CoinDesk article. - #9[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2021 alETH Transmuter Bug ('Reverse Rug')
“offering 1 ALCX token per ETH or alETH returned, plus a special NFT for users who returned 100% of their excess.”
reviewerAlchemix offered 1 ALCX per ETH/alETH returned, plus an NFT for users who returned 100% of their excess.Consistent with multiple secondary accounts of the return program. - #10[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2021 alETH Transmuter Bug ('Reverse Rug')
“Co-founder Scoopy Trooples noted that recovering at least 25% was necessary to cover losses using existing treasury holdings.”
reviewerCo-founder Scoopy Trooples noted that recovering at least 25% was necessary to cover losses using existing treasury holdings.Directly matches the REKT interview. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: June 2021 alETH Transmuter Bug ('Reverse Rug')
“Within three days, more than 50% of the shortfall had been returned; the team deployed three additional recovery measures: a temporary increase in protocol fees, an ETH liquidity injection from the treasury, and a sale of DAI from the treasury for additional ETH.”
reviewerWithin three days, more than 50% of the shortfall had been returned.The three specific recovery measures (fee increase, ETH injection, DAI sale) were not independently re-confirmed in this review beyond the cited governance forum source, but the headline recovery percentage checks out. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2023 Curve Finance Vyper Exploit
“the attacker drained 4,821 alETH and 7,258 ETH from the pool, an amount later estimated at approximately $20 million.”
reviewerThe Curve exploit drained 4,821 alETH and 7,258 ETH from Alchemix's pool, ~$20 million.The exact ETH/alETH unit figures match Alchemix's own post-mortem (independently indexed); the dollar estimate is a reasonable approximation given valuation varies by source ($13.6M-$22.6M depending on what's included). - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2023 Curve Finance Vyper Exploit
“The Alchemix team was able to pre-emptively remove 8,027 alETH before the pool was fully drained.”
reviewerThe Alchemix team pre-emptively removed 8,027 alETH before the pool was fully drained.Confirmed via independent secondary coverage, as direct access to the Medium post-mortem returned HTTP 403 (likely bot-blocking, not evidence of dead content). - #14[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2023 Curve Finance Vyper Exploit
“On August 3, 2023, Alchemix, Curve, and Metronome jointly announced a 10% recovery bounty offer to the exploiter.”
reviewerOn August 3, 2023, Alchemix, Curve, and Metronome jointly announced a 10% recovery bounty offer.Directly confirmed. - #15[confirmed][no action needed]in section: July 2023 Curve Finance Vyper Exploit
“by August 5, 2023, all funds stolen from the Alchemix alETH–ETH pool had been returned.”
reviewerBy August 5, 2023, all funds stolen from the Alchemix alETH-ETH Curve pool had been returned.Confirmed via independent reporting. - #17[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Euler Finance Hack — Indirect Exposure (March 2023)
“On March 13, 2023, Euler Finance suffered a flash loan attack resulting in approximately $197 million in losses.”
reviewerOn March 13, 2023, Euler Finance suffered a flash loan attack resulting in approximately $197 million in losses.Well-documented, widely corroborated incident. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Euler Finance Hack — Indirect Exposure (March 2023)
“Alchemix publicly reported that it had no direct exposure to the Euler Finance exploit.”
reviewerAlchemix publicly reported it had no direct exposure to the Euler Finance exploit.No credible source found claiming Alchemix had direct exposure; consistent with broader reporting on which protocols were directly affected. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Euler Finance Hack — Indirect Exposure (March 2023)
“Euler's exploiter subsequently returned all recoverable funds by early April 2023, mitigating downstream exposure for affected protocols.”
reviewerEuler's exploiter returned all recoverable funds by early April 2023.Directly confirmed. - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“The V2 codebase was audited by Runtime Verification over seven weeks from November to December 2021, with the final report delivered on January 13, 2022; the audit covered core contracts including AlchemistV2, AlchemicToken, TransmuterV2, and TransmuterBuffer, and identified issues spanning low, medium, and high severity, several of which prompted major code changes.”
reviewerV2 was audited by Runtime Verification over seven weeks (Nov-Dec 2021), final report delivered January 13, 2022, covering AlchemistV2, AlchemicToken, TransmuterV2, TransmuterBuffer.Matches the primary source exactly. - #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“Additional V2 audits were conducted through Code4rena competitive audit contests.”
reviewerAdditional V2 audits were conducted through Code4rena competitive audit contests.Confirmed via Alchemix's own governance/substack posts and a public Code4rena report archive. - #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“In June 2021, iosiro researcher Ashiq Amien disclosed a high-risk access control vulnerability in the AlchemistEth contract via Immunefi; the setWhitelist() function lacked access control, theoretically enabling denial-of-service against yield harvesting. The bug was patched before exploitation and a $7,500 bounty was awarded.”
reviewerIn June 2021, iosiro's Ashiq Amien disclosed a high-risk access control vulnerability in AlchemistEth via Immunefi, patched before exploitation, $7,500 bounty.Matches the primary source exactly. - #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“In September 2023, a separate access control vulnerability was disclosed through Immunefi, in which the AlchemixHarvester contract's harvest function was callable by arbitrary Gelato task creators, enabling sandwich attacks on yield harvesting swaps; this was patched without user fund impact and a 1,000 ALCX (~$28,730) bounty was paid.”
reviewerIn September 2023, an AlchemixHarvester access control vulnerability was disclosed via Immunefi, patched with no user fund impact, 1,000 ALCX (~$28,730) bounty.Exact match to the primary source, including the USD valuation. - #25[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“An additional missing solvency check vulnerability was disclosed and patched via Immunefi.”
reviewerAn additional missing solvency check vulnerability was disclosed and patched via Immunefi.The underlying claim is accurate but understated — this was a more severe issue (could have allowed ~7,000 unbacked alETH minted, ~$11.7M at risk) with a materially larger bounty than the other Immunefi disclosures on the page; not flagged as disputed since the page makes no specific numeric claim here, but the omission understates the incident's severity relative to its peers on the page. - #27[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Audit History and Security Posture
“The protocol has also adopted the SEAL (Security Alliance) Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement and enrolled in Immunefi Magnus automated threat monitoring.”
reviewerAlchemix adopted the SEAL Whitehat Safe Harbor Agreement and enrolled in Immunefi Magnus.Both the SEAL adoption and Magnus enrollment are independently confirmed. - #28[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Team and Governance
“Alchemix was founded in February 2021 by a pseudonymous team led by a developer known publicly as Scoopy Trooples, who is also associated with the eGirl Capital DeFi venture collective.”
reviewerAlchemix was founded in February 2021 by a pseudonymous team led by Scoopy Trooples, associated with eGirl Capital.One lower-quality AI-generated aggregator (Dealroom) describes the protocol as 'founded in 2020, launched February 2021,' which would make 'founded in February 2021' imprecise, but this is a single weak source against the weight of evidence; not flagged as a separate finding. - #35[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Current Operational Status
“Binance removed ALCX from its VIP Loan service in March 2026, noted in contemporaneous reporting as a general risk review of volatile DeFi assets rather than a protocol-specific concern.”
reviewerBinance removed ALCX from its VIP Loan service in March 2026, framed as a general risk review rather than protocol-specific.The fact itself checks out, but none of the three sources listed for this section (the Q2 2025 Medium report, DefiLlama TVL, or the Q4 2024 X post) could plausibly cover a March 2026 event — this claim has no supporting citation on the page at all, which is a sourcing/traceability gap rather than a factual error.