← Aavereviewed 2026-09-09 · 26 claims checked
Fact-check findings
What an automated fact-checker found when it re-read Aave against the sources the page cites. Only the most recent review is shown.
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These findings are produced by an automated reviewer, and its results vary between runs: the same page, checked three times on the same day, came back with 15%, 20% and 34% of its claims disputed, mostly because each run extracted a different number of claims. Treat what follows as leads, not rulings.
“Disputed” means the reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. It does not mean the claim is false. “Unverifiable” means no reachable source settled it either way.
Nothing here changes the page on its own. A proposed correction is applied only after a human moderator approves it; until then the page reads as it did when reviewed.
disputed
5 claimsThe reviewer could not reconcile the claim with the evidence it cited. This is a lead, not a ruling that the claim is false.
- #7[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Kelp DAO / rsETH Exploit and Lazarus Group Attribution (April 2026)
“The attacker minted approximately 89,567 unbacked rsETH tokens and deposited them into Aave's lending markets as collateral, then borrowed roughly $190 million in ETH and related assets across Ethereum and Arbitrum.”
reviewerThe attacker minted approximately 89,567 unbacked rsETH tokens.The page's own cited primary source (Aave governance incident report) contradicts the '89,567 minted' figure -- that number is the amount deposited on Aave, not the total minted/released from Kelp's bridge.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The attacker minted approximately 116,500 unbacked rsETH tokens, of which approximately 89,567 were deposited into Aave's lending markets as collateral, then borrowed roughly $190 million in ETH and related assets across Ethereum and Arbitrum. - #8[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Kelp DAO / rsETH Exploit and Lazarus Group Attribution (April 2026)
“The attack caused Aave's TVL to fall by approximately $15 billion over four days and triggered $9 billion in protocol-wide withdrawal activity.”
reviewerThe Kelp DAO attack caused Aave's TVL to fall by approximately $15 billion over four days and triggered $9 billion in protocol-wide withdrawal activity.Multiple credible sources, including the page's own cited Yahoo Finance article, put the TVL decline in the $6.6-9B range in the days immediately after the hack, not $15B. A cumulative $12-15B decline was reported only over a longer ~6-day window.Proposed correction (not yet applied)The attack caused Aave's TVL to fall by approximately $8 billion over four days and triggered $9 billion in protocol-wide withdrawal activity. - #9[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the summary
“triggering an $8.45 billion, 48-hour deposit run that cut TVL from ~$45.8B to ~$28.6B”
reviewerThe Kelp DAO exploit triggered an $8.45 billion, 48-hour deposit run that cut Aave's TVL from ~$45.8B to ~$28.6B.This figure is both internally inconsistent (45.8 minus 28.6 equals 17.2, not 8.45) and does not match any external reporting. The $45.8B figure appears to conflate Aave's unrelated 52-week TVL high (~$45.9B, reached in October 2025) with the pre-hack TVL on April 18, 2026, which independent sources put at approximately $26.4B.Proposed correction (not yet applied)triggering an approximately $6.6 billion, 48-hour deposit run that cut TVL from ~$26.4B to ~$20B - #10[disputed][awaiting moderator]in section: Protocol Scale and Market Position
“with a combined ecosystem TVL approaching $25 billion across multiple protocol versions and chains”
reviewerAs of May 2026, Aave holds approximately $14.8 billion in TVL in V3 alone, with a combined ecosystem TVL approaching $25 billion across multiple protocol versions and chains.The $14.8B V3-alone figure is roughly consistent with reported data, but the additional 'combined ecosystem TVL approaching $25 billion' is not supported by any source found; total TVL across all Aave versions and chains as of May 2026 was approximately $14.5 billion, not ~$25 billion on top of that.Proposed correction (not yet applied)with total protocol TVL across all versions and chains at approximately $14.5 billion as of May 2026, down from a ~$30 billion peak in November 2025 - #15[disputed][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“2025-12-23”
reviewerThe brand asset transfer proposal was submitted and voted down (55.29% against, 41.21% abstain) on December 23, 2025.The 55.29%/41.21% vote result described in this timeline entry closed on December 25, 2025, not December 23. Kulechov moved the proposal to a Snapshot vote on December 22; the page's date falls between the two real dates and matches neither the initiation nor the actual result it describes.Proposed correction (not yet applied)2025-12-25
unverifiable
1 claimNo source the reviewer could reach confirms or contradicts the claim.
- #25[unverifiable][awaiting moderator]in the timeline
“Aave V1 launches on Ethereum, rebranding from ETHLend. Flash loans introduced as a novel DeFi primitive.”
reviewerAave V1 launched on Ethereum on January 8, 2020.The month and year are well established, but no independently fetched source pins the exact day (January 8) to confirm or contradict it.
stale
1 claimThe claim was accurate when written but events since have overtaken it.
- #14[stale][awaiting moderator]in section: North Korea Sanctions / Court Action (May 2026)
“As of early May 2026, the litigation was ongoing.”
reviewerAs of early May 2026, the North Korea/Gerstein Harrow litigation over the $71 million was ongoing, with no further resolution described.The page's sources (all dated May 5-6, 2026 or archived by early May) predate a significant May 9, 2026 court ruling that is not reflected anywhere on the page. The section's closing sentence is stale rather than technically false, but omits a material development that changes the state of the dispute.Proposed correction (not yet applied)On May 9, 2026, a federal judge modified the restraining notice to allow Arbitrum governance to transfer the $71 million in ETH to an Aave-controlled wallet without participants incurring liability, while Aave agreed to remain bound by the restraining notice and North Korea terror-judgment creditors retained their underlying legal claim to the funds; the dispute over ultimate ownership remained unresolved.
partially supported
1 claimThe cited evidence supports part of the claim but not all of it.
- #17[partially supported][awaiting moderator]in section: Historical Security Incidents and Smart Contract Risks
“Trader Avraham Eisenberg — who had earlier drained Mango Markets — accumulated a 92 million CRV short position on Aave over several days, collateralized with approximately 57 million USDC.”
reviewerAvraham Eisenberg accumulated a 92 million CRV short position on Aave collateralized with approximately 57 million USDC, was liquidated in a squeeze, and left Aave with ~$1.6 million in bad debt.The core narrative (92M CRV short, community squeeze, ~$1.6M bad debt, ~$10M loss to Eisenberg) is confirmed. The $57 million USDC collateral figure is a reasonable approximation of a value that changed over the course of the position (reported between $50M and $63.6M) but is not independently pinned down at exactly 57M.
confirmed
18 claimsThe cited evidence supports the claim as written.
- #1[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Founding
“Aave was founded by Stani Kulechov, a Finnish lawyer born in Estonia on January 13, 1991.”
reviewerStani Kulechov is a Finnish lawyer born in Estonia on January 13, 1991, who founded ETHLend/Aave.Independently corroborated by multiple secondary biographical sources. - #2[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Background and Founding
“In November 2017, ETHLend conducted an initial coin offering (ICO) that raised $16.2 million by selling one billion LEND tokens.”
reviewerETHLend conducted its ICO in November 2017, raising $16.2 million by selling one billion LEND tokens.Timeline date (2017-11-25) matches the confirmed ICO date; amount and token count check out. - #3[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“ETHLend conducts ICO, raising $16.2 million by selling one billion LEND tokens at $0.0162 each.”
reviewerETHLend ICO occurred on November 25, 2017.Date and math are internally consistent and match independent reporting. - #4[confirmed][no action needed]in section: SEC Investigation and Regulatory Exposure
“On December 16, 2025, the SEC closed its investigation without filing an enforcement action.”
reviewerThe SEC closed its investigation into Aave on December 16, 2025 without enforcement action.Widely corroborated across multiple outlets, consistent with page's framing (not an exoneration). - #5[confirmed][no action needed]in section: SEC Investigation and Regulatory Exposure
“SEC crypto enforcement fell approximately 60% in 2025 compared to 2024, from 33 actions to 13, coinciding with the tenure of new SEC Chair Paul Atkins and a shift toward a more collaborative regulatory posture.”
reviewerSEC crypto enforcement actions fell approximately 60% in 2025 versus 2024 (33 to 13), coinciding with Paul Atkins' tenure.Confirmed by Cornerstone Research analysis independent of the page's cited source. - #6[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Kelp DAO / rsETH Exploit and Lazarus Group Attribution (April 2026)
“On April 18, 2026, an attacker exploited Kelp DAO's cross-chain bridge infrastructure, ultimately draining approximately $292 million from the broader DeFi ecosystem.”
reviewerOn April 18, 2026, an attacker exploited Kelp DAO's cross-chain bridge, draining approximately $292 million, attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group.Core facts (date, amount, 1-of-1 DVN root cause, Lazarus attribution) are well corroborated across CoinDesk, Halborn, and other outlets. - #11[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Kelp DAO / rsETH Exploit and Lazarus Group Attribution (April 2026)
“The Aave protocol ultimately faced approximately $196 million in bad debt concentrated in the rsETH–wrapped ether pair; recovery efforts were approximately 90% complete as of late April 2026.”
reviewerThe Aave protocol ultimately faced approximately $196 million in bad debt concentrated in the rsETH-wrapped ether pair; recovery efforts were approximately 90% complete as of late April 2026.Both the bad-debt figure and the 90% recovery figure (attributed to a Galaxy Digital researcher) are independently corroborated. - #12[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“Aave leads the industry 'DeFi United' coalition, raising over $300 million in ETH to contain fallout from the KelpDAO exploit across the DeFi sector.”
reviewerAave led the industry 'DeFi United' coalition, raising over $300 million in ETH to contain fallout from the KelpDAO exploit.Corroborated. - #13[confirmed][no action needed]in section: North Korea Sanctions / Court Action (May 2026)
“On May 5, 2026, Aave LLC filed a motion in federal court to lift the restraining notice, arguing that the frozen assets belong to Aave protocol users — not to North Korea — and that keeping them frozen risks 'irreparable harm' to the platform and broader DeFi ecosystem.”
reviewerOn May 5, 2026, Aave LLC filed a motion in federal court to lift the restraining notice on ~$71 million tied to North Korea terror-victim claims.Corroborated by multiple outlets (CoinDesk, CryptoTimes, Decrypt). - #16[confirmed][no action needed]in the timeline
“DAO approves 'Aave Will Win' framework: 100% of revenue from Aave-branded products directed to DAO treasury; $25 million grant approved for Aave Labs.”
reviewerThe DAO approved the 'Aave Will Win' framework on April 13, 2026, directing 100% of Aave-branded product revenue to the DAO treasury and granting Aave Labs $25 million.Core facts confirmed; the page omits the additional 75,000 AAVE token component of the grant, but this is a minor incompleteness rather than an error. - #18[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Historical Security Incidents and Smart Contract Risks
“In January 2023, Aave purchased 2.7 million CRV tokens to offset the residual bad debt.”
reviewerIn January 2023, Aave purchased 2.7 million CRV tokens to offset the residual bad debt from the Eisenberg incident.Corroborated. - #19[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Historical Security Incidents and Smart Contract Risks
“the mechanism has been used in attacks on third-party DeFi protocols, including the Beanstalk Farms exploit in April 2022 ($182 million) and the Euler Finance exploit in March 2023 ($197 million), both of which involved flash loans sourced partly from Aave.”
reviewerThe Beanstalk Farms exploit (April 2022, $182M) and Euler Finance exploit (March 2023, $197M) both involved flash loans sourced partly from Aave, without Aave itself being directly harmed.Well-established facts, consistent with the page's careful framing that Aave itself was not the exploited party. - #20[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Posture and Audits
“The V3.6.0 codebase was reviewed by Pashov Audit Group in November 2025, with one issue reported, none classified as critical.”
reviewerAave V3.6.0 was reviewed by Pashov Audit Group in November 2025, with one issue reported, none critical.Confirmed against the primary audit report.citedaave.com/security - #21[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Posture and Audits
“The V3 Risk-Steward contracts underwent formal verification by Certora in June 2024.”
reviewerThe V3 Risk-Steward contracts underwent formal verification by Certora in June 2024.Confirmed. - #22[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Security Posture and Audits
“Aave V3.3.0 was audited by Oxor in January 2025.”
reviewerAave V3.3.0 was audited by Oxor in January 2025.Confirmed; the audit firm is more commonly styled 'Oxorio' rather than 'Oxor' but this is a naming nuance, not a factual error. - #23[confirmed][no action needed]in section: GHO Stablecoin: Depeg and Stability Concerns
“By 2025, GHO's circulation had grown to over $3.5 billion, and peg stability improved, though the stablecoin continued to experience periodic deviations. Sources indicate approximately nine depeg events exceeding 1% occurred in 2025, most of which resolved within hours.”
reviewerGHO launched in July 2023 and grew to over $3.5 billion in circulation by mid-2025, with approximately nine depeg events exceeding 1% in 2025.Confirmed by independent sources. - #24[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Protocol Scale and Market Position
“Aave V4, launched March 30, 2026, introduced a hub-and-spoke architecture replacing fragmented liquidity pools.”
reviewerAave V4 launched on Ethereum on March 30, 2026 with a hub-and-spoke architecture.Confirmed. - #26[confirmed][no action needed]in section: Historical Security Incidents and Smart Contract Risks
“A periphery contract (the ParaSwapRepayAdapter) was separately exploited for approximately $56,000; this contract is not part of the core Aave protocol and no core user funds were reported at risk.”
reviewerA periphery contract (ParaSwapRepayAdapter) was exploited for approximately $56,000; not part of core Aave protocol.Confirmed and cited source is live and on-topic.
How this fits together. The reviewer reads the published page and its cited sources and records one finding per claim. A human moderator decides whether each proposed correction is applied; those decisions, and the score changes they cause, appear in the audit log. Earlier review runs are not shown here; only the latest reflects the page as it stands.